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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN
╘╘╘╘Defendant.

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:

Ada County District Court
Reardon (District), Michael J.
04/02/2018
PRE-FILE01-18-2011
Police Reference Number: 18-002159
Prosecutor Control Number: 2018-0002945

CASE INFORMATION
Offense
Jurisdiction: County
1. Controlled Substance-Possession of

Case Type: Criminal

Statute

Deg

Date

I37-2732(c)(1)
{F}

FEL

04/01/2018 Case Flags: Ada County Prosecutor

TCN: ID1110267089 ACN: 1
01MPD - Meridian Police Department
Arrest: 04/01/2018
2. Failure to Appear (No New Offense) - FE
FFTA
FEL
TCN: ID1110267089

10/26/2018

Warrants
Bench Warrant - JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH (Judicial Officer: Reardon
(District), Michael J. )
11/01/2018
10:48 AM
Warrant Returned Served
10/29/2018
12:22 PM
Outstanding Bench Warrant/Det Order
10/29/2018
12:22 PM
Pending Judge's Signature
Fine:
$0
Bond:
$40,000.00
Any
Bench Warrant - JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH (Judicial Officer: Oths,
Michael J. )
06/12/2018
2:47 PM
Quashed
05/11/2018
10:52 AM
Outstanding Bench Warrant/Det Order
05/11/2018
10:52 AM
Pending Judge's Signature
Fine:
$0
Bond:
$20,000.00
Any
Bonds
Surety Bond
10/31/2018
2/8/2019
Counts: 2

#AC50-7546549 $40,000.00
Posted
Exonerated

Surety Bond
11/14/2018
10/29/2018
10/29/2018
7/20/2018
Counts: 1

#AC25-7544484 $20,000.00
Exonerated
Exonerated
Notice of Bond Forfeiture
Posted

Surety Bond
10/29/2018
4/3/2018
11/1/2018
Counts: 1

#AC5-7542350 $2,000.00
Notice of Bond Forfeiture
Posted
Exonerated

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CR01-18-15616
Ada County District Court
06/12/2018
Reardon (District), Michael J.
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
PARTY INFORMATION
Lead Attorneys
Hunt, David Mitchell
208-287-7700(W)

State

State of Idaho

Defendant

JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH

DATE

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

04/02/2018

Video Arraignment (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)

04/02/2018

Initiating Document - Pre-File Case

04/02/2018

Criminal Complaint

04/02/2018

Advisement of Rights - Felony Arraignment (Provided to Def.)

04/02/2018

Application for Public Defender

04/02/2018

PC Minute Sheet

04/02/2018

Arr. Minutes & Hearing Notice

04/02/2018

Order Appointing Public Defender

04/02/2018

Bond Set
2000

04/02/2018

Pretrial Release Order
Supervised

04/03/2018

Proof of Service
Notice of hearing 4/23/18

04/03/2018

Pretrial Release Order
Proof of service-PTRO

04/05/2018

Bond Receipt and Court Date
4/23/18

04/05/2018

Bond Posted - Surety
AC5-7542350 $2000

04/23/2018

Preliminary Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Gardunia, Theresa L.)

04/23/2018

Court Minutes

04/23/2018
04/26/2018

Groberg, Debra Anne
Retained
208-343-1000(W)
INDEX

Notice of Hearing
Stipulation
for Substitution of Counsel
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
04/26/2018

Request for Discovery

05/02/2018

Stipulation
to Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing

05/04/2018

Order
Granting Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing

05/11/2018

CANCELED File Memo/Review (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Gardunia, Theresa L.)
Vacated

05/11/2018

Probable Cause Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Vehlow, Karen J.)

05/11/2018

05/11/2018
05/15/2018

05/16/2018

Motion & Affidavit
Motion to Revoke & Affidavit of E. Flores
Warrant/Det Order Issued - Bench
Stipulation
Stipulation to Continue
Request for Discovery

05/16/2018

Response to Request for Discovery
State's Discovery Response to Court

05/21/2018

Order
to Continue

05/22/2018

CANCELED Preliminary Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Oths, Michael J.)
Vacated

06/12/2018

Preliminary Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Oths, Michael J.)

06/12/2018

Court Minutes

06/12/2018

Court Minutes

06/12/2018

Notice of Hearing

06/12/2018

Bound Over (after Prelim)

06/12/2018

Order for Commitment

06/12/2018

Exhibit List/Log

06/12/2018

Motion
to Revoke and Increase - Denied

06/12/2018

Warrant or Detention Order Quashed

06/13/2018
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
Warrant/Det Order Returned - No Service
06/13/2018

06/15/2018

Motion
Motion for Preparation of Preliminary Hearing Transcript
Order for Preliminary Hearing Transcript

06/15/2018

Information Filed
Info and Booking Photo

06/18/2018

Estimate
of Cost for Transcript

06/21/2018
06/22/2018
06/22/2018
06/22/2018

06/22/2018

Notice of Payment of Transcript
Arraignment (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
Court Minutes
Order
Governing Further Criminal Proceedings and Notice of Trial Setting
Plea (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
1. Controlled Substance-Possession of
Not Guilty
TCN: ID1110267089 :

06/22/2018

Motion for Disqualification of Judge
Alternate

06/25/2018

Order
Disqualifying Alternate Judge (Copsey)

06/27/2018

Transcript Filed
Preliminary Hearing 6/12/18

06/29/2018

Motion to Disqualify

07/03/2018

Order
to Disqualify (Carey as alternate)

07/10/2018

Notice of Hearing
(07/20/18 @ 8:30am)

07/10/2018

Motion
to Revoke and Increase Bond

07/18/2018

Notice
of Lodging

07/19/2018
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
Notice
of Lodging
07/20/2018

Hearing Scheduled (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
Bond

07/20/2018

Court Minutes

07/20/2018

Order Changing Bail

07/23/2018

Order
to Revoke and Increase Bond

07/24/2018

Response to Request for Discovery
Discovery Response to Court

07/25/2018

Notice of Service
Defendant's Notice of Service of Response to State's Request for Discovery

07/26/2018

Bond Receipt and Court Date

07/26/2018

Bond Posted - Surety
AC25-7544484

08/10/2018

Motion to Suppress

08/10/2018

Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Suppress Evidence

09/06/2018

Notice of Hearing
(09/27/18 @ 1:30pm)

09/10/2018

Response to Request for Discovery
First Addendum to Discovery Response to Court

09/11/2018

Motion
Motion for Preparation of Transcript

09/14/2018

Objection
State's Objection and Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress

09/18/2018

Order
for Preparation of Transcript

09/18/2018

Stipulation
Stipulation of Lodging

09/21/2018

Stipulation
Amended Stipulation of Lodging

09/26/2018

Motion
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
Motion to Rescind or Withdraw Order For Preparation of Transcript
09/27/2018
09/27/2018

Motion to Suppress (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
Court Minutes

09/27/2018

Exhibit List/Log
(Suppression Hearing)

10/01/2018

Order
to Rescind or Withdraw Order for Preparation of Transcript

10/19/2018
10/19/2018

Status Conference (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
Court Minutes

10/19/2018

Response
State's Post-Hearing Argument and Authorities

10/19/2018

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence

10/22/2018

Memorandum
Closing Arguments Memorandum In Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence

10/26/2018

Pre-trial Conference (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)

10/26/2018

Court Minutes

10/29/2018

Notice of Forfeiture of Surety Bond

10/29/2018

Notice of Forfeiture of Surety Bond

10/29/2018

Warrant/Det Order Issued - Bench

11/01/2018

Order
Quashing Notice of Bond Forfeiture

11/01/2018

Warrant Returned - Served

11/01/2018

Bond Receipt and Court Date
11/2/18

11/01/2018

Bond Posted - Surety
AC50-7546549 $40,000

11/02/2018

Status Conference (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)

11/02/2018

Court Minutes

11/05/2018

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
Vacated
2d
11/05/2018

11/06/2018

Miscellaneous
Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture & Exonerate Bond

11/06/2018

Certificate of Surrender
AC25-7544484

11/14/2018

Order
(exonerating bond AC25-7544484)

11/16/2018
11/16/2018

11/16/2018
11/30/2018

Status Conference (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
Response to Request for Discovery
Second Addendum to Discovery Response to Court
Court Minutes
Entry of Plea (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)

11/30/2018

Court Minutes

11/30/2018

Guilty Plea Advisory

11/30/2018

Rule 11 Plea Agreement

11/30/2018

Order for Pre-Sentence Report (PSI)

11/30/2018

Amended Plea (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
1. Controlled Substance-Possession of
Guilty
TCN: ID1110267089 :

12/01/2018

Report
PSI Documents

12/27/2018

Notice
of Continued Sentencing Hearing

01/25/2019

Pre-Sentence Report
Copy of Presentence Report

02/01/2019
02/01/2019
02/01/2019

Sentencing (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Williamson, Darla S.)
Court Minutes
Order to Transport
(02/08/19 @ 1pm)
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
02/08/2019
02/08/2019
02/08/2019

Sentencing (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
Court Minutes
Disposition (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
1. Controlled Substance-Possession of
Guilty
TCN: ID1110267089 :
2. Failure to Appear (No New Offense) - FE
Dismissed by Court
TCN: ID1110267089 :

02/08/2019

Sentence (Judicial Officer: Reardon (District), Michael J.)
1. Controlled Substance-Possession of
Felony Sentence
Confinement
Type:
Facility: Idaho Department of Correction
Effective Date: 02/08/2019
Determinate: 2 Years
Indeterminate: 3 Years
Retained Jurisdiction
Retained Jurisdiction:
Fee Totals:
Court Costs 285.50
Felony - Drug
Fee Totals $
285.50
Fee Totals:
Restitution (PA) Agency/Other
100.00
(Interest Bearing)
Fee Totals $
100.00

02/08/2019

Bond Exonerated

02/08/2019

Case Final Judgment Entered

02/11/2019
02/11/2019

Order of Restitution and Judgment
Interest Ordered on Restitution
Int Start Dt: 02/08/2019

02/12/2019

Judgment of Conviction, Retained Jurisdiction

03/20/2019

Notice of Appeal

03/20/2019

03/20/2019
03/25/2019

04/11/2019

Motion
for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
Order
for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender
Reporter's Notice of Transcript(s) Lodged
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
- Supreme Court No. 46886
04/19/2019

Amended
Amended Notice of Appeal

05/08/2019

Reporter's Notice of Transcript(s) Lodged
- Supreme Court No. 46886

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Defendant JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 6/11/2019

PAGE 9 OF 9
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DR#: 18-002159
Control #: 2018-0002945

CHRISTOPHER

unscacm

By VIOLETA GARCIA
DEPUTY

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Cathy A. Guzman
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 6773
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocsébadawebnet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

Case

NoOﬁOi ’l&’ 6(016

COMPLAINT

VS.
vvvvvvvvvv

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE me this

@— day of April

Guzman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County

of Ada,

State

2018, Cathy A.

of Idaho, who,

being

ﬁrst duly sworn, complains and says that: FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN, on or about
the

lst day of April 2018, in the County of Ada,

State

of Idaho, did commit

the crime(s) of:

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, FELONY, I.C. §37-2732(c) as follows:

CR01
CRCO

COMPLAINT (JACOBSEN)

Page

- 18

—

15516

Criminal Complaint

1

'

l

000011
|||I||||||||l||||||l|l||_|l||l|g

That the defendant, FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN, on or about the lst day

of

April 2018, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess-a controlled substance,
to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.

All of which

is contrary to the form, force and effect

against the peace and dignity

of

the statute in such case and

of the State of Idaho.
JAN M. BENNETTS

PM

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By: Cathy Afﬁuzman
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this 2-

Judg

COMPLAINT (JACOBSEN)

«5.
day

of April

2018.

4.x
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION

CHFII STOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By woman GARCM
DEPUTY

PROBABLE CAUSE FORM
STATE OF IDAHO

vs

060143“

CASE NO.

_
cIefIZIC

CLERK

J

-

I

)4 (JOY/3

Jill Lon hurst

PROSECUTOR:

h Guzman

L.

4

DATE

[5(0 / b

CASTANEDA

02

2018

TIME

CASE ID

10:30

byé‘l

BEG.

207

COURTROOM

END

/0 (/77

.

COMPLAINING WITNESS

INTox

JUDGE

STATUS

I

I:I BERECZ

EIMacGREGOR-IRBY

III BIETER

El MANWEILER

El CAWTHON

El MCDANIEL

lI

STATE SWORN

AI ‘

PC FOUND

C

WW3

COMPLAINT SIGNED

I

COMSTOCK

El MINDER

El AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED

I:I

ELLIS

El OTHS

El AFFIDAVIT SIGNED

D FORTIER
D GARDUNIA

D
D

I:I JUDICIAL NOTICE TAKEN

El HARRIGFELD

El STECKEL

D

El HAWLEY

I:

El SUMMONS TO

El KOTYK

I:I WATKINS

El WARRANT ISSUED

El KIBODEAUX

El BOND SET 5

REARDON

SCHMIDT

I:I NO

SWAIN

PC FOUND

EXONERATE BOND
BE ISSUED

El NO CONTACT
DR#

"

El (for)

El MOTION TO REVOKE 0R INCREASE
BOND FOR NON- COMPLIANCE W/PT
RELEASE CONDITIONS

El SET HEARING AT AR DATE ON

MOTION TO REVOKE OR INCREASE BOND
-

I:I DISMISS CASE
#1 IN CUSTODY

COMMENTS
1:] AGENTS

WARRANT

W/ JUDGE

D OUT OF COUNTY -RULE 5(3)
El FUGITIVE

PV AR set
COUNTY

BOND 5

(STATE)

[3 MOTION & ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE W/

,

CRO1—18—15616

‘I

CMINPc
Pc Minute Sheet
593327

PROBABLE CAUSE FORM

[REV

6/14]

000013

.

6801 —- 18— 15616
ARMN
Arr. Minutes & Hearing Notice
594155

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

VIDEO ARRAIGNMENT MINUTES
State of Idaho vs. FREDERICK JEREMIAH
JACOBSEN
JUDGE:

Case No. CR01-18—1 5616

mL

DATE24/2/2018

CLERK2D2/

INTERPRETER:

HEARING TYPE: Video Arraignment
Parties:
State of Idaho
Attorney:
FREDERICK JEREMIAH
Attorney:
JACOBSEN

Count
1

\

‘

~

{”ZWI

U

((6

6

Charge Description
Controlled Substance-Possession of

Case Called:

Charge Code
I37-2732(c)(1) {F}

5 50 96

Defendant: IZI Present El Not Present IX In Custody
PD Appointed C] PD Denied
E] Waived Attorney IX] Advised of Rights L—J Rights Waived
IXI Defendant Advised of Charges
[:1 Defendant Advised of Subsequent Penalties
Not Guilty Plea
E] Guilty Plea/Admit
Pre-Trial Release Order
|:| No Contact Order Issued

Z
I]

,

26°“ —-Z 00

Z/
Z/

17%

-

6UPUeA/1W

gagll 8

on

at

23

Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Boise, ID
.

I Release Defendant. This Case Only

(

(M) :2
83702, telephone (208) 287-7400.
/_______.

3&22 (aapm w/Judge

You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your
arrest, or default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infraction.
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE, ID 83702
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as
follows:
Defendant
Hand Delivered El
Via Counsel
Defense Atty
Hand Delivered E]
Intdept Mail
Prosecutor
Hand Delivered El
Intdept Mail

I:
I]
I]

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Signature:

of the District Court

By:

DATED:

Signed: 4/3/2018 10:51 AM

Deputy Clerk

VIDEO ARRAIGNMENT MINUTES

1

000014

CR01 — 18—15616
ABMN
Arr. MI nutes & HeaIng Notice
594155

Ill

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF iDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

III

l

VIDEO ARRAIGNMENT MINUTES

State of Idaho vs. FREDERICK JEREMIAH
JACOEISEN
JUDGE.

Case No. CR01-18-15616

ML

DATEz4/2/2018

CLERK_D2,

iNTERPRETER:

HEARING TYPE: Video Arraignment
Parties:
State of Idaho
Attorney:
FREDERICK JEREMIAH
Attorney:
JACOB SEN

Count
1

I]

5 50 9

PD Appointed

Defendant:

El PD Denied
Defendant Advised of Charges
Not GuiIZty
P1065

0
26°“ —-—-

2/

I‘ZWI

I/

I

C6

6

Charge Description
Controlled Substance-Possession of

Case Called:

Z

I

Charge Code
I37-2732(c)(1) {F}

Present

D Not Present

In Custody

[I

Waived Attorney
Advised of Rights C] Rights Waived
E] Defendant Advised of Subsequent Penalties
No Contact Order Issued
[:1 Guilty Plea/Admit
Pre-Trial Release Order

VIA”

I]

Supt/ﬂaw
.

LICIZEII

on

Z/

8

at

8330

@pm w/Judge

(MI

i

ﬂy.”

Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St, Rm. 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208) 287—7400.
-

I

I

Release Defendant, This Case Onlv

You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being Issued for your
arrest, or default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infraction.
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE, ID 83702
‘
that copies of
hereby

certify
Defendant
Defense Atty
Prosecutor

l

this noti
Hand Delivered
Hand Delivered
Hand Delivered [:1

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

I]

were sewed as follows:
Via Counsel |:l
lntdept Mail
lntdept Mail

I]
[I

Signature:

W

of the District Court

By:

DATED:

Deputy Clerk

VIDEO ARRAIGNMENT MINUTES

000015

CR01-18—15616

NO.

I

I

APR

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

02

20.8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OmlSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DAYSHA ZUBER
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTTéDF ADA
DEW”
(9“?
I
Case No. CIZO
State of Idaho

l- 8’

Pla'nt'ﬁ:
VS-

Pretrial Release Order
(

FQQOKQRICIC

daco bSCl/l

Defendant.

El Amended

BOND $ ‘2 0 00.

I

00

The above-named defendant has been ordered, as a condition of bond, to the following:
Unsupervised Conditions of
OR
ACSO Monitoring
1:]
ond
Ada County Sheriff’s Pretrial Services Unit (PSU)
Call by 9:00am next business day
(208) 577-3444
7180 Barrister, Boise ID 83704
Monday'through Friday 8:00am to 4:00pm
Basic Conditions for ALL types of pretrial release:
No new crimes
Attend all court appearances
No possession or consumption of illegal drugs; may only take medications as prescribed.
No possession or consumption of alcohol or frequenting establishments where alcohol sales are
primary source of revenue (This condition also applies if alcohol monitoring is ordered)
No violation of No Contact Order or contact with alleged victim ( )
I
I
MUCIT KEMAJH IN CITATE OF [PALfO . bwt M144 ‘I'I‘ZNd JrocrInGCm'aej U";
Other:
Ee riodic reporting to the PSU as determined by Sheriff’s Office Risk Assessment
'1‘ CWNCI ‘x W/ dour-I—
Defendant must provide accurate information to the PSU
FraceecIu/ﬂc. WIN)
Notify PSU of any contact with Law Enforcement
Defendant must notify the PSU of any and all changes in contact information (address, phone,
l’eIxun 4,,
employment, emergency contact information, etc.)
“Aw“
Alcohol Monitoring as determined post interview by the PSU to include urinalysis (U.A.), ankle monitor
emu—I- cIacI’C
ﬁnsdermal), or portable breath test
or Court determined: E] UA I:l Ankle Monitor E] Portable Breath Test
k, (M‘IKAQA'
E] Ankle monitor required prior to release from custody
gDrug Monitoring via random urinalysis (UA)
GPS El GPS installation required prior to release from custody
Other GPS Restrictions:
This Section for PSU Use Only
IPRAI: Y/ N Score:
ln-Custody: Y /N RLSD:
HR
Supervision Level: A B E
Charge:
Defendant is responsible for all associated costs for electronic monitoring or urinalysis fees at the time of
testing. Defendant will follow all pretrial program instructions given by PSU, unless self-monitoring. If
the Court of the alleged
Defendant fails to comply with any of these terms, the PSU will promptly notify
'
violations.
be taken i to custody for that purpose.
Defendant is subject to additional testing by court order and m
d for any alleged violations.
The Court may revoke bond and order Defendant to return

g

A

A

A

-

M‘A'

I17

|

Tt
Defendant

Judge

4'Izllg/
Date

Date

000016

CRO‘I —18

-—

15515

mg;

PTRO

Pretrial Release Order

_.

m.
—.

B

59

[,2

llIIIlIlllllllllllllllllllllllllll

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT QETIiSTOPHEFt

THE STATE OF IDAHQ. IN AND FOR THE COUN
Case No. C IZO
Idaho
State of
l
Pla'nt'ﬁ»
Eetrial Release Order
S'
Amended
BOND $ 2 o 00, oo
Famelﬁlrde UQC‘)
/
Defendant.

H 8'

ADA
é”:
W

D. ﬁriCt-l
By DAYSHA XUBER

Clem

DEW”

‘F

.

I050”

V

I

i

'I’he above-named defendant has been ordered, as a condition of bond. to the following:
Unsupervised Conditions of
OR
[:I
ACSO Monitoring
3 on d
Ada County Sheriffs Pretrial Services Unit (PSU)
Call by 9:00am next business day
(208) 577-3444
7180 Barrister, Boise ID 83704
Monday through Friday 8:00am to 4:00pm
B

sic Conditions for ALL types of pretrial release:

No new crimes
Attend all court appearances
as prescribed.
No possession or consumption of illegal drugs; may only take medications
alcohol sales are
where
establishments
frequenting
or
alcohol
of
No possession or consumption
is ordered)
monitoring
alcohol
if
applies
also
condition
revenue
(This
of
source
primary
l .—
I
No violation of No Contact Order or contact with alleged victim ( I
+ra.vcl
toﬁkGem-ge/
man
OF
U1;
Mu‘rT
ll7Al—IO.
IN
QTLTE
KEMAN
Other:
'
s
.
Assessment
Risk
Office
Sheriffs
“ud—
e riodic reporting to the PSU as determined by
Defendant must provide accurate information to the PSU
I7ra Leedwaci on L1 —
Notify PSU of any contact with Law Enforcement
phone,
return 4,,
Defendant must notify the PSU of any and all changes in contact information (address.
etc.)
information,
whew
employment, emergency contact
ankle monitor
Alcohol Monitoring as determined post interview by the PSU to include urinalysis (UA),
A cute
g1
transdermal), or portable breath test
:9 (me I
UA El Ankle Monitor [:l Portable Breath Test
or Court determined:
custody
from
release
to
prior
1:] Ankle monitor required
gDrug Monitoring via random urinalysis (UA)
GPS installation required prior to release from custody
GPS
Other GPS Restrictions:
This Section for PSU Use Only
IPRAI: Y / N Score:
ln-Custody'. Y / N RLSD:
HR
|
E
B
A
Supervision Level:
n

but

A

é

“I“ CNV‘K’M w/
mat,

It?

court

“A“!

I]

I]

I

I

;

4

Charge:
urinalysis fees at the time of
Defendant is responsible for all associated costs for electronic monitoring or
self-monitoring. if
unless
PSU.
given
by
instructions
testing. Defendant will follow all pretrial program
of the alleged
Court
the
notify
promptly
will
PSU
the
terms.
these
Defendant fails to comply with any of
violations.
’be taken i to custody for that purpose.
Defendant is subject to additional testing by court order and m
d for; any alleged violations.
return
to
revo bond and order Defendant

The Court may

:{st
Judge

4'Iig’
Date
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" IN
Of;fHe4tH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
tN THE DISTRICT COURT OFgTHE‘MTH

OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA.
THE STATE
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiﬁ,
Plointiff,

DA.TE
OF COURT DAIE
NOTICE
NOTICE OF

vs
vs.

'

rc'n

/ Fun
xn.-LtYfn.M____

FREDERICK J
JACOBSEN, FREDERICKJ

Defendant
Defendont

AM

BOND
BOND RECEIPT
.

,

APR 00 5
5 2018

,

CHRISTOPHEH a
CHRISTOPHER
R|CH, Clsrk
Clerk
Q. men.

’

RACHAELPuvgvrsmmsaav
By
rynacxnelul&nrenav

‘

OEPUTY
‘

before the Judge,
you must appear before
You are hereby notified that you
M
A.
a/23/2078 at 08:30 A.Mon 4/23/2018

Courthouse
ADA County Courthouse
200 W.
W. Front Street
lD 83702
Boise,
Boise, ID
specified herein, your bond will be
as speciﬁed
you are further notiﬁed
notified that if you fail to appear as
You
issued against you.
warrant of Arrest will be issued
and aa Warrant
forfeited and
'

Bond
Bond Amount

#
Case it

Bond
#
Bond '3

Bond
Bond Type

PCS

$2,000.00
s2,0oo.0o

18- 15616
CROl—
cR01-18-L5616

AC5—7542350
AC5-7542350

Cash
cash

Charge
Charge #2

Bond
Bond Amount

Case N
#

Bond H#

Bond Type

#3
Charge
Charge ”3

Bond Amount

Case
#
Case R

Bond
Bond #

Charge
CharBe #4

Bond Amount

Case ’3
#

#
Bond
Bond 50

Charge
Charge #5

Bond
Bond Amount

#
Case 43‘

Charge
Charge #6

Bond Amount

Case #

fi1
Charge
Charte #1

Cash

s119IyEL
E
[3
E Surety
El

Surety
Surety [:1

Bond Type

Surety E]
Cash!
E] suretyI

Cash
‘

Band
Bond Type

SuretyI
Cash!
El
E] Surety
suretyI
Cash
cashI
D
E] Surety

,Cash

Bond
Bond Type

#
Bond
Bond 8

f

Bond

f

Bond Type
Bond

is

V

Cash

[:1
!

Surety
SuretyE
El

Agency/Person:
Bonding Agency/Person:

ALADDIN
ALADDIN BB
Address:

80 N
N COLE
COLE RD
City:

State:

Zip Code:

ID

83704

’

BOISE
Bondsperson:
Bondsperson:

JOHNSON
AARON JOHNSON
APP EAR
NOTI CE,TO APPEAR.
tjf this NOTICE'TO
a copy 6f
This is
IS to certify that II have received a
mY
and
bail
posting
my promise
of
Promise to
releasedd on the conditions
II understand that II am being release
in this notice.
ce described
described In
appear in court at the time, date and

£67“
l{
4'7- My

Zﬁr i
/),rd
(
6

/

Printed.
Printed /3/20

De

Date
Dote

igna re

Initials & ADA#)
07(rnitials
SBS707(
By:S857
2:
40 PM
PM By:
2:40

_

NC5646
11/16 xC5646
Revised 1V16
ACSO
ACSO Revised
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CRU1— 18—15616

Court Minutes
617282

mmmm

“Hill

I
IIIIIIIIIIHIIIIIIII
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THEII-uun i . mum," .._ ...- .. ‘T
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
CLERK OFT E D'STR'CT COURT

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Deputy

Case Number:

CROI— I3 4 5(0

Judge.

0% S

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

l/s‘cgy

Z(I

III In Chambers

/V\ HQimcLS

)
)

Defendant.

POCQ

Interpreter

IZI

DefendantﬁPresent

III Not Present El In Custody Bond $

XPosted Bond s

2 QO’O

XPTRO

JiN

PD Appointed /Private

)

)
)

,

(0

I

)

J Jadosen

.

5242,a

(2)57

Case Called:

)

ﬂ/I

BY

PRELIMINARY HEARING NOTICE I MINUTE SHEET

B/F

El NCO El Advised

BNV

of Rights El Waive Rights El Waive Time

D Motion/Stipulation for: III Bond Reduction D Amended NCO Denied /Granted
III Amended Complaint Filed

III Complaint Amended by Interlineation

III Reading of Complaint Waived

III Rule11 Plea Agreement w/ DVC Offer Sheet III Guilty Plea(s) Entered

Accepted

III StateﬁkDefense III Mutual -- Re {uest for Continuance

@Case continued to

5! 22'; l 8

III Defendant Waives Preliminary Hearing

at

I1 Objection

0 @lpm for

El Hearing Held

III Case Bound Over to Judge

El Commitment Signed

am/pm

at

III Order §18-212 Commitment

III Defense

III Case Dismissed by Court after Hearing / On State’s Motion

III Consolidated w/
E]

HP ITMA/

on

III Order for §18-211 Evaluation, requested by: El Prosecutor

MNO Objection

III Release Defendant, This Case Only

W

Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W.Front St., # 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208) 287-7400.
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE, ID 83702

You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest.
I

hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as follows:

Defendant:

KHand

Delivered

III Via Counsel

Defense Atty: El Hand Delivered

III Intdept Mail

Prosecutor:

D Intdept Mail

By:

El Hand Delivered

W

Signature

(/

(/ D,

DATED

Lil

/ 25/1 3

Deputy Clerk

PRELIMINARY HEARING NOTICE / MINUTE SHEET

[REV 7-2017]
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Electronically Filed
4/26/2018 10:07 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Chynae Hull, Deputy Clerk

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)
NEVTN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
PO. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
(1 rober
nbmlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff,

STIPULATION FOR
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

VS.
VVVVVVVVVV

FREDERICK

J.

JACOBSEN,

Defendant.

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND THE STATE OF IDAHO

Please note that Debra Groberg and

LLP do hereby substitute

as

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT

counsel for Defendant in place

of Neil Price

and the Ada County

Public Defender’s Ofﬁce. Please address all future correspondence accordingly.

DATED this

25TH day

of April,

2018.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

DATED this 25th day of April, 2018.

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

“1,1n
Neil
Price

STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL -

1

000020

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 25‘h day of April, 2018, I electronically ﬁled the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt e-ﬁle system, which caused the following parties or
counsel to be served by electronic means:

Ada County Prosecutor
ac ocourtdocs adaweb.net

/s/ Debra Groberg

STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL - 2

000021

Electronically Filed
4/26/2018 4:49 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock

PO. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
nbmlaw.com
d rober

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff,
vs.
vvvvvvvvvv

FREDERICK

J.

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

JACOBSEN,

Defendant.

TO THE STATE OF IDAHO AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, through his attorneys, requests discovery
and inspection pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16, as follows:
1.

Statement

of Defendant,

The defendant requests permission to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant
written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, Within the possession,
custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting
attorney by the exercise of due diligence.
The defendant also requests that the prosecution reveal the substance of any relevant oral
statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace ofﬁcer, prosecuting
attorney, or his agent, and to inspect or copy tape recordings of such oral statements if any.

Finally the defendant requests that the prosecution permit the defendant to inspect and
copy or photograph the recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to
the offense charged,

if any such testimony exists.

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -

1

000022

2.
2.

co-defendant.
Statement
Statement of
of aa co-defendant.

The
photograph any
written or
The defendant
permission to
or
or photograph
to inspect
inspect and
defendant requests
and copy
requests permission
any written
copy or
if any.
recorded
statements of
of aa co-defendant,
co-defendant, if
recorded statements
any.
that the
The
The defendant
the prosecution
the existence
of
defendant also
existence and
prosecution reveal
reveal the
and substance
requests that
also requests
substance of
co-defendant
in
any
relevant
oral
statement
made
by
a
co-defendant
whether
before
or
after
arrest
in
response
to
after
Whether
statement
relevant
oral
or
arrest
to
before
response
made
any
by a
co-defendant to
interrogation
be aa peace
interrogation by
the co-defendant
the
known by
to be
ofﬁcer or
or agent
agent of
of the
person known
peace officer
any person
by any
by the
prosecuting attorney,
permit the
any
tape
recording
of
such
the defendant
to inspect
inspect and
recording
of
to permit
prosecuting
defendant to
and copy
tape
and to
such
attorney, and
copy any
oral
oral statement.
statement.

3.
3.

Defendant's prior
Defendant's
prior record.
record.

that the
The defendant
the prosecuting
the defendant
The
prosecuting attorney
furnish the
of
defendant requests
defendant such
requests that
such copy
attorney furnish
copy of
if any,
prior criminal
criminal record,
his prior
the prosecuting
his
become available
prosecuting attorney.
is now
or may
to the
now or
available to
as is
attorney.
record, if
may become
any, as

4.
4.

Documents
tangible objects.
Documents and
and tangible
obiects.

that the
The defendant
the prosecuting
the defendant
The
prosecuting attorney
permit the
to inspect
inspect and
defendant requests
defendant to
and
requests that
attorney permit
copy
or
photograph
books,
papers,
documents,
photographs,
videotapes,
audiotapes,
law
photograph
or
law
photographs,
documents,
Videotapes,
audiotapes,
books,
papers,
copy
CAD messages/MDT
enforcement
buildings, or
places or
tangible objects,
enforcement CAD
or places
or copies
or
messages/MDT data,
copies or
objects, buildings,
data, tangible
in the
the possession,
the prosecuting
portions thereof,
which are
portions
control of
or control
of the
prosecuting attorney
are in
and
thereof, which
possession, custody
attorney and
custody or
which are
which
are
the preparation
the defense,
a.)
preparation of
material to
to the
of the
or
defense, or
a.) material
trial or
for use
the prosecutor
the trial
b.) intended
use by
by the
prosecutor as
preliminary hearing,
intended for
or preliminary
or
at the
evidence at
as evidence
hearing, or
b.)
from
the
which
c.)
which
were
obtained
from
or
belonged
to
the
defendant,
and
or
to
obtained
and
belonged
were
defendant,
c.)
front and
original citation,
the original
d.)
back, as
of the
rough notes,
both front
well as
and back,
as well
as any
citation, both
notes, notes,
notes,
d.) aa copy
any rough
copy of
diagrams,
statements or
or otherwise.
otherwise.
diagrams, reports,
reports, statements

5.
5.

Reports
examinations and
Reports of
of examinations
and tests.
tests.

The defendant
The
photograph any
permission to
to inspect
inspect and
or photograph
or
defendant requests
results or
and copy
requests permission
any results
copy or
in
mental examinations,
experiments made
reports
scientiﬁc tests
of scientific
or experiments
reports of
of physical
or mental
tests or
and of
made in
examinations, and
physical or
with this
this case,
the possession,
the
connection
within the
control of
connection with
or copies
or control
of the
copies thereof,
thereof, Within
possession, custody
custody or
case, or
the existence
the prosecuting
which is
known or
prosecuting attorney,
of which
is known
or is
is available
to the
prosecuting
existence of
prosecuting attorney
available to
attorney
attorney, the
the exercise
by the
of due
diligence.
exercise of
due diligence.
by

6.
6.

State
witnesses and
witnesses.
the state
statements of
of the
State Witnesses
state Witnesses.
and statements

The
that the
furnish to
written
The defendant
the defendant
the prosecuting
to the
defendant requests
defendant aa written
prosecuting attorney
requests that
attorney furnish
list
persons having
list of
all persons
having knowledge
of names,
telephone numbers
of all
of relevant
relevant facts
numbers of
facts
knowledge of
and telephone
addresses and
names, addresses
who may
be called
witnesses at
preliminary hearing,
trial or
with any
the state
the trial
together with
at the
or preliminary
state as
who
called by
as Witnesses
hearing, together
any
may be
by the
record
prior felony
person which
which is
within the
the knowledge
the
of prior
of any
is within
of the
convictions of
knowledge of
record of
such person
felony convictions
any such
prosecuting attorney
the exercise
of due
or is
is available
prosecuting
diligence.
exercise of
available by
due diligence.
attorney or
by the
2
REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY
DISCOVERY -- 2
REQUEST FOR

000023

that the
The
prosecuting attorney
The defendant
the prosecuting
all statements,
furnish any
defendant also
and all
requests that
also requests
statements,
attorney furnish
any and
whether oral,
the
above
mentioned
prosecution
witnesses
or
the
whether
mentioned
or otherwise,
or
prosecution
Witnesses
made by
above
written, or
otherwise, made
oral, written,
by
in the
prospective witnesses
the prosecuting
his agents
the
ofﬁcial involved
to the
or his
or to
to any
prosecuting attorney
agents or
involved in
prospective
Witnesses to
attorney or
any official
Criminal
investigatory
unless aa protective
pursuant to
the case
of the
is issued
to Idaho
protective order
order is
Idaho Criminal
process of
issued pursuant
case unless
investigatory process
Rule
Rule 16(k).
16(k).

7.
7.

Expert Witnesses.
Expert
witnesses.

that the
The
furnish to
written
The defendant
the prosecuting
the defendant
to the
defendant requests
prosecuting attorney
defendant aa written
requests that
attorney furnish
that the
summary
witness testimony
pursuant
the state
report of
expert Witness
intends to
or report
of any
to introduce
introduce pursuant
state intends
testimony that
summary or
any expert
trial or
to
the trial
The summary
the
hearing. The
to I.R.E.
I.R.E. 702,
or 705
at the
or hearing.
must describe
provided must
describe the
705 at
summary provided
702, 703,
703, or
expert’s qualifications.
witness’s
witness’s opinions,
the facts
for those
the expert’s
qualifications.
facts and
those opinions,
and data
and the
data for
opinions, the
opinions, and
with the
the requirements
mental health
health shall
Disclosure
expert opinions
shall also
opinions regarding
regarding mental
requirements
of expert
Disclosure of
also comply
comply with
18-207.
of
of I.C.
1.0 §§ 18-207.

8.
8.

Police
Police reports.
reports.

that the
furnish to
The defendant
the prosecuting
the defendant
The
to the
defendant requests
prosecuting attorney
defendant reports,
requests that
reports,
attorney furnish
in his
in the
his possession
the possession
memoranda,
possession or
control or
control of
or control
or in
or control
of
rough notes
notes in
notes and
and rough
possession or
memoranda, notes
in
the
the
any
other
person
who
participated
in
the
investigation
or
evaluation
of
the
case
which
were
made
which
other
investigation
participated
or
of
evaluation
person
who
were
made
case
any
in connection
the case.
the investigation
by aa police
police officer
with the
prosecution of
investigation or
investigator in
or prosecution
of the
connection with
ofﬁcer or
or investigator
case.
by

9.
9.

Notice of
Notice
of 404(b)
Evidence.
4041b! Evidence.

Plaintiff provide
that the
The defendant
all witnesses
the Plaintiff
The
immediate notice
notice of
of all
defendant requests
provide immediate
Witnesses (and
requests that
(and
it intends
their expected
trial which
the trial
which it
which
offer at
summaries
intends to
of their
to offer
at the
summaries of
and evidence
expected testimony)
evidence which
testimony) and
“other crimes,
acts,” as
in I.R.E.
terms are
would constitute
used in
I.R.E.
of “other
or acts,”
constitute evidence
these terms
are used
evidence of
would
wrongs or
as these
crimes, wrongs
404(b).
404(b).
10.
10.

for Brady Material
Material
Request
Reguest for

The Defendant
the state
all evidence
the scope
The
within the
Defendant hereby
turn over
of Brady
state turn
demands the
over all
evidence Within
scope of
hereby demands
427 U.S.
v.
and Kyles v.
United States v.
v. Maryland, 373
373 U.S.
US. 83
83 (1963),
v. Augers 427
US. 97
97 (1976)
v.
(1976) and
(1963), United
514 U.S.
419 (1995).
Whitley,
US. 419
Whitley, 514
(1995).
th
26th
DATED this
this 26
DATED
day
of April,
2018.
April, 2018.
day of

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,
BARTLETT LLP
LLP
MCKAY &
BENJAMIN, McKAY
& BARTLETT
NEVIN,
/s/ Debra
Debra Groberg
Groberg
/s/
Debra
Debra Groberg
Groberg

REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY
DISCOVERY -- 33
REQUEST FOR

000024

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th
26th
that on
this 26
II hereby
day
the foregoing
filed the
foregoing
of April,
on this
electronically filed
April, 2018,
certify that
2018, II electronically
hereby certify
day of
e-ﬁle system,
with
with the
using the
which caused
parties or
the following
the Clerk
the Court
the iCourt
following parties
Clerk of
of the
iCourt e-file
or
Court using
caused the
system, which
counsel
be served
by electronic
to be
electronic means:
means:
counsel to
served by

Ada
Prosecutor
Ada County
County Prosecutor
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

/s/ Debra
Debra Groberg
Groberg
/s/

4
REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY
DISCOVERY -- 4
REQUEST FOR

000025

Electronically Filed
Filed
5/2/2018 2:30 PM
Fourth
Fourth Judicial
Judicial District,
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Markle, Deputy Clerk
By: Sara Markle,

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock

PO. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
durobel‘u@11blnlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff,

STIPULATION TO VACATE AND
RESET PRELIMINARY HEARING

vs.

FREDERICK

J.

JACOBSEN,

Defendant.

Defendant Frederick J. Jacobsen, through his attorneys, and the State, through its attorney,
J.

Matt Haynes, stipulate and agree to vacate the Preliminary Hearing presently set for May 22,

2018 in front of Judge Oths and reset

it to

June 4, 2018.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2018.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

/5/ Debra Grobem
Debra Groberg

STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARING

—

1

000026

DATED this

2"d day

of May, 2018.
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR

J.

'

M/
'

es

STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARING - 2

000027

Filed: 05/04/2018 12:31:24
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wiensz, Mandi

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock

PO. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
nbmlaw.com
(1 rober

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR01-18—15616

)

)
vs.

)

FREDERICK

J.

JACOBSEN,

Defendant.

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION
TO VACATE AND RESET

PRELIMINARY HEARING

)

)

Pursuant to Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing, and good cause being

shown, it is ordered that the Preliminary Hearing currently set for May 22, 2018 be vacated and
reset to June 4, 2018 at 8:30 am.

Signed: 5/3/2018 02:38 PM

Honorable Michael Oths

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARING -

1

000028

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 5/4/2018 12:31 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that

on this
day
electronic means to the following parties or counsel:

of May, 2018, I

served the foregoing by

Ada County Prosecutor
ac ocourtdocs adaweb.net
Debra Groberg
dg:0berg@nbmlaw.com
dpresher@nbmlaw.com

Clerk of Court

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARING - 2

000029

N0

0

AM

'1

f‘ 4..
”Sin

MAY

'1

i

2018

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
ByJEANNE TURNER
DEPUTY

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
J. Matthew Haynes
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 9211
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 287-7700.
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW,
State

of Idaho,

J.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

MOTION TO REVOKE
AND INCREASE BOND

Matthew Haynes, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for Ada County,

and moves this Court, for an order revoking and increasing the Defendant’s bond

based upon the attached afﬁdavit

of Ada County Deputy E.

Flores.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of May, 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

ﬂ/tu
By: JMatthew Haynes
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO REVOKE AND INCREASE BOND (JACOBSEN)
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JEANNE TURNER

DEW

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No.

CR01-I8-156I6

Plaintiff,
VS'

AFFIDAVIT OF
PRETRIAL OFFICER E. FLORES, ADA

.

Jacobsen, Frederick

#5313

Defendant,

STATE OF IDAHO
County

of Ada
1,

)
)ss.
)

Ofﬁcer E. Flores, being ﬁrst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

I.

I

2.

I am currently employed by the Ada County

make this afﬁdavit based on my personal knowledge, except where otherwise indicated.

Sheriff‘s Ofﬁce (hereinafter “ACSO”)

as a

Pretrial OtIicer, and serve as the Pretrial Officer for Defendant, Frederick Jacobsen.
3.

On April 2, 2018, the court ordered the Defendant to comply with Pretrial Conditions as a

condition of his release from custody, including no new crimes, attend all court appearances,
no possession or consumption ot‘illegal drugs; may only take medications as prescribed, no
possession or consumption
a

of alcohol or frequenting

establishments where alcohol sales are

primary source of revenue, must remain in state of Idaho but may travel to St. George UT

in connection with court proceedings only

—

must return to ID when court date is concluded,

alcohol monitoring as determined post interview by the Pretrial Services Unit (PSU), and
drug monitoring via random urinalysis (UA).

AFFIDAVIT OF OFFICER E. FLORES, ADA

#5313

~—
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4.

On April 6, 2018, the Defendant reported to our Pretrial Unit. He was provided an

orientation and placed on random UA testing for alcohol (ETG) and drugs (standard panel).
On this date, the Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a baseline UA. This test
was later reported as negative for ETG.
5.

On April 18, 2018, the Defendant failed to report to Averhealth for a scheduled UA.

6.

On April 19, 2018,

called and spoke to the Defendant about his missed UA on April 18,

I

2018. He stated that he had court in St. George, Utah on

April

17, 2018, but that he

didn’t

actually make it to court because he got stuck in Salt Lake City in bad weather. He stated
that he stayed overnight in Salt Lake City, returned to Boise on April 18, 2018, and didn’t
realize he missed a UA. I reminded the Defendant that it is his responsibility to make sure
he is calling the testing line

daily to ensure he doesn’t miss any tests. I also reminded him

that he needs to notify me in advance when he has court in Utah.

1

instructed the Defendant

to UA this date. Later this date, the Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a UA.

This test was reported
7.

as negative

for ETG.

On April 23, 2018, the Defendant failed to report to Averhealth for a scheduled UA. At
5:59

pm,

he called and left a message stating,

“...I

was trying to get into Averhealth on

time...l’m not going to make it. .I guess I’ll have to schedule it for tomorrow...”.
.

8.

On April 24, 2018, I called and spoke to the Defendant about his missed UA from April 23,
2018. He stated that he had been working at his friend’s house and forgot to call the testing

line until 5:30 pm. He said that by the time he called the testing line, he didn’t have enough
time to make it to Averhealth before they closed.
importance

of calling

AFFIDAVIT OF OFFICER
JACOBSEN, FREDERICK

I reminded the Defendant

of

the

the testing line earlier in the day. I instructed him to UA this date.

E. FLORES, ADA #5313 — Page 2
Case No. CR01-18-15616
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Later this date, the Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a UA. This test was
reported as negative for standard panel.
9.

On April 27, 2018,

I

submitted a Status Update to include the Defendant’s UA results

Qﬂeaseseeauached)
10. On

May

1,

2018, the Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a scheduled UA.

This test was later reported as positive for ETG at a level

of 3,894.6 ng/ml, with

the

cutoff

bdngSOOnghnL
11. On

May 4, 2018,

I

called and spoke to the Defendant about his positive UA from May I,

2018. He admitted to consuming alcohol on April 30, 2018. He stated that the anniversary

of his mother’s

death was approaching, which was causing him stress. He asked

if there

was a place he could go to for outpatient treatment. I provided him with the phone number

for BPA funding. Later this date, the Defendant called and left a message stating that he had
been denied

for BPA funding but had received referrals to treatment facilities that had

sliding-scale fees. He said that he was going to call these locations and look into treatment
options.

AFFIDAVIT OF OFFICER

E. FLORES, ADA #5313

—
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I

certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true

and correct.

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

DATED this

7th

day

of May, 2018.

Pretria

Of icer E. Flores, ADA #5313

Reviewed and approved by:

Ada County Sh
Pretrial Services Unit
7180 Barrister Drive
Boise, ID 83704

AFFIDAVIT OF OFFICER E. FLORES, ADA

#5313

—
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
and correct copy

of the foregoing Motion

__

day

of May, 2018,

I

caused to be served, a true

to Revoke Bond upon the individual(s) named below in

the manner noted:

Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701
El By depositing copies
C]

of the same in the United

States mail, postage prepaid,

ﬁrst class.

By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

D By informing the ofﬁce of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup

at the

Ofﬁce of the Ada County Prosecutor.

D By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s)
[3 By hand delivering copies

D By iCourt eFile and

at the facsimile number:

of the same to defense counsel.

Serve.

Legal Assistant

MOTION TO REVOKE AND INCREASE BOND (JACOBSEN)
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Electronically Filed
Filed
5/15/2018 8:54 AM
Fourth
Fourth Judicial
Judicial District,
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Markle, Deputy Clerk
By: Sara Markle,

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

J. Matthew Haynes
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 92] I
200 West Front Street Room
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287—7700
Fax: (208) 287—7709

3

|
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff.

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE

vs.

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSI‘IN.
Defendant.

COMES NOW.
through the State

01‘

J.

Matthew Haynes, Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney. by and

Idaho. County

of Ada.

and Debra Groberg, Attorney for Defendant. and do

hereby move and stipulate this Coun to reschedule the preliminary hearing in the above entitled
matter, currently set for the 4‘h day oillune 2018 at 8:30am, to [he 12‘" day ofJune 2018 at

DATED this 14th

day

823021111.

ofMay,2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

r'

If}!

Dig L/p XML”:

Lukhm Croberg

Attorney for Defendant

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE (JAf‘IOBSEN)

lhew Haynes
By: J.
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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Filed
Electronically Filed
5/16/2018 7:56 AM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Markle, Deputy Clerk
By: Sara Markle,

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada
Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County
Attorney
County Prosecuting
J. Matthew Haynes
Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney
Attorney
Deputy Prosecuting
9211
Idaho
Bar No.
Idaho State
No. 9211
State Bar
Front Street,
200
Room 3191
3191
200 W.
W. Front
Street, Room
ID 83702
Boise,
83702
Boise, ID
287-7700
Telephone:
Telephone: (208)
(208) 287-7700
287-7709
Fax:
Fax: (208)
(208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
ac ocourtdocs adawebnet

IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
IN
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
STATE OF
THE
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
OF ADA
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN
STATE OF
STATE
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO,

)
)
) Case No. CR01-18-15616
Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
)
) REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
vs.
VS.
)
FREDERICK JEREMIAH
JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
)
FREDERICK
J ACOBSEN,
)
)
Defendant.
Defendant.
)
TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:
VVVVVVVVVV

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that
undersigned, pursuant
pursuant to
that the
Criminal
the undersigned,
the Idaho
to Rule
Rule 16
16 of
of the
Idaho Criminal
Rules,
the following:
inspection of
following:
of the
and inspection
requests Discovery
Rules, requests
Discovery and
(1)
Tangible Objects:
Documents and
and Tangible
Objects:
(1) Documents
Request
by the
prosecution to
photograph books,
books, papers,
papers,
the prosecution
is hereby
to inspect
inspect and
or photograph
Request is
and copy
made by
hereby made
copy or
documents,
portions thereof,
which are
within the
the
tangible objects
or copies
or portions
are within
copies or
objects or
photographs, tangible
thereof, which
documents, photographs,
in
possession,
which the
the defendant,
the defendant
control of
intends to
to introduce
or control
of the
introduce in
defendant intends
and which
defendant, and
possession, custody
custody or

evidence
trial.
at trial.
evidence at

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (JACOBSEN) Page
Page 11
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Examinations and
(2)
Reports of
of Examinations
and Tests:
Tests:
(2) Reports
the State
The prosecution
the defendant
The
prosecution hereby
permit the
or
to permit
to inspect
inspect and
defendant to
State to
and copy
requests the
hereby requests
copy or

photograph any
mental examinations
examinations and
photograph
scientiﬁc tests
or reports
reports of
of physical
or mental
of scientific
or
results or
tests or
and of
physical or
any results
in connection
this case,
experiments
with this
within the
possession or
the possession
experiments made
control of
connection With
or copies
or control
of
made in
copies thereof,
thereof, Within
case, or
in evidence
the
which the
were
the defendant,
the defendant
the trial,
which were
intends to
to introduce
at the
or which
defendant intends
introduce in
evidence at
defendant, which
trial, or

trial when
prepared by
by aa Witness
witness Whom
whom the
when the
the defendant
the trial
the results
intends to
to call
call at
at the
or reports
reports
defendant intends
results or
prepared

relate
witness.
the Witness.
relate to
to testimony
of the
testimony of
(3)
Defense Witnesses:
Witnesses:
(3) Defense
list of
The
prosecution requests
with aa list
The prosecution
the defendant
the State
to furnish
fumish the
of names
defendant to
names and
and
requests the
State With

addresses
witnesses the
the defendant
trial.
intends to
to call
call at
at trial.
of Witnesses
defendant intends
addresses of
Expert Witnesses:
(4)
Witnesses:
(4) Expert

The
provide aa written
The prosecution
the defendant
report of
written summary
to provide
or report
of any
defendant to
prosecution requests
requests the
summary or
any
Criminal Rule
that the
testimony
pursuant to
the defense
including
intends to
to introduce
Rule 16(c)(4),
to Idaho
introduce pursuant
Idaho Criminal
defense intends
testimony that
16(c)(4), including
witness’s qualifications.
the
the facts
the opinion
opinion and
the witness’s
supporting the
qualiﬁcations.
facts and
and data
and the
data supporting
that the
(5)
the defendant
the State
19-519, the
Pursuant to
to Idaho
defendant
Section 19-519,
Idaho Code
requests that
State hereby
Code Section
hereby requests
(5) Pursuant

in writing
state
within ten
place or
which the
writing within
ten (10)
the defendant
or places
at which
claims to
to
defendant claims
state in
speciﬁc place
places at
days any
any specific
(10) days

have
been at
upon
time of
the witnesses
the time
the alleged
the names
of the
at the
of the
offense and
names and
and addresses
Witnesses upon
alleged offense
and the
have been
addresses of
whom he
intends to
whom
he intends
to rely
to establish
alibi.
establish such
such alibi.
rely to
15th
15thday
DATED this
day of
this the
the _____
of May,
2018.
May, 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada
Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County
Attorney
County Prosecuting

ﬂ/k

By:
J. Matthew Haynes
Haynes
By: J.
Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney
Attorney
Deputy Prosecuting

Mew

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
that on
I HEREBY CERTIFY that
the _____ day
on the
of May,
to be
caused to
be served,
true
2018, II caused
served, aa true
day of
May, 2018,
in the
and
upon the
below in
the foregoing
for Discovery
the individual(s)
the
foregoing Request
of the
correct copy
named below
and correct
Request for
Discovery upon
individual(s) named
copy of

manner
manner noted:
noted:
Debra Groberg, P.O.
PO. Box 2772, Boise, ID 83701
in the
ﬁrst class.
 By
postage prepaid,
prepaid, first
the same
the United
depositing copies
of the
United States
States mail,
same in
copies of
class.
mail, postage
By depositing
in the
 By
the same
the Interdepartmental
Interdepartmental Mail.
Mail.
depositing copies
of the
same in
copies of
By depositing
DUDE]

 By
the same
delivering copies
of the
to defense
hand delivering
defense counsel.
same to
copies of
counsel.
By hand
informing the
that said
 By
were available
pickup at
the office
for pickup
the
of said
at the
ofﬁce of
available for
said individual(s)
said copies
copies were
individual(s) that
By informing

Office
the Ada
of the
Ofﬁce of
Prosecutor.
Ada County
County Prosecutor.
C] By faxing

the facsimile
the same
facsimile number:
at the
of the
to said
number: _______________.
same to
said attorney(s)
copies of
attorney(s) at
By faxing copies

 By
eFile and
iCourt eFile
and Serve.
Serve.
By iCourt
______________________________
Legal
Assistant
Leg$ Assistant

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (JACOBSEN) Page
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Filed
Electronically Filed
5/16/2018 7:56 AM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Markle, Deputy Clerk
By: Sara Markle,

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada
Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County
Attorney
County Prosecuting
J. Matthew Haynes
Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney
Attorney
Deputy Prosecuting
9211
Idaho
Bar No.
Idaho State
No. 9211
State Bar
Front Street,
200
Room 3191
3191
200 W.
W. Front
Street, Room
Boise,
Idaho 83702
83702
Boise, Idaho
287-7700
Telephone:
Telephone: (208)
(208) 287-7700
287-7709
Fax:
Fax: (208)
(208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
ac ocourtdocs adawebnet

IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
IN
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
STATE OF
THE
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
OF ADA
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN
STATE OF
STATE
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH
JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
FREDERICK
JACOBSEN,

Defendant.
Defendant.

))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))

Case No. CR01-18-15616

DISCOVERY RESPONSE
TO COURT

COMES NOW, J.
in and
for the
the County
Matthew Haynes,
Prosecuting Attorney,
of
and for
J. Matthew
Attorney, in
County of
Deputy Prosecuting
Haynes, Deputy
Defendant’s Request
Ada,
with the
that the
informs the
the Court
the State
the Defendant’s
of Idaho,
complied With
State of
State has
and informs
has complied
Request
Court that
Idaho, and
Ada, State

for
for Discovery.
Discovery.
15th day
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
this the
the _____
of May,
2018.
day of
May, 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada
Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County
Attorney
County Prosecuting

ﬂAUV

By:
J. Matthew
Mthew Haynes
Haynes
By: J.
Deputy
Prosecuting
Attorney
Prosecuting
Attorney
Deputy
DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (JACOBSEN) Page
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
15th day
that on
I HEREBY CERTIFY that
be served,
the _____
on the
of May,
2018 II caused
to be
true
caused to
served, aa true
day of
May, 2018
and
upon the
the foregoing
the individual(s)
foregoing Discovery
of the
to Court
correct copy
named below
and correct
Response to
below
Court upon
Discovery Response
individual(s) named
copy of
in the
in
the manner
manner noted:
noted:

Debra Groberg, P.O.
PO. Box 2772, Boise, ID 83701
Cl By
in the
ﬁrst class.

postage prepaid,
prepaid, first
the same
the United
depositing copies
of the
United States
States mail,
same in
copies of
class.
mail, postage
By depositing
Cl By
in the

the same
the Interdepartmental
Interdepartmental Mail.
Mail.
depositing copies
of the
same in
copies of
By depositing
Cl By
informing the
that said

were available
pickup at
the office
for pickup
the
of said
at the
ofﬁce of
available for
said individual(s)
said copies
copies were
individual(s) that
By informing

Office
the Ada
of the
Ofﬁce of
Prosecutor.
Ada County
County Prosecutor.
Cl By
faxing copies

the facsimile
the same
facsimile number:
at the
of the
to said
number: _______________.
same to
said attorney(s)
copies of
attorney(s) at
By faxing
Cl By

the same
delivering copies
hand delivering
of the
to defense
defense counsel.
same to
copies of
counsel.
By hand

 By iCourt eFile
eFile and
and Serve.
Serve.
NiCourt

Legal
Assistant
Legal ‘Assistant

2
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Filed: 05/21/2018 13:59:38
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Trivolis, Dawn

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada
Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County
Attorney
County Prosecuting
J. Matthew Haynes
Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney
Attorney
Deputy Prosecuting
9211
Idaho
Bar No.
Idaho State
No. 9211
State Bar
Front Street,
200
Room 3191
3191
200 W.
W. Front
Street, Room
ID 83702
Boise,
83702
Boise, ID
287-7700
Telephone:
Telephone: (208)
(208) 287-7700
287-7709
Fax:
Fax: (208)
(208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
ac ocourtdocs adawebnet
IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
IN
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
STATE OF
THE
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
OF ADA
IDAHO, IN
STATE OF
STATE
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS'

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
ORDER TO CONTINUE

VVVVVVVVVV

FREDERICK JEREMIAH
JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
FREDERICK
JACOBSEN,

Defendant.
Defendant.

this Court
The
before this
The above
matter having
entitled matter
having come
no
and good
and no
come before
above entitled
Court and
good cause
cause appearing,
appearing, and

objection
being raised;
objection being
raised;
th day of
12th
that the
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
be continued
the preliminary
hearing be
the 12
to the
continued to
preliminary hearing
day of

June
2018 at
at 8:30am.
June 2018
8:30am.
Signed: 5/18/2018 10:20 AM
DATED _________________________

Judge
Judge

ORDER TO CONTINUE (JACOBSEN) Page
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 5/21/2018 01:59 PM
I served
that on
the foregoing
II hereby
upon
foregoing document
on ___________________,
document upon
served the
certify that
hereby certify
, I

the
persons and
below.
the following
the addresses
following attorneys,
at the
listed below.
and agencies
agencies at
addresses listed
attorneys, persons
Anne Groberg
Debra
Debra Anne
Groberg
PO
BOX 2772
PO Box
2772
ID 83701
Boise
Boise ID
83701

[[ ]] U.S.
postage prepaid
prepaid
US. Mail,
Mail, postage
[[ ]] Facsimile
Facsimile
Email
[[ ]] Email
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com

J.
Matthew Haynes
J. Matthew
Haynes
Prosecutor’s Office
Ada
Office
Ada County
County Prosecutor’s
Rm 3191
Front St.
200
3191
200 W.
St. Rm
W. Front
ID 83702
Boise,
83702
Boise, ID

[[ ]] U.S.
postage prepaid
prepaid
US. Mail,
Mail, postage
[[ ]] Facsimile
Facsimile
Email
[[ ]] Email
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Ada
the Court
Clerk of
of the
Court
Ada County
County Clerk

__________________________________
Deputy
Clerk
Deputy Clerk

ORDER TO CONTINUE (JACOBSEN) Page
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6/1 2/201 8

-

Oths Wiensz

Time

1A-CRT204

Speaker

PM Case Called
02:06:37 PM State's Attorney
02:06:38 PM Defense Attorney
02:07:06 PM State's Attorney
02:07:59 PM SW#1
02:08:03 PM State's Attorney
02:09:09 PM
02:09:14 PM State's Attorney
02:1 1 :44 PM State's Attorney
02:12:50 PM Defense Attorney
02:12:54 PM State's Attorney
02:13:02 PM State's Attorney
02:1 3:05 PM Defense Attorney
02:14:36 PM State's Attorney
02:14:41 PM Judge
02:14:45 PM Defense Attorney
02:33:57 PM Defense Attorney
02:34:00 PM State's Attorney
02:34:03 PM Judge
02:34:07 PM State’s Attorney
02:06:25

Note
Frederick J Jacobsen CR01-18-15616

Cory Nielsen

-

Ada County Prosecutor

Debra Groberg
Calls

SW#

1

-

Defense Attorney

Officer Kyle Mikowski

/Sworn

Offers officer training and experience
Direct Examination

SW#1

Identifies

SW#1

Defendant

SW#1

Continues Direct Examination

Moves

to

Admit SE#1

No objection for this hearing
So orders SE# 1 Admitted
Nothing Further

Cross Examination

SW#1

Objection/Relevance

Sustained

Continues Cross Examination

SW#1

Nothing Further
Nothing Further

Witness steps down/excused

Submit closing argument on evidence
presented/reserve rebuttal

O_2:3_4:1_0P_M Defense Attorney

02:35:32

PM

Judge

Closing

CT finds

that the State has proved there is enough
evidence to provide probable cause to sign
Commitment and bind case over to District Court with
Judge Reardon on 6/22/18
8:30 am for AR and
further proceedings

@

PM
02:38:29 PM
02:38:38 PM
02:40:55 PM
02:44:07 PM
02:47:14 PM
02:36:35

State's Attorney

Motion to Revoke and Increase

Judge

A warrant

State's Attorney

Response

Defense Attorney

Response

Judge

Motion to Increase

has already been issued

-

Denied

Case End

cno1—18—15616
CMIN
Court Minutes

m Immunmmmmm
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1

of1

000044

MWM
Wm

o
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

lN

lillllll
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
CLERK 0F THE D'STR'CT COURT

ADA

BY

PRELIMINARY HEARING NOTICE l MINUTE SHEET

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff,

[MI

Judge:

)
)

vs.

Case

)

QZOéZKS

Called:

&

)

\JQCOWSém

L)

)

Defendant.

)
)

D

)

Defendant: Nresent

D

Not Present

Motion/Stipulation for:

D Amended
D

D

D

Complaint Filed

Defense

D

--
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D

D

v

—«

at

8«'?0

®lpm
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Interpreter
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Order
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Am: j

eputy

Case Number:

)

‘

Marmm”

Release Defendant, This Case Only

élmshea/

D Consolidated w/
D

Contact the

Ada County

Public Defender,

200 W.Front

St.,

# 1107,

Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208) 287-7400.

ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET,
You must appear as scheduled above.
I

hereby

certify that

W Hand Delivered

Defense

D
D

Prosecutor:

By:

do so will

result in a warrant being issued for

your

arrest.

copies of this notice were served as follows:

Defendant:
Atty:

Failure to

BOISE, ID 83702

Hand Delivered

MW
Hand Delivered

D Via Counsel
D Intdept Mail
D Intdept Mail

Signature

DATED

VDé’puty Clerk
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Order for Commitment
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ED
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By MANDI

WIEst

DEPUTV

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County
J.

Prosecuting Attorney

Matthew Haynes

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 9211
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

IN

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case N0. CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff,

COMMITMENT

VSVVVVVVVVVV

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
having

W1

3mm

brought before this Court for a Preliminary Examination 0n the
,

2018, on a charge that the defendant on or about the

County of Ada,

State

0f Idaho,

did

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, FELONY,

COMMITMENT (JACOBSEN) Page

commit
I.C.

the

crime(s)

lst
of:

F%y

day 0f April 2018,

of

in the

POSSESSION OF A

§37-2732(c), as follows:

1

000046

That the defendant,

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,

on or about the

lst

day of

April 2018, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance,
to-wit:

Methamphetamine, a Schedule

The

defendant

having

controlled substance.

II

appeared

so

and

having

had/having

waived

preliminary

examination, the Court sitting as a Committing Magistrate ﬁnds that the offense charged as set
forth has

been committed in Ada County, Idaho, and

the defendant

is

that there is sufﬁcient cause t0 believe that

guilty of committing the offense as charged.

WHEREFORE,

IT IS

ORDERED

that the defendant

be held t0 answer

to the District

Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, to the
charge herein set forth. Bail

DATED this

is set

U'

in the

sum of $

day of

(j;

v
ZF (2&0

h<

(F2

QM

,2018.

COMMITMENT (JACOBSEN) Page 2
000047

Electronically Filed

6/13/2018 10:07

Fouﬁh

AM

Judicial Disﬁrict.

Ada Coumy

Christopher D. Rich, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,
303 West Bannock
P.O.

Box 2772

Boise, ID 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

nbmlaw.com

d rober

Attorneys for Defendant

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

IN

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO.

CR01-18-15616

)

vs.

)
)

FREDERICK J. JACOBSEN,

)
)

Defendant.

MOTION FOR
PREPARATION OF
PRELIMINARY HEARING
TRANSCRIPT

)
)

Defendant, through his attorneys, moves this court t0 order the preparation 0f a
transcript

of the preliminary hearing which was held in

the Honorable Michael

This motion

transcript

is

is

J.

this

matter

011

June

12,

2018, in front 0f

Oths.

based upon Rule 5.2 0f the Idaho Criminal Rules.

A copy 0f the

necessary to the preparation of the defense in this case.

DATED this

13th

day ofJune, 2018.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS

- 1

000048

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

that

on

this

13th

day of June, 20181 electronically ﬁled the

foregoing With the Clerk 0f the Court using the iCourt e-ﬁle system, which caused the following
parties 0r counsel to

Ada County

be served by electronic means:
Prosecutor

acpocourtdocs@adaweb .net

/s/Debra Groberg

Debra Groberg

MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS

-

2

000049

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVFN, BENJAMIN,

Filed: 06/15/2018 08:08:25
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP

303 West Bannock
P.O.

Box 2772

Boise, ID 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

d rober

nbmlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

IN

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO.

CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff,

vs.
VVVVVVVVVV

FREDERICK J. JACOBSEN,

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF
PRELIMINARY HEARING
TRANSCRIPT

Defendant.

Defendant, having

moved the court for an order for the preparation of a preliminary hearing

transcript, pursuant to I.C.R. 5.2(a),

A transcript
to counsel for

ORDERED that:

of the preliminary hearing held on June

Defendant

DATED:

IT IS

at the

12,

2018, be prepared and delivered

Defendant’s expense.

Signed: 6/14/2018 04:32 PM

Honorable Michael Reardon

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT

-

l

000050

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

electronic

means

that

on

this

15TH

day of June, 2018,

I

served the foregoing by

t0 the following parties or counsel:

Ada County Prosecutor
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

Debra Groberg

nbmlaw.com
dpresher@nbmlaw.com
d rober

Transcripts Coordinator
transcri ts

adawebnet

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the Court

Clerk 0f Court
Signed: 6/15/2018 08:09 AM

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT

-

2

000051

Electronically Filed
6/15/2018 9:50 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Brenda Ruckdashel, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

Case No. CR01-18-15616
INFORMATION

JAN M. BENNETTS, Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho,
who in the name and by the authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes now into District
Court of the County of Ada, and states that FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN is accused by
this Information of the crime(s) of:

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,

FELONY, I.C. §37-2732(c), which crime(s) were committed as follows:

INFORMATION (JACOBSEN) Page 1
000052

That the defendant, FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN, on or about the 1st day of
April 2018, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance,
to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

MQZ/

/for/

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

INFORMATION (JACOBSEN) Page 2
000053

¢
7A9:

,

COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE

Stephen same“,

Shem

Ada County Mugshot
‘JACOBSEN FREDERICK JEREMIAH

01117867

Male

Notof hispanic

White

origin
‘

Brown

508

Blue

160

7

Alias

FREDERICK
Primary

JACOBSEN
\FREDRICK

\Alias

‘FRITz

}Alias

TAT BACK

Angel

TAT CHEST

Devil,

TAT FACE

Sincere

Angel

Love and Loyalty

TAT HEAD

———
Ram

Horns

TAT

L

ARM

FJ

TAT

L

CALF

Girl

TAT

L

HND

Portrait

TAT

L

LEG

LJ, roses

TAT NECK

Love make excepetion,

TAT R ANKL

Sin City

TAT R CALF

Skulls

TAT R HND

Portrait

TAT R LEG

Angel and temple

Social Security

Number

JJ, 8/17/13

xxx—xx—xxxx

H

Printed

-

6/14/2018 2:15:27 PM

Mugsm’: MN

1

a3?

Fu’ltadified:

2;"15!20‘.8

Printed by:

PRBLACKM
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Filed: 06/18/2018 15:58:32
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Bourne, Pamela

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK J. JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
) Case No. CR01-18-15616
)
) ESTIMATED COST OF
) TRANSCRIPT
)
)

An Order for transcript was filed in the above-entitled matter on June 15, 2018, and a copy of said
Order was received by the Transcription Department on June 15, 2018. I certify the estimated cost
of preparation of the transcript to be:
Type of Hearing: Preliminary
Date of Hearing: June 12, 2018 Judge: Michael J. Oths
45 Pages x $3.25 = $ 146.25 = 30 Day Preparation
45 Pages x $3.75 = $ 168.75 = 14 Day Expedited Preparation
The Transcription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District
Court within thirty-five (35) days (or expedited days) from the date payment is received. The
transcriber may make application to the District Judge for an extension of time in which to prepare
the transcript.
Please make checks payable to: KIM MADSEN and mail or deliver to the TRANSCRIPTION
DEPARTMENT, 200 WEST FRONT STREET, ROOM 4172, BOISE, IDAHO, 83702.
Signed: 6/18/2018 03:58 PM

Dated this June 18, 2018

____________________________________
PAMELA BOURNE
Transcript Department

ESTIMATED COST OF TRANSCRIPT - Page 1
000055

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

that 0n June 18, 2018, a true and correct copy 0f the Estimated Cost 0f Transcript was
forwarded t0 Defendant’s attorney 0f record, by electronic means t0 the following counsel:

I certify

Debra Groberg

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,
d

ober

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

nbmlaw.com

Signed: 6/18/2018 03:58 PM

PAMELA BOURNE
Transcript Department

ESTIMATED COST OF TRANSCRIPT - Page

2

000056

Filed: 06/21/2018 08:28:47
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Bourne, Pamela

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK J. JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
NOTICE OF PAYMENT OF
ESTIMATED COST OF
PRELIMINARY HEARING
TRANSCRIPT

I hereby certify that the estimated cost of transcript in the above-entitled matter has been paid to the
court on June 19, 2018.
Said transcript will be filed with the Clerk of the District Court on or before thirty (30) days (or
expedited days) from date of this notice.
Dated June 20, 2018

Signed: 6/21/2018 08:28 AM

___________________________________
PAMELA BOURNE
Ada County Transcript Department

NOTICE OF PAYMENT OF ESTIMATED COST OF TRANSCRIPT
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nun '11} w
IN Tl IE DISTRICT

COURT 01: THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

1‘11]:

STATE 0F

g

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO. IN

OI:

IDAI 10.

g

)

,

)

Plaintiff.

m

Casc No.

)

CR-ﬂ

‘

ly

’3 b7L

)

vs.

ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND
NOTICE 0F TRIAL SETTING

)

R w At n ML TR LAHLW.

)
)
)

Defendant.

IT IS
(l)

(2)

)

HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
Compliance dale

for discovery

is set

Status conference will be held

on

on or before

(3)

Pretrial

(4)

3’

Jurymal win beheld on
days.

'l‘he

Notice

is

may be

20

’Y

)gat" ‘7

,

20

,

20}?

.

.m. wherein

0L37M

at

".39

Am. wherein

in court.

Mn M

.20 )‘(at ﬂ ‘5.m.and shall be scheduled ror
be drawn by lot the aﬂemoon before lhc day of trial in

W WW“

present for thc drawing of the names.

w

hereby given. pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6). l.C.R. that an altemate judge
trial of this case. 'I‘he following is a list ofpotcntial altemale judges:

preside over lhc

llon.

{\zvi

,

coun.

order of the jury panel will

chambers. Counsel
(5)

in

conference will be held on ll}

defendant“) must be personally present

,\w§ vi]

DLA‘IM

)q

defendant(s) must bc personally present

l7

GD. Carey

bc assigned lo

Hon. Cheri Copscy

‘Hom—Rnnacﬂoﬂ.

llon. Darla

Hon. Thomas Neville

llon.

Gerald Schroeder

Williamson

Hon. Ronald Wilpcr

ALL SITTING FOURTH DISTRICT JUDGES
(6)

Defendant shall ﬁle

motions governed bx Rule 12 of the Idaho Criminal Rules no
days after the comaliance date set for discover! or otherwise show
formal motion, whx such time limits should be extended. All such motions
all pretrial

later than fourteen [l4]

good cause,

nun

must be brought on
trial,

whichever

days prior to the

for hearing within fourteen (l4)

is earlier.

pretrial

days aﬂcr ﬁling or forty-eight (48) hours bcforc
All motions in Iimine shall be in writing and ﬁled no later than ﬁve (S)

confcmncc. All Motions to Suggress Evidence must bc accompanied bx a

brief selling fonh the factual basis and legal basis for the supercssion ofcvidence.
'r

cc:

Hand

Is

so ORDERED this

D.) C-lday

‘

20]

3/.

delivered Io Defendant and Counsel

ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING

ﬂu

Wax

“mmmnm, m"
run m xm- msmct com:

nv
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000059

Electronically Filed

6/22/2018 2:06

Fouﬁh

PM

Judicial Disﬁrict.

Ada Coumy

Christopher D. Rich, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

303 West Bannock
P.O.

Box 2772

Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

d rober

nbmlaw.corn

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO.

CR01-18-15616

)

vs.

)

FREDERICK JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)

MOTION FOR

)

DISQUALIFICATION OF

)

ALTERNATE JUDGE

)

)

Defendant Frederick Jacobsen, through his attorneys and pursuant

moves

to I.C.R. 25(a)(1),

the Court for the disqualiﬁcation Without cause of alternate Judge Cheri Copsey.

Defendant has not previously disqualiﬁed a judge assigned to

this case.

DATED this 22nd day 0f June, 201 8.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN,
/s/

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE

-

]

000060

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
hereby certify that on this 22nd day 0f June, 2018, I electronically ﬁled the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt e-ﬁle system, which caused the following parties or
I

counsel to be served

Ada County

by

electronic means:

Prosecutor

acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg
/s/

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE

-

2

000061

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP

303 West Bannock
P.O.

Filed: 06/25/2018 14:10:26
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

Box 2772

Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

d rober

nbmlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

)

CR01-18-15616

)

vs.

ORDER DISQUALIFYING
ALTERNATE JUDGE

)

)

FREDERICK JACOBSEN,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

Pursuant t0 Defendant’s Motion for Disqualiﬁcation of Judge under I.C.R. 25(a)(1),

IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Cheri Copsey be disqualiﬁed as the judge

in this case.

DATED

Signed: 6/25/2018 12:00 PM

Honorable Michael Reardon

ORDER DISQUALIFYING ALTERNATE JUDGE -

1

000062

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

electronic

means

that

0n

this

25th day

of June, 2018,

I

served the foregoing by

t0 the following parties 0r counsel:

Ada County Prosecutor
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

Debra Groberg

nbmlaw.com
dgresher@nbmlaw.com
d rober

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the Court

Clerk 0f Court

Signed: 6/25/2018 02:10 PM

ORDER DISQUALIFYING ALTERNATE JUDGE - 2
000063

Electronically Filed
6/29/2018 10:06 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Chynae Hull, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
R. Scott Bandy
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 6032
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
) Case No. CR01-18-15616
)
) MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, R. Scott Bandy Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada,
State of Idaho, and moves the Court pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a), to disqualify, without cause, the
Honorable Judge George D. Carey from presiding over the above-entitled case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 2018
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

05%

By: R. Scott Bandy
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY (JACOBSEN) Page 1
000064

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
29
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _______
day of June, 2018, I caused to be served, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Disqualify upon the individual(s) named below
in the manner noted:
Debra Groberg, Attorney at Law, PO Box 2772, Boise, ID 83701
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: ____________.
 By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.
 Via iCourt eFile and Serve.

Wﬁb

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY (JACOBSEN) Page 2
000065

Filed: 07/03/2018 09:45:57
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
R. Scott Bandy
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 6032
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
) Case No. CR01-18-15616
)
) ORDER TO DISQUALIFY
)
)
)
)
)

The above entitled matter having come before this Court based on the State’s Motion to
Disqualify;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Judge George D. Carey be disqualified
from the above entitled case pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a), without cause.
Signed: 6/29/2018 12:54 PM

DATED _____________________

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on ___________________,
I served the foregoing document upon
3 July, 2018
the following attorneys, persons and agencies at the addresses listed below.
Debra Anne Groberg
PO Box 2772
Boise ID 83701

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[X ] Email
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com

David M. Hunt
Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front Street #3191
Boise, ID 83702

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ X ] Email
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Ada County Clerk of the Court

_____________________________
Deputy Clerk
Signed: 7/3/2018 09:46 AM
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Electronically Filed
7/10/2018 3:51 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Phyllis Morriss, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.
TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
NOTICE OF HEARING

Debra Anne Groberg, Attorney of Record, you will please take notice that on

20th day of July, 2018 at the hour of 8:30 AM of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be
heard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney David M. Hunt, will move this Honorable Court regarding
the State’s Motion to Revoke or Increase Bond in the above-entitled action.
DATED this _____day
of July, 2018.
10
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

MM

By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
10th
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____ day of July, 2018 I caused to be served, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing upon the individual(s) named below in the
manner noted:
Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By iCourt eFile and Serve.

W

Legal Assistant
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Electronically Filed
7/10/2018 3:51 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Phyllis Morriss, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 287-7700.
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

MOTION TO REVOKE
AND INCREASE BOND

COMES NOW, David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for Ada County,
State of Idaho, and moves this Court, for an order revoking and increasing the Defendant’s bond
based upon the attached affidavit of Ada County Deputy Officer E. Flores.
10 day of July, 2018.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ____
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Mu

____________________________
By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO REVOKE AND INCREASE BOND (JACOBSEN), Page 1
000070

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _______
10th day of July, 2018, I caused to be served, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Revoke Bond upon the individual(s) named below in
the manner noted:
Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By iCourt eFile and Serve.

W

___________________________
Legal Assistant
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IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR01—18-15616

)

)

)

vs.

)

.

)

AFFIDAVIT OF
PRETRIAL OFFICER E. FLORES, ADA #5313

Jacobsen, Frederlck

Defendant,
i

)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

)ss.

County 0f Ada

I,

1.

I

2.

I

Ofﬁcer E. Flores, being ﬁrst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and

make

am

On

this afﬁdavit

currently

Pretrial

3.

)

based 0n

my personal knowledge,

employed by the Ada County

says:

except where otherwise indicated.

Sheriff’s

Ofﬁce

(hereinafter

“ACSO”)

as a

Ofﬁcer, and serve as the Pretrial Ofﬁcer for Defendant, Frederick Jacobsen.

April 2, 2018, the court ordered the Defendant t0 comply with Pretrial Conditions as a

condition 0f his release from custody, including n0

new crimes,

attend

all

court appearances,

n0 possession 0r consumption 0f illegal drugs; may only take medications as prescribed, n0
possession or consumption 0f alcohol or frequenting establishments where alcohol sales are
a primary source 0f revenue, must remain in state of Idaho but

in connection with court proceedings only

— must

return t0

may

travel t0 St.

ID when court date

is

George

UT

concluded,

alcohol monitoring as determined post interview by the Pretrial Services Unit (PSU), and

drug monitoring Via random urinalysis (UA).
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4.

On

April

201 8, the Defendant reported

6,

0n random

orientation and placed

On

this date, the

was

On April

6.

On

18,

He

actually

realize he

t0 court

missed a UA.

UA this date.

On

t0 the

in St.

test

Defendant about his missed

UA

UA.
on April

Lake

in Salt

City, returned t0 Boise

reminded the Defendant

I

in

He

that

is

it

0n April

18,

2018, and didn’t

his responsibility t0

he doesn’t miss any

advance when he has court in Utah.

tests.

I

I

make

as negative for

time. .I’m not going to
.

2018.

24, 201 8,

He

stated that

line until 5:30

time to

I

make

p.m.

it

left

make

instructed the Defendant

called

.

.I

guess

and spoke

I’ll

t0 the

he had been working

He

said that

UA.

ETG.

a message stating,

it.

sure

reminded him

also

April 23, 2018, the Defendant failed to report to Averhealth for a scheduled

On April

stated

Later this date, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a

was reported

18,

George, Utah on April 17, 2018, but that he didn’t

because he got stuck in Salt Lake City in bad weather.

me

5:59 p.m., he called and

8.

and spoke

he had court

he needs t0 notify

This

7.

it

test

ETG.

calling the testing line daily t0 ensure

is

that

t0

called

I

he stayed overnight

that

he

negative for

stated that

make

provided an

UA testing for alcohol (ETG) and drugs (standard panel).

201 8, the Defendant failed t0 report t0 Averhealth for a scheduled

April 19, 2018,

2018.

He was

Unit.

Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a baseline UA. This

later reported as

5.

t0 our Pretrial

“...I

have

was

trying t0 get into Averhealth

to schedule

it

for

tomorrow.

Defendant about his missed

by the time he called the

t0 Averhealth before they closed.

I

importance 0f calling the testing line earlier in the day.
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testing line,

.

on

.”.

UA from April 23,

house and forgot to

at his friend’s

UA. At

call the testing

he didn’t have enough

reminded the Defendant 0f the
I

instructed

him

t0

UA

this date.
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Later this date, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a

UA. This

test

was

reported as negative for standard panel.

9.

On

April 27, 2018,

I

submitted a Status Update to include the Defendant’s

UA

results

(please see attached).

10.

On May
This

test

2018, the Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a scheduled

1,

was

later reported as positive for

ETG

at

UA.

a level 0f 3,894.6 ng/ml, with the cutoff

being 500 ng/ml.

11.

On May
201 8.

2018,

4,

He

called and spoke to the Defendant about his positive

I

He

admitted to consuming alcohol 0n April 30, 2018.

0f his mother’s death was approaching, which was causing him

was a place he could go
for

BPA funding.

sliding-scale fees.

I

He

was going

1,

stated that the anniversary

stress.

left

He

asked

if there

a message stating that he had

funding but had received referrals t0 treatment
said that he

May

from

provided him with the phone number

Later this date, the Defendant called and

BPA

been denied for

t0 for outpatient treatment.

UA

to call these locations

facilities that

had

and 100k into treatment

options.

'

12.

On May 7,

13.

On May

11,

201 8, a warrant was issued for the Defendant 0n

14.

On June

12,

201 8, the above mentioned warrant was quashed.

15.

On

201 8, an Afﬁdavit was submitted.

June 13, 201

8, I

called and left a

message

this case.

for the Defendant, informing

him

required to continue calling the Averhealth testing line and reporting for

scheduled.

I

instructed

him

t0 call

me back as

that

he was

UA’s when

soon as possible.
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16.

On

June 21, 2018, the Defendant called the

PSU and

Defendant stated that he had been unaware he was
informed him that he was

17.

still

still

required t0 participate in

on

spoke

t0

Ofﬁcer

Pretrial monitoring.

Ofﬁcer Blair

UA testing.
UA. This

June 22, 2018, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled

was

test

later reported as positive for the following:

The

T. Blair.

Amphetamines

at

a level of 1,439

ng/ml, with the cutoff being 1,000 ng/ml; and Methamphetamine at a level 0f 661 ng/ml,

with the cutoffbeing 500 ng/ml.

18.

On June
201 8.

26, 201 8,

He

I

called

stated that

and spoke

to the

Defendant about his positive

he used Methamphetamine 2 days prior t0 the

he n0 longer had t0 d0

testing.

I

reminded the Defendant

that

UA from June 22,

UA because he thought
he was ordered

t0

n0

possession 0r consumption 0f illegal drugs, and he stated that he understood. Later this date,
the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled

UA.

This test was

later

June 28, 2018, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled

UA.

reported as negative for standard panel.

19.

On

This

test

was

later

20.

On June 29, 20

21.

On July 2,
He

1

201 8,

8,

I

reponed as negative

called and spoke t0 the Defendant about his missed

0n June 28, 2018, but

that

UA that date.

he missed a

test

I

On July

5,

UA.

UA 0n June 29, 201 8.

informed him that he had completed a

UA

UA

this

This

test

on June 29, 2018.

I

instructed

him

Later this date, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a

was reported
22.

ETG.

the Defendant failed t0 report t0 Averhealth for a scheduled

stated that he thought he did a

date.

for

to

UA.

as negative for standard panel.

201 8, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled UA.
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23.

On July 6,

201 8, the Defendant failed to report t0 the

2:00 p.m. 0n this date,

I

have not yet received the

PSU

for a scheduled

test results

ofﬁce

visit.

from the Defendant’s

As 0f

UA

on

July 5, 2018.
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I

certify

and

under penalty 0f perjury pursuant

t0 the

law 0f the State 0f Idaho

that the foregoing is true

correct.

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

DATED this 6‘“ day ofJuly,

2018.

éuﬁﬁm
Pref ialOfﬁcerE. Flores

Reviewed and approved

1,

Ada County Sh
Pretrial Services

i

s

ADA #5313

by:

Supervisor

Ofﬁce

Unit

7180 Barrister Drive
Boise, ID 83704
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Electronically Filed
7/18/2018 10:14 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Phyllis Morriss, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

NOTICE OF LODGING

COMES NOW, David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, State
of Idaho, and hereby lodges a copy of the Affidavit of Pretrial Officer E. Flores for consideration
with the Motion to Revoke and Increase Bond which was previously filed.
DATED this _____day
of July, 2018.
16
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Mu

By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
18th day of July, 2018, I caused to be served, a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _______
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Lodging upon the individual(s) named below in the
manner noted:
Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By hand delivering said document to defense counsel.
 By emailing a copy of said document to defense counsel.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By iCourt eFile and Serve.

mm

_________________________
Legal Assistant
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Electronically Filed
7/19/2018 5:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Chynae Hull, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

NOTICE OF LODGING

COMES NOW, David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, State
of Idaho, and hereby lodges for the Court's consideration, an Affidavit of Pretrial Officer E. Flores
dated July 19, 2018, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Mu

By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of July, 2018, I caused to be served, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Lodging upon the individual(s) named below in the manner
noted:
Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By hand delivering said document to defense counsel.
 By emailing a copy of said document to defense counsel.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By iCourt eFile and Serve.

mm

gm

_________________________
wanna;
Legal Assistant
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IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Case N0. CR01-18-15616
Plaintiff,

VS.

AFFIDAVIT OF
PRETRIAL OFFICER E. FLORES, ADA #5313

Jacobsen, Frederick

Defendant,

STATE OF IDAHO

)

)ss.

County 0f Ada

Ofﬁcer E. Flores, being ﬁrst duly sworn upon

I,

I

make

I

am

On

this

afﬁdavit based 0n

currently

Pretrial

.

)

my personal

oath, deposes

and says:

knowledge, except where otherwise indicated.

employed by the Ada County

Sheriff‘s

Ofﬁce (hereinaﬁer “ACSO”)

as a

Ofﬁcer, and serve as the Pretrial Ofﬁcer for Defendant, Frederick Jacobsen.

April 2, 2018, the court ordered the Defendant to comply with Pretrial Conditions as a

condition 0f his release from custody, including n0

n0 possession or consumption 0f

illegal drugs;

new

may

crimes, attend

all

court appearances,

only take medications as prescribed, n0

possession 0r consumption of alcohol or frequenting establishments where alcohol sales are

a primary source of revenue, must remain in state of Idaho but

in

connection with court proceedings only — must return t0 ID

may

when

travel t0 St.

court date

is

George

UT

concluded,

alcohol monitoring as determined post interview by the Pretrial Services Unit (PSU), and

drug monitoring via random urinalysis (UA).
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EXHIBIT
A

4.

On

April

201

6,

was

date, the

On April

6.

On

18,

He

actually

stated that he

make

realize he

it

missed a UA.

UA this date.

On

to court

t0 the

in St.

Defendant about his missed

test

UA

0n April

reminded the Defendant that

in

was reported

it is

18,

He

in Utah.

tests.

I

I

make

sure

also reminded

him

instructed the Defendant

time. .I’m not going t0
.

2018.

24, 201 8,

He

stated that

line until 5:30

time t0

I

make

p.m.

it

left

make

called

a message stating,

it.

.

.I

guess

and spoke

I’ll

to the

he had been working

He

said that

UA.

ETG.

April 23, 2018, the Defendant failed t0 report t0 Averhealth for a scheduled

On April

stated

2018, and didn’t

his responsibility to

he doesn’t miss any

advance when he has court

as negative for

18,

George, Utah 0n April 17, 2018, but that he didn’t

because he got stuck in Salt Lake City in bad weather.

I

test

UA.

Later this date, the Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a

5:59 p.m., he called and

8.

and spoke

had court

me

he needs to notify

This

(standard panel).

ETG.

calling the testing line daily t0 ensure

is

that

7.

called

I

provided an

and completed a baseline UA. This

he stayed overnight in Salt Lake City, returned t0 Boise on April

that

t0

negative for

t0 Averhealth

(ETG) and drugs

201 8, the Defendant failed t0 report t0 Averhealth for a scheduled

April 19, 2018,

2018.

he

Defendant reported

later reported as

5.

UA testing for alcohol

on random

orientation and placed

On this

He was

the Defendant reported t0 our Pretrial Unit.

8,

“...I

have

was

trying to get into Averhealth

t0 schedule

it

for

tomorrow.

Defendant about his missed

by the time he called the

t0 Averhealth before they closed.

importance of calling the testing line earlier in the day.
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I

testing line,

.

0n

.”.

UA from April 23,

house and forgot to

at his friend’s

UA. At

call the testing

he didn’t have enough

reminded the Defendant of the
I

instructed

him

t0

UA

this date.
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Later this date, the Defendant reported to Averhealth and completed a

UA. This

test

was

reported as negative for standard panel.

9.

On

April 27, 2018,

I

submitted a Status Update t0 include the Defendant’s

UA

results

(please see attached).

10.

On May
This

test

2018, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled

1,

was

later reported as positive for

ETG

at

UA.

a level 0f 3,894.6 ng/ml, with the cutoff

being 500 ng/ml.

11.

On May
201 8.

2018,

4,

He

called

I

and spoke

t0 the

Defendant about his positive

He

admitted t0 consuming alcohol 0n April 30, 201 8.

of his mother’s death was approaching, which was causing him

was a place he could g0
for

BPA funding.

been denied for

t0 for outpatient treatment.

I

sliding-scale fees.

He

was going

May

1,

stated that the anniversary

stress.

left

He

asked

if there

a message stating that he had

funding but had received referrals t0 treatment
said that he

from

provided him with the phone number

Later this date, the Defendant called and

BPA

UA

t0 call these locations

facilities that

and 100k

had

into treatment

options.

12.

On May

7,

13.

On May

11,

20 1 8, a warrant was issued

14.

On June

12,

20 1 8, the above mentioned wanant was quashed.

15.

On

201 8, an Affidavit was submitted.

June 13, 201 8,

I

called

and

left

for the

Defendant 0n

this case.

a message for the Defendant, informing him that he was

required t0 continue calling the Averhealth testing line and reponing for

scheduled.

I

instructed

him

to call

me

UA’s when

back as soon as possible.
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16.

On

June 21, 2018, the Defendant called the

PSU

Defendant stated that he had been unaware he was
informed him that he was
17.

still

and spoke

still

required to participate in

0n

t0

Ofﬁcer

The

T. Blair.

Pretrial monitoring.

Ofﬁcer Blair

UA testing.

June 22, 2018, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled UA. This

was

test

later

reported as positive for the following:

Amphetamines

at

a level 0f 1,439

ng/ml, with the cutoff being 1,000 ng/ml; and Methamphetamine at a level 0f 661 ng/ml,

with the cutoff being 500 ng/ml.

18.

On

June 26, 201 8,

201 8.

He

I

called

stated that

and spoke

t0 the

Defendant about his positive

he used Methamphetamine 2 days prior

he no longer had t0 d0

testing.

I

to the

reminded the Defendant

that

UA from June 22,

UA because he thought
he was ordered

t0

n0

possession 0r consumption of illegal drugs, and he stated that he understood. Later this date,
the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled

UA. This

test

was

later

reponed as negative for standard panel.
19.

On

June 28, 2018, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled UA.

This

test

was

later reported as

20.

On June 29,

21.

On

July 2, 201

He

stated that

8, I

called

and spoke to the Defendant about his missed

he thought he did a
that

UA that date.

he missed a

test

I

UA 0n June 29, 201 8.

informed him that he had completed a

UA

UA

this

This

test

0n June 29, 2018.

I

instructed

him

Later this date, the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a

was reported
22.

ETG.

201 8, the Defendant failed t0 report t0 Averhealth for a scheduled UA.

0n June 28, 2018, but
date.

negative for

On July

5,

t0

UA.

as negative for standard panel.

201

8,

the Defendant reported t0 Averhealth and completed a scheduled
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23.

On July 6,

2018, the Defendant failed t0 report t0 the

2:00 p.m. on this date,
July 5, 201

24.

On

I

have not yet received the

an Afﬁdavit was submitted.

8,

Averhealth for a scheduled
stating, “...I

25.

On

.

test results

UA.

At 6:26

On

this date, the

my

brother...I didn’t realize

I

26.

On

call t0 the

full,

and

I

I

dirty...l

received the test results from the Defendant’s

and

I

Defendant regarding his missed

was unable

July 10, 2018,

full,

Defendant

UA 0n

failed t0 report t0

and

left

was

actually riding

wouldn’t have enough time

Averhealth reported the results as negative for standard panel.

was

As of

a message

t0

make

it

.”.

July 9, 2018,

phone

from the Defendant’s

p.m., the Defendant called

spaced our meeting today...1’m not guilty...not

bikes with

back.

for a scheduled ofﬁce visit.

8.

July 6, 201

dirt

PSU

I

t0 leave a

on July

6,

0n July

this date,

2018.

call t0 the

attempted a

Defendant. His voicemail box was

t0 leave a message.

On July

12,

201 8, the Defendant failed to report to Averhealth for a scheduled

28.

On July

13,

201 8, an Afﬁdavit was submitted.

29.

On July

18,

201

30.

On

the Defendant failed to report to Averhealth for a scheduled

July 19, 2018, as of 2:00 p.m.,

July 6, 201

2018.

His voicemail box

27.

8,

I

5,

message.

attempted another phone

was unable

UA

On

UA

I

UA.

UA.

have had n0 communication with the Defendant since

8.
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I

under penalty 0f peljury pursuant to the law 0f the State of Idaho that the foregoing

certify

and

is

true

correct.

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

DATED this

19‘“

day ofJuly, 201 8.

(.14

gaW/x /

Pretvrielefﬁcer E. Flores,

Reviewed and approved
\

\.

v‘

(1

ADA #53 l3

by:

-

©m<_ﬁ)\&m5cm cw

Christine Krzeminski, Superﬁkor

Ada County

Sheriff’s

Pretrial Services

Ofﬁce

Unit

71 80 Barrister Drive

Boise, ID 83704
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REARDON / MASTERS MADSEN

20 JULY 2018

/

Time
09:55:24

Speaker

Note

AM-

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CR01

09:55:44mAMf”

Preseﬁt:

AM’7Hunt‘"

09:57:32

AM: French
'

AM

?Response suggesting

Ms. French (on behalf of Debra

GPS

monitoring.

'l’f

66nd‘is 'fév‘ok'etask for a

surrender

'

Hunt

have a bit more information to present to the Court- NCIC shows
he had three misdemeanor arrests in Salt Lake City on 12 July
I

_

Response

10:00:32 AME-Fr’ench

10:00:56

for the State,

MOIREVOKE BOND

;Argues motion.
self

:

Davnd Hunt

18 15616

.Gf9be’9.).f°' the...99.f.§"§ﬁ: .Eﬁfeﬂdant 9.9.9999

0935608

09:59 38

1A-CRT508

AM: Court

Not inclined to Eoné’idér that but ihclined to consider his lack of
performance while on pretrial release Revoke pretrial release grant
motion to Increase bond to $20 000. Defendant remanded.
I

10:03:45 AM?-

End
j

7/20/201 8

of

case

1of1
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K.“

H

(I'M,-

f

J
a.

IN

y:

-

lmf

"

THE DISTRICT COURT 0F THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DESTRICT 01?
THE STATE 0F IDAHO,

1N

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE 0F IDAHO.
Case No. CR-

Plaintiff,

m

‘6’
l

13

l/

1

(a

VS.

F“h,“ HL-

ORDER CHANGING BOND

xU ngy‘ﬂk
Defendant.

IT IS
$

ép lﬂ’ 0

HEREBY ORDERED that thc Defendant’s bond -ecreased lo

/h
and made subject

to the following conditions:

MAINTAIN CLOSE AND CAREFUL CONTACT WITH COUNSEL
MAKE ALI. FUTURE COURT DATES

NO ALCOHOL
NO DRUGS WITHOUT PHYSICIAN PRESCRIP'I‘ION
NO FURTHER CRIMINAL CHARGES
CONTACT PROBATION OFFICER
COMPLY WITH TERMS OF PROBATION
REMAIN IN ADA COUNTY/IDAHO
IMMEDIA’I‘ELY

MAKE ALL PRESENTENCE INTERVIEWS

Dazed

this

Bl ’V

day or

’29} A

.20

\

my,

(lU/SL
MVCHAWARDON
District

cc:

File,

Ada County

Judge

Jail
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Filed: 07/23/2018 10:06:06
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 287-7700
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

ORDER TO REVOKE AND
INCREASE BOND

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on State’s Motion in the matter of State v.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN and being otherwise advised in the premises, Orders that
$20,000
the Defendant’s bond is hereby revoked and increased to ____________.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED _____________________
Signed: 7/20/2018 03:39 PM

______________________________
Judge
ORDER TO REVOKE AND INCREASE BOND (JACOBSEN) Page 1
000090

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on ___________________,
I served the foregoing document upon
23 July, 2018
the following attorneys, persons and agencies at the addresses listed below.
Debra Anne Groberg
PO Box 2772
Boise ID 83701
David M. Hunt
Ada County Prosecutor’s Office
200 W. Front Street #3191
Boise, ID 83702
Ada County Sheriff
acsocourtdocs@adaweb.net

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ X ] Email
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ X ] Email
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Ada County Clerk of the Court
___________________________
Deputy Clerk
Signed: 7/23/2018 10:06 AM
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Electronically Filed
7/24/2018 11:07 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
DISCOVERY RESPONSE
TO COURT

COMES NOW, David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has complied with the Defendant’s Request
for Discovery.
23 day of July, 2018.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the _____
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Mu

By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (JACOBSEN) Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____
24th day of July, 2018, I caused to be served, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Discovery Response to Court upon the individual(s) named below
in the manner noted:

W

Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701
 By iCourt eFile and Serve.

Legal Assistant

DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (JACOBSEN) Page 2
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Electronically Filed

7/25/2018 2:10

Fouﬁh

PM

Judicial Disﬁrict.

Ada Coumy

Christopher D. Rich, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Phyllis Morriss, Deputy Clerk

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

303 West Bannock
P.O.

Box 2772

Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

d rober

nbmlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO.

CR01-18-15616

)

vs.

)

)

DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF
SERVICE OF RESPONSE

)

TO STATE’S REQUEST FOR

)

DISCOVERY

)

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSON,
Defendant.

)

Defendant Frederick Jacobson, through

his attorneys,

hereby provides notice pursuant t0

Idaho Criminal Rule 16 that he has served on counsel for the State Defendant’s Response
State’s

to

Request for Discovery.

DATED this 25‘“ day ofJuly, 2018.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

/s/

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO STATE’S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
-

1

000094

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

that

on

this 25th

day of

July,

2018,

I

electronically ﬁled the

foregoing with the Clerk 0fthe Court using the iCourt e-ﬁle system, which caused the following
parties or counsel to

Ada County

be served by electronic means:
Prosecutor

acpocourtdocs@adaweb .net

/s/

Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO STATE’S REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY - 2
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IN

4TH JUDICIAL DI§JRICT OF THE
THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'fHE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FO‘R THE COUNTYNQEAﬁATﬂ.
JUL

THE STATE 0F IDAHO,
Plaintiﬁ,

N o TIC E O F

vs.

2'5 ZI‘ES

WME
‘

L
Bﬂﬁﬁ D.ﬁuCH.C!-m

MEREDITH

DE’U‘TV

JACOBSEN, FREDERCIKJEREMIAH

AND
BOND

Defendant

RECEIPT

You are hereby notiﬁed that you must appear before the Judge,
on 10/19/2018

at 10:30

A.M.

ADA County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
you fail to appear as specified herein, your bond
forfeited and a Warrant of Arrest will be issued against you.

You are further notiﬁed that

if

Bond Amount

Charge #1

Case #

Bond #

Bond Type

Cash

Bond Type

D

Pcs

$20,000.00

CR01-18-15616

AC25-7544484

Charge #2

Bond Amount

Case

t!

Bond #

Charge #3

Bond Amount

Case

ti

Bond #

Charge #4

Bond Amount

Case #

Bond

St

Bond Type

Charge #5

Bond Amount

Case #

Bond ﬂ

Bond Type

Bond Amount

Case #

Bond ﬂ

Cash

[j

be

Surety

g
D
D
D
D

Surety

E]

Surety

Surety

Bond Type

D
Cash D
Cash D
Cash D

Cash

Charge #6

will

Surety
Surety

Bond Type

Bonding Agency/Person:

ALADDIN BAIL BONDS
Address:

80 N COLE RD

W
City:

State:

Zip Code:

BOISE

ID

83704

Bondsperson:

RYAN BERNHARD

This
|

is

understand that

l

appear

/

ﬂ
Printed:

I

DeWnt

7/20/2018 12:38

NOTICE TO APPEAR.
being released on the conditions of posting bail and my promise

to certify thatl have received a copy of this

am

in

court at the time, date and place described

9W
PM

By:TO4496(lnitials

& ADA#)

Z-r

in this

to

notice.

z iv (J,
Date
C301 - 13 - 1551B

BRCD
Bond Receipt and Court Date

000096
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Electronically Filed
8/10/2018 3:13 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
Attorneys for the Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSON,
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

Defendant Frederick Jeremiah Jacobson, through his attorneys, moves the Court for its
Order suppressing as evidence against him all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
search and seizure of his person and vehicle in Ada County, Idaho on or about April 1, 2018.
This Motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b), the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. This Motion is supported by the contemporaneously filed memorandum of
counsel.
Mr. Jacobson requests an evidentiary hearing be set and the opportunity to present a
post-hearing supporting memorandum of law.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 1
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DATED this 10th day of August, 2018.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of August, 2018, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt e-file system, which caused the
following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means:
Ada County Prosecutor
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 2
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Electronically Filed
8/10/2018 3:13 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
Attorneys for the Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSON,
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

COMES NOW, Frederick Jacobson, through his attorney, and files this Memorandum
in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.
I.

FACTS PERTAINING TO THE MOTION1

On April 1, 2018, at approximately 8:22 a.m., Meridian Police Department’s Officer
Mikowski was traveling westbound on Overland Road when a small black Toyota truck driven
by Frederick Jacobson passed him traveling eastbound. Officer Mikowski executed a U-turn
and began following the vehicle. Once following the vehicle, Officer Mikowski observed the
rear license plate of the truck was not mounted on the rear bumper of the vehicle and a portion
of the license plate was blocked by a decal on the window so he could not read the registration
The facts as stated in this memorandum are from the discovery and are the anticipated testimony at an
evidentiary hearing.

1
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tab. The truck turned southbound onto Eagle Road and Officer Mikowski activated his
overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop of Mr. Jacobson’s vehicle. Mr. Jacobson
immediately pulled his vehicle to the shoulder of Eagle Road and stopped. Officer Mikowski
approached Mr. Jacobson’s vehicle and indicated he had been stopped for failing to have his
license plate mounted on the rear of the truck and because the registration tags were not visible
due to the decal in the window. Officer Mikowski then requested insurance, driver’s license,
and registration. He also requested identification from Mr. Jacobson’s sole passenger in the
vehicle, Christopher Roest, who provided his license. Mr. Jacobson provided his identification
card and explained that he did not have a driver’s license and asked if that would require the
vehicle be towed. Officer Mikowski stated that his honesty would go a long way and they
would get it figured out. Video 1 until 2:00.
Officer Mikowski then returned to his vehicle and ran a record check of both parties.
After spending approximately four and a half minutes in his vehicle running their information,
Office Mikowski again returned to the vehicle and asked if they had found the registration or
insurance. Mr. Jacobson responded that he did not because he had just bought the truck and
had just moved out here this week, but he did have the bill of sale for the truck and provided
the bill of sale to Officer Mikowski. The officer questioned Mr. Jacobson about where he was
from and why he moved here, he then asked about whether Mr. Jacobson or his passenger were
on probation, parole, or out on bail. Mr. Jacobson responded no and his passenger explained he
was on bail for a revoked registration and license and possession of paraphernalia. During the
questioning, a second police unit arrived on scene to assist Officer Mikowski. Id. at 2:00 –
8:15.
Officer Mikowski then returned to his vehicle and while walking to his vehicle

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 2
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requested a canine unit to also assist. Officer Mikowski proceeds to sit in his vehicle and type
and search on his computer for the next approximately fourteen minutes before printing
citations for Mr. Jacobson. Id. at 8:20 – 22:30. During this span of time, Officer Mikowski also
placed a call to another officer to ask what code violation to use if someone does not have a
driver’s license. The officer responded to cite for failure to purchase or invalid license, Idaho
Code § 49-301, and then asked Officer Mikowski, “got any dope or no?” To which he
responds, “I think it’s a pretty good stop, we’ll see.” Id. at 17:00.
The canine unit (Officer Kindelberger) also arrives while Officer Mikowski was still in
his vehicle. He approached Officer Mikowski’s vehicle and Officer Mikowski turns off his
audio and a conversation ensued while both officers’ audios are off. Id. at 9:10; Video 2 at 0:00
– 0:30. Officer Kindelberger then approached Mr. Jacobson’s vehicle, directed him out of the
vehicle, patted him down for weapons, and directed him to sit in front of Officer Mikowski’s
vehicle. There he questions Mr. Jacobson numerous times about whether there are drugs in the
vehicle. Video 2 at 0:30. Officer Kindelberger leaves Mr. Jacobson and proceeds to pull the
passenger, Mr. Roest, out of the vehicle to search him for weapons and interrogate him about
his drug use. Id. at 2:30. During the questioning of Mr. Roest, Officer Mikowski finished
printing the citations and stepped out of his vehicle. Officer Mikowski approaches Mr.
Jacobson and directs him to sit on a curb by his patrol vehicle. Id. at 3:30; Video 1 at 22:25.
With his audio still off, Officer Mikowski speaks for a moment with Mr. Jacobson as
he is seated on the curb and then returns to the truck to direct Mr. Roast to sit on the curb next
to Mr. Jacobson. He then stands behind the two while Officer Kindelberger retrieves his canine
from his vehicle, then he moves to stand in front of the two while another officer stands behind
them. Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Roest remain seated on the ground, surrounded by three officers
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while Officer Kindelberger runs his canine past them to conduct a sniff of the vehicle. During
this encounter, all officers have their audio turned off. At no point does Officer Mikowski
attempt to provide the printed citations to Mr. Jacobson. Finally, Officer Mikowski turns on his
audio and the ongoing conversation is wholly unrelated to the purpose of the initial stop. Id. at
25:30. The canine eventually alerts on the vehicle and Officer Mikowski assists Officer
Kindelberger in conducting a search of the vehicle.
After the vehicle is searched and nothing is found, Officer Mikowski returns to Mr.
Jacobson, still sitting on the curb, and directs him to stand and speak with him away from Mr.
Roest. Id. at 35:40. The following conversation ensues:
Officer Mikowski:
Mr. Jacobson:
Officer Mikowski:
Mr. Jacobson:
Officer Mikowski:
Mr. Jacobson:

Do you got anything illegal on you?
No.
Nothing at all, nothing? I know they checked you for weapons,
you got nothing in your pockets, anything like that?
I’ve got a lighter.
Without reaching in. Is it cool if I check really quick man?
I’ve got a lighter, chapstick. Yeah, go ahead.

Officer Mikowski thoroughly searches Mr. Jacobson’s person and finds a small baggie of
white substance in the coin pocket of Mr. Jacobson’s pants. Mr. Jacobson is arrested and
placed into Officer Mikowski’s vehicle. Mr. Jacobson is now charged with one count of
possession of a controlled substance, a felony. Mr. Jacobson now challenges the legality of the
seizure and search conducted in this matter and requests this Court suppress all evidence
obtained resultant from this unlawful seizure and search.
II.

WHY RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Greene, 140 Idaho
605, 607, 97 P.3d 472, 474 (Ct. App. 2004). “Evidence discovered in result of an illegal search
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will be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Id. (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable. Id.
A.

Officers Kindelberger and Mikowski did not have a reasonable belief that
Mr. Jacobson was armed and dangerous and thus were not justified in
searching or even asking to search him.

Officers Kindelberger nor Mikowski had a right to search Mr. Jacobson for weapons,
and any request to do so was unjustified. Officer Mikowski further did not have a right, either
pursuant to a Terry patdown or Mr. Jacobson’s consent, to pull out the clear plastic baggie
from Mr. Jacobson’s pocket.
“Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), police may conduct a warrantless search of a
person, without an arrest, if they are conducting the search for the limited purpose of
discovering weapons.” Id. The purpose of the limited patdown search, however, is not to
discover evidence of a crime, “but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear
of violence.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
The United States Supreme Court carefully considered when law enforcement may
perform a patdown on a person in Ybarra v. Illinois. The Court scrutinized the legality of a
police frisk of a patron of a bar where an authorized narcotics search was taking place. The
Court stated that:
The Terry case created an exception to the requirement of probable cause, an
exception whose “narrow scope” this Court “has been careful to maintain.”
Under that doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and
safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or
suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted. Nothing in
Terry can be understood to allow a generalized “cursory search for weapons”
or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The “narrow scope”
of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked . . . .”
444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (citation omitted, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
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In Ybarra, police were executing a warrant at a tavern where Ybarra happened to be a
customer.
Upon seeing Ybarra, [police] neither recognized him as a person with a criminal
history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to
assault them. Moreover . . . [his] hands were empty, [he] gave no indication of
possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent
to commit an assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening .
. . [and] the most [police] could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a 3/4length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be expected on
almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March.
Id. at 93. The Court concluded that the state could not “articulate any specific fact that would
have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and
dangerous.” Id. The search of Ybarra was held to have been unreasonable. Id.
The Ninth Circuit has opined that “[a] wide variety of factors support a reasonable
belief that an individual is armed and dangerous.” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d
1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). In Ramirez, an officer noticed a car parked outside a drugstore with
a man apparently asleep at the wheel. Id. The officer subsequently detained, searched, and
arrested the man, Ramirez, for being under the influence of a controlled substance. Id. Ramirez
later sued the officer’s city and appealed when the district court granted the city’s motion for
summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that:
[T]he officer’s pat-down search of plaintiff violated the Fourth Amendment, as
there was a complete lack of evidence that would support a reasonable suspicion
that he had a weapon. Being “testy” and suspected of illicit drug use did not
support a finding that he had a weapon.
Id. The Court listed the facts surrounding Ramirez’s frisk:
Ramirez was cooperative. He complied with Montez’s request that he exit his
vehicle, and there is no evidence he did so in a furtive manner. There is nothing
in the record to suggest Ramirez made any abrupt movements or that he
attempted to reach for anything upon exiting his vehicle. He also cooperatively
submitted to the search of his person, albeit without his consent. Montez
testified that he tapped Ramirez’s outer garments “to make sure” there were no
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bulges or weapons concealed, but does not allege that he observed a visible
bulge or weapon on Ramirez.
Id. In conclusion, the Court recognized that “[a]lthough the nature of the suspected crime itself
does at times provide the requisite amount of reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down
search of a detained individual . . . this court has never held that mere suspicion of drug use
alone provides the basis for a Terry frisk.” Id.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho found a patdown search to be unreasonable in
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 661, 152 P.3d 16, 22 (2007). In Henage, two brothers were
stopped in a truck with a broken taillight. Id. at 657, 152 P.3d at 18. Law enforcement issued
the driver a citation and told the brothers they were free to go, but then, because the two police
officers were aware that the brothers had prior drug involvement, the officers decided to
continue questioning them. Id. One officer told the brother who was a passenger that he
wanted to talk to him “about some things.” Id.
The officer testified that he had known the brother for several years and had “never had
a problem with him,” stating that during this encounter with the brother, the brother was polite
but nervous. Id. The brother agreed to answer questions and exited the truck. Id. The officer
asked the brother if he had contraband on his person, and the brother responded that he had a
knife. Id. The officer performed a patdown on the brother and retrieved the knife. Id. The
officer then
. . . resumed the search. As the search continued, he “felt a large hard object in
one of [the brother’s] cargo pockets.” When asked what the object was, [the
brother] responded that he did not know. [The officer] reached into the pocket
and removed two objects, which he identified as a glass pipe and a cigar tube.
[The officer] opened the cigar tube and found a white rock later identified as
methamphetamine.
Id.
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In opining on the brother’s appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, the Court set
out the rules regarding a patdown search, noting that: “Whether an officer may reasonably
justify such a search is evaluated in light of the ‘facts known to the officers on the scene and
the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of the circumstances.’”
Id. (quoting State v. Wright, 134 Idaho79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301).
The officer testified that, after the brother was known to have a knife, he “felt” that his
safety had been compromised. Id. The Court stated that this did not justify the patdown search
of the brother. Id. Weapons searches, the Court stated, are not justified by an officer’s
subjective feeling; rather, the officer must present specific facts that can be objectively
evaluated to support the conclusion that the subject of the intended search posed a potential
risk. Id. The Court reversed the denial of the brother’s motion to suppress. Id.
In summary, the Court in Ybarra found a patdown to be unreasonable when police:
know nothing about a person; have no reason to stop that person (even though they are on
premises that are subject to a warrant); and the person makes no threatening gestures. The
Ramirez Court reasoned that being testy, under-the-influence, and sleeping behind the wheel of
a car is not behavior that merits a frisk. The Court in Henage found a patdown to be
unreasonable when: the encounter is consensual; the person makes no threatening gestures; the
person is known to be nice; but the person has a knife and is known to have had illicit drug
involvement in the past.
Officer Mikowski did have cause to stop Mr. Jacobson--for a minor traffic infractions-and then cite him for those infractions and failure to purchase a license but, while failure to
purchase a license is a misdemeanor offense under Idaho Code § 49-301, it is a non-arrestable
offense, I.C. § 19-603, and Officer Mikowski did not intend to arrest Mr. Jacobson for the
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offense. Nonetheless, Officer Kindelberger asked Mr. Jacobson to exit his vehicle and patted
him down for weapons, and Officer Mikowski later proceeded to ask Mr. Jacobson if he could
pat him down for weapons.
The Ninth Circuit has held that where an officer does not have a reasonable belief that a
defendant is armed and dangerous, even his question whether the defendant has any weapons is
not justified. United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Officer Kindelberger
did not have an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Jacobson was armed or dangerous, and
his question asking if he could search Mr. Jacobson was therefore not justified.
The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful
patdown search may not be used against the victim of that search. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho
26, 407 P.3d 1285, 1289 (2017). Here, Officers Kindelberger and Mikowski were not justified
in asking to frisk Mr. Jacobson, and thus, evidence obtained as a result of the searches cannot
be used against Mr. Jacobson and should be suppressed.
B.

Officer Mikowski’s seizure of the clear, plastic baggie from Mr. Jacobson’s
pocket exceeded both the limits of an allowable patdown under Terry and
the scope of Mr. Jacobson’s consent to search him for weapons.
1.

Officer Mikowski exceeded the limits of an allowable patdown under
Terry when he removed the baggie of methamphetamine from Mr.
Jacobson’s pocket.

Even had Officer Mikowski been justified in asking to perform a search of Mr.
Jacobson, Officer Mikowski exceeded the allowable limits of such a search. The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the limits of an allowable patdown under Terry are
narrowly drawn. For example in Minnesota v. Dickerson, the defendant was convicted for
possession of a controlled substance after he was frisked by a police officer who found a lump
of cocaine in his pocket. 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993). The officer in that case, while performing a

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 9

000107

protective patdown, did not immediately recognize a lump within the suspect’s pocket as crack
cocaine. Id. Instead, he determined that the lump was crack only after squeezing, sliding, and
otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket -- a pocket which the officer
already knew contained no weapon. Id. The Dickerson Court affirmed the state court’s ruling
that the police officer overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed bounds of a Terry
search, stating that:
Here, the officer’s continued exploration of respondent’s pocket after having
concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to ‘the sole justification of
the search [under Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others
nearby.’ It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry
expressly refused to authorize, and that we have condemned in subsequent
cases.
Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has similarly recognized the limits of Terry. In State v.
Watson, the defendant’s neighbors called police because Watson was walking around his
apartment complex yelling obscenities and talking about killing people. 143 Idaho 840, 842,
153 P.3d 1186, 1188 (Ct. App. 2007). Police responded to a second call from Watson’s
neighbors on the same day. Id. During that second contact, the police officer cuffed Watson
and proceeded to pat him down. Id. “The officer felt a hard object and reached into Watson’s
pocket to remove the object. In doing so, the officer emptied all items from Watson’s front
pocket. The officer found money, a toothpaste container, keys, and a small, plastic bag that
contained methamphetamine.” Id. Watson moved to suppress the methamphetamine. Id.
The Court first affirmed that “. . . discovering an unidentified ‘bulge’ in a pocket during
the course of a lawful pat-down would entitle the officers to assure themselves that it was not a
weapon.” Id. at 44, 153 P.3d at 1190. The Court continued, however, to state that:
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Police officers may not further intrude on a person’s privacy without first
attempting to determine by touch whether the object causing a bulge could be a
weapon. See United States v. Campa, 234 F.3d 733, 739 (1st Cir. 2000)
(reaching into pockets whenever officer felt a protrusion and emptying all items
indiscriminately not permitted when he did not attempt to distinguish between
bulging items that could have been weapons and other types of concealed
objects). Nor may officers further intrude on a person’s privacy when an
objectively reasonable determination can be made by touch that the object
causing the bulge is not a weapon based on its size and density. See Ellis v.
State, 573 So. 2d 724, 725 (Miss. 1990) (officer exceeded limits of Terry frisk
in removing bag causing obvious bulge in pants when he testified bag did not
feel like a solid object).
We therefore hold that the permissible scope of a pat-down search for weapons
is limited to the minimum intrusion necessary to reasonably assure the officer
that the suspect does not have a weapon. If the officer is unable to make an
objectively reasonable determination that an object causing a bulge under a
person’s clothing is not a weapon by feeling its size and density, the officer is
entitled to further invade the person’s privacy only to the extent necessary that
such a determination can be made.
Id. at 845, 153 P.3d at 1191.
There is no indication that Officer Mikowski suspected that the tiny baggie in Mr.
Jacobson’s pocket was a weapon. Officer Mikowski’s continued exploration of Mr. Jacobson’s
pocket was the type of search, as in Dickerson, that exceeds the sole justification set out in
Terry—safety—and that the United States Supreme Court has condemned. As in Watson,
Officer Mikowski “exceeded the scope of a pat-down search for weapons when he emptied
[Mr. Jacobson’s] pocket.” Officer Mikowski intentionally removed an item that could not have
been a weapon when it was unnecessary to do so in violation of Terry. The contraband pulled
out by Officer Mikowski should be suppressed.
2.

Officer Mikowski exceeded the scope of Mr. Jacobson’s consent to search
for weapons.

Whether scope of consent to search has been exceeded is a factual question determined
by totality of circumstances. United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Consent to search is considered a waiver of the right to demand a warrant; thus, it can be
limited in the same way that the specifications of a warrant may be limited i.e. the places to be
searched and the items to be searched for. Id. As the Idaho Court of Appeals has said:
It is well settled that when the basis for a search is consent, the State must
conform its search to the limitations placed upon the right granted by the
consent. The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, or in other words what a
reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer
and the suspect. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 297(1991) . . .
State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626, 288 P.3d 840, 843 (Ct. App. 2012) (some citations
omitted).
In State v. Bonilla, police stopped Bonilla after watching his car, based upon a tip he
was operating a mobile meth lab and witnessing him commit traffic infractions. 161 Idaho 902,
903, 392 P.3d 1243, 1244 (Ct. App. 2017). The officer asked Bonilla to exit the vehicle and he
eventually agreed. Id. Then:
As Bonilla exited the vehicle, Officer Reimers saw a six-inch Maglight on the
driver’s side floorboard, which the officer testified he knew from his training
and experience could be used as a club or weapon. The officer obtained consent
to search Bonilla for weapons and lifted Bonilla’s shirt to look at his waistband.
When doing this, the officer observed a plastic baggie containing
marijuana sticking out of Bonilla’s pocket. The officer then placed Bonilla
under arrest and deployed a drug dog. A search of Bonilla’s vehicle led to the
discovery of methamphetamine, hydrocodone, Temazepam, Quetiapine, a
digital scale, and a shotgun.
Id. Bonilla appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, which he
brought on the grounds that the officer’s search of him exceeded either a Terry patdown
or, alternatively, his consent. Id.
The Court of Appeals, relying on the rules set out in State v. Tyler, found that the
district court did not err in concluding that Bonilla consented to a search, noting that the
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officer’s preliminary hearing testimony supported such a finding:
Q. That’s okay. How did he respond to your inquiry about the additional
weapons?
A. I asked him if I could check his person for weapons, and he told me that he
would allow me to do that.
Q. What did you discover when you patted him down for weapons?
A. Well, he had a T-shirt that was falling below his belt line, and when I lifted
his T-shirt to inspect his waistline, I observed a baggie sticking out of the right
pocket of his pants.
Id. The Court concluded that the lifting of Bonilla’s shirt was within the scope of consent for a
search of weapons and that therefore the search of Bonilla’s person did not exceed his consent.
Id. at 904, 392 P.3d at 1245.
Unlike the officer in Bonilla, however, Officer Mikowski desired to go beyond the
scope of Mr. Jacobson’s original consent to a search for weapons, engaging in conduct that
equated to more than the equivalent of lifting a shirt to check a waistband. This is evidenced by
the fact that Officer Mikowski had to dig in the small pocket of Mr. Jacobson’s pant to pull out
the tiny plastic baggie. Video 1 at 36:15.
C.

Officer Mikowski Unlawfully Prolonged the Seizure of Mr. Jacobson and
Initiated a New Unreasonable Seizure by Launching into a Drug
Investigation Without Reasonable Articulable Suspicion.
1.

An Abandonment of the Purpose of a Seizure Without New Reasonable
Suspicion Is Unlawful.

An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
justifying suspicion that a detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). Idaho
courts have long held that such detentions must be temporary and last no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct.
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App. 2004); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus,
where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931, citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357,
361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000).
An initially reasonable detention becomes unreasonable if an officer extends the
duration of the stop to investigate other criminal conduct for which there is no reasonable
suspicion. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Thus, if addressing an infraction is the
purpose of the stop, the stop may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 407 (2007)). Because an officer must be focused on effectuating the purpose of a stop,
“[w]here a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its
underlying justification.” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924, P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016),
citing Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. Further, the officer is obligated to diligently
pursue his duties with respect to the initial purpose of the stop. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605,
609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016) (referring to Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616
(2015)).
Importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court recently clarified the import of Rodriguez for
Idaho courts:
The United States Supreme Court has plainly established that a traffic stop is a
seizure, but it is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment so long
as there is a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic
laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621
(1981). The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues
the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related. However,
should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that
original reasonable suspicion supporting his new actions. Indeed, when an officer
abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes
initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own
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reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggy-back
on the reasonableness of the original seizure. In other words, unless some new
reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the seizure’s new purpose, a
seized party’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original purpose of
the stop is abandoned (unless that abandonment falls within some established
exception).
State v. Linze, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 354 at *10 (S.Ct. Nov. 10, 2016). In other words, “[t]he
United States Supreme Court’s intention in Rodriguez is thus made clear. The rule isn’t
concerned with when the officer deviates from the original purpose of the traffic stop, it is
concerned with the fact that the officer deviates from the original purpose of the stop at all.”
Id. at *11.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Linze underscores previous holdings of Idaho
courts and sets a bright-line rule indicating that any abandonment of the purpose of a seizure
that is not substantiated by reasonable suspicion is unlawful. For example, in Linze, the Idaho
Supreme Court determined law enforcement violated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment
rights after deviating from the original purpose of the stop “by delaying the traffic stop for two
and a half minutes while performing a back-up function for a drug dog sweep.” Id.
This result aligns with prior Idaho rulings indicating that any abandonment of the
purpose of a seizure without reasonable suspicion is unlawful. For example, in recounting its
prior ruling in State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P.3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005), the Court of
Appeals noted that:
upon informing Aguirre of the purpose of the stop, the officers obtained Aguirre’s
license and registration. However, instead of pursuing the issuance of the citation,
the officer asked if anything illegal was in the vehicle and asked for consent to
search. When denied consent, the officer employed a drug dog around the vehicle.
Though other officers were at the scene, none of the officers continued the initial
purpose of the stop; rather, the officers all pursued the drug investigation. This
Court noted that the “purpose that justified the stop—the issuance of a traffic
citation—was immediately abandoned.” Id. at 564, 112 P.3d at 852. We therefore
held that the use of the drug dog impermissibly extended the duration of the
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detention. Id.
State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 426, P.3d 1280, 1289 (Ct. App. 2015).
Thus, under Idaho law, abandoning the initial purpose of a lawful seizure to pursue a
new investigation constitutes a new seizure. Because such a seizure must comport with the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantees, this new seizure itself must be substantiated by reasonable
suspicion.

If this new seizure’s purpose is not substantiated by independent reasonable

suspicion, the seizure is unlawful.
2.

Officer Mikowski Abandoned the Purpose of the Stop and Initiated a
New Seizure by Beginning a Drug Interrogation and Investigation
Without Reasonable Suspicion.

Even though Officer Mikowski had reasonable suspicion to initially detain Mr.
Jacobson, he did not diligently pursue his duties and abandoned the purpose of that stop and
initiated a new seizure of Mr. Jacobson by beginning an investigation tantamount to a fishing
expedition based on no reasonable suspicion. It is evident that Officer Mikowski intended for
his assist units to engage in a drug investigation, and that he himself abandoned the purpose of
the stop to also engage in a drug investigation.
After speaking with Mr. Jacobson a second time, Officer Mikowski called for a canine
officer to assist him. The call was placed while Officer Mikowski was walking back to his
vehicle, and so would not be considered an extension of the stop under State v. Renteria. 415
P.3d 954, 958 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018). There, the officer stopped a vehicle for failing to signal
for at least five seconds before changing lanes. After collecting the driver’s license and
registration and while walking to his car the officer requested the assistance of a canine officer
through dispatch. The Court held the call was not an unlawful extension of the stop as it was
conducted while the officer was walking to his vehicle, so it did not extend the time of the stop.
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Id. at 956. Here, while Officer Mikowski’s call for a canine unit was not an extension of the
stop, it is illustrative of Officer Mikowski’s intent to begin a drug investigation.
Officer Mikowski first abandoned the purpose of the underlying stop when he did not
diligently pursue his duties. After his first interaction with Mr. Jacobson, he returned to his
vehicle and ran both Mr. Jacobson’s and his passenger’s information for over four minutes.
Yet, after he called the canine unit he sat in his vehicle for another fourteen (14) minutes and
appears to be looking for additional background information on Mr. Jacobson and his
passenger. An officer is obligated to diligently pursue his duties with respect to the initial
purpose of the stop. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016) (emphasis
added) (referring to Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015)). Here, Officer
Mikowski had ample time to perform the checks permitted by law, and instead he abandoned
the purpose underlying the stop and continued to search for background information on Mr.
Jacobson and Mr. Roest to assist in the drug investigation he had no reasonable suspicion to
conduct.
Officer Mikowski again unlawfully extended the stop when he quit pursuing the task at
hand to discuss with Officer Kindelberger why he suspected drug use. The case is
distinguishable from Renteria and McGraw. In Renteria the Court found a stop was not
unlawfully extended where the primary officer explained to the assisting canine officer why he
suspected the defendants of drug use. The Court’s holding was based upon the fact that the
conversation occurred while the officer was awaiting a response from dispatch on a driver’s
license and warrants check, and so the time of the stop was not extended by the conversation.
Id. at 958. Further, in State v. McGraw, the Court held that it was not an extension of the stop
where at least one officer was still diligently pursuing the purpose of the stop. 418 P.3d 1245,
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1249-50. Neither case is applicable here because during Officer Mikowski’s conversation with
Officer Kindelberger, neither was diligently pursuing the purpose of the stop. Rather, the initial
purpose of the stop was put on hold so the officers could engage in a conversation about
suspected drugs – a conversation wholly unrelated to the issuance of citations.
Yet, most illustrative of the blatant extension of the stop is Officer Mikowski’s
complete abandonment of his duties after he prints the citations and gathers Mr. Jacobson and
Mr. Roest, directs they sit on the curb, and stands over them while Officer Kindelberger walks
to his vehicle, retrieves his canine, and conducts a drug search. During that time, Officer
Mikowski does nothing related to the underlying purpose of the stop. He simply waits for
Officer Kindelberger to receive an alert from the canine so the two can search the vehicle for
drugs. Finally, Officer Mikowski again unlawfully extends the duration of the stop when, after
searching the vehicle and finding nothing, he pulls Mr. Jacobson aside and asks to search him
for weapons. This action is again unrelated to the underlying purpose for the stop.
Although Officer Mikowski possessed no reasonable, articulable suspicion establishing
Mr. Jacobson had violated any law other than the purported traffic violations and failure to
purchase a license, again a non-arrestable offense pursuant to I.C. 19-603, Officer Mikowski’s
full attention and investigation was focused not on resolving those traffic violations, but upon a
fishing expedition for drugs or other contraband.
Under Linze, this drug investigation was an abandonment of the original purpose of the
stop and, “for all intents and purposes initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which
requires its own reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Linze at *9-10. These actions
not only unlawfully extended the duration of the stop under Neal, but also comprised an
unreasonable new seizure under the rule set forth in Linze. After all, Officer Mikowski’s
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interaction with Mr. Jacobson was entirely focused on morphing a traffic investigation into a
new investigation for which he had no reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Because Officer Mikowski abandoned the initial purpose for his stop, he was required
to possess reasonable suspicion for the new seizure of Mr. Jacobson in order to comply with
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements. Because Officer Mikowski possessed
no such reasonable suspicion to undergird the new seizure of Mr. Jacobson, this seizure was
unlawful.
D.

Officer Mikowski’s Search of Mr. Jacobson Was Unlawful Because Officer
Mikowski’s Actions Unlawfully Coerced Mr. Jacobson to Consent to the
Search.

In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
searches, the State must demonstrate that consent to search was voluntary rather than the result
of duress or coercion. In State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App.
2006), the Court of Appeals stated:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches. A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se
unreasonable unless the State shows that it fell within one of the narrowly drawn
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct. App. 2002). A
search conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is one such exception.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. It is the
State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was
voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 221; State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State
v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 522, 554, 989 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1999); Dominguez, 137
Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. A voluntary decision is one that is “the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). An individual’s consent is
involuntary, on the other hand, “if his will has been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired.” Id. In determining whether a subject’s will was
overborne in a particular case, the court must assess “the totality of the surrounding
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. Thus, whether consent was granted
voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is a factual determination to be based upon
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the surrounding circumstances, accounting for subtly coercive police questions and the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the party granting the consent to a search.” Id. at
229; Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796, 69 P.3d at 1057; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.2d
at 327.
In State v. Rector, 144 Idaho 643, 167 P.3d 780 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court’s finding that “[the defendant’s] act of pulling the
methamphetamine from her pocket was not an act of free will but the product of coercive
circumstances.” There, the court noted several factors contributing to a coercive atmosphere
and also noted that “by asking the deputies for permission to smoke, [the defendant] had
demonstrated that she did not consider the encounter to be consensual but rather considered
herself to be under the control of the deputies.” Rector, 144 Idaho at 646, 167 P.3d at 783.
Here, Mr. Jacobson was similarly subjected to coercive police behavior. As in Rector,
Jacobson was clearly not free to leave.

In Rector, law enforcement asked “to see [the

defendant’s] pocket’s contents.” Id.,144 Idaho at 644, 167 P.3d at 781. Here, Mr. Jacobson’s
decision to acquiesce to a search of his person was not a voluntary choice, but one in which his
will was overborne by Officers Mikowski and Kindelberger’s actions. Mr. Jacobson had
already once been illegally searched by Officer Kindelberger, then questioned by him about
drug use or possession without any reasonable suspicion for a drug-investigation. Then he was
directed to sit on the curb while three law enforcement officers stood over him and a canine
was directed to his vehicle – all because of traffic related offenses. He then watched as his
vehicle was searched. Only after that was he directed to stand and speak to Officer Mikowski
who asked to again search him for weapons.
The unlawful search of Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Roest in conjunction with the drug
investigation and unlawful extension of the stop were directly and impliedly coercive. Under
such circumstances, it is clear that, as in Rector, the ultimate search and seizure of Mr.
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Jacobson’s person was coerced and not voluntary. Thus, Officer Mikowski’s search was
unlawful.
III.

CONCLUSION

Officer Mikowski abandoned his investigation into Mr. Jacobson’s alleged traffic
violation to begin a separate and unjustified investigation wholly unrelated to the traffic stop.
Because the purpose for Officer Mikowski’s new investigation was not substantiated by
reasonable suspicion, this new seizure violated Mr. Jacobson’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, Officer Mikowski’s seizure and
search of Mr. Jacobson’s person was unlawful because Officer Mikowski did not have consent
to search Mr. Jacobson for anything more than weapons. As a result, the evidence against Mr.
Jacobson obtained subsequent to these unlawful actions should be suppressed.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2018.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg
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I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

For purposes of this Objection, the State generally concurs with the “Facts Pertaining to the
Motion” included in Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence. Mem.
1-4.
II.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Officer Mikowski diligently pursued the initial purpose of the stop until the canine alert,
which provided separate grounds to pursue a drug investigation. At that time, Defendant voluntarily
consented to a search of his pockets. There were no violations of Defendant’s constitutional rights;
therefore Defendant’s Motion should be denied.
The State does not rely on Terry v. Ohio as the basis for the search that resulted in the
discovery of the heroin; the State relies on Defendant’s voluntary consent. It is not improper for
officers to ask for consent to conduct a search, and the case law cited by Defendant does not support
that proposition. Defendant’s consent to the search of his pockets was voluntary and effective. The
scope of the search of Defendant’s pockets was exactly what Officer Mikowski requested and what
Defendant agreed to. Finally, the stop was not prolonged beyond its initial purpose at any point
until after the canine alerted, providing additional, reasonable grounds for seizure related to the drug
investigation.
1. The State does not rely on Terry v. Ohio as the relevant warrant exception in this case.
In this case, police frisked Defendant twice. First, Deputy Kindelberger frisked Defendant
for weapons and found none. Several minutes later, Officer Mikowski approached the Defendant,
after the canine had alerted on his vehicle and after a fruitless search of that vehicle, and asked “Do
you got anything illegal on you?” He immediately clarified that he was not asking about weapons,
saying “I know they checked you for weapons,” but asked again, “you got nothing in your pockets,
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anything like that?” After asking specifically about the contents of Defendant’s pockets, Defendant
answered “I’ve got a lighter,” and he began to reach into his pockets. Deputy Mikowski – trained to
prevent suspects from reaching into their pockets for officer safety – stopped him by gesturing and
saying, “without reaching in.” He then continued: “Is it cool if I check really quick, man?” To
which, Defendant replied, “Yeah, go ahead” and then listed the contents of his pockets: a lighter,
chapstick, and his wallet. Officer Mikowski immediately reached into Defendants pockets without
any objection.
Deputy Kindelberger’s initial frisk is not at issue in this Motion, since it did not lead to the
discovery of the contraband that Defendant now seeks to suppress.
Regarding Officer Mikowski’s frisk, the State does not rely upon Terry as the relevant
warrant exception. Officer Mikowski acknowledged that he knew Defendant had already been
checked for weapons; that clearly wasn’t the purpose of the search. The Court need not analyze
whether Officer Mikowski could frisk Defendant or remove the contraband from his pocket under
Terry; the State relies instead on Defendant’s consent, discussed below.
2. It is not improper for officers to ask for consent to search.
Defendant cites United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) for the
proposition that “where an officer does not have a reasonable belief that a defendant is armed and
dangerous, even his question whether the defendant has any weapons is not justified.” Extending
from there, Defendant concludes that without an objectively reasonable belief that Defendant was
armed or dangerous, Officer Mikowski’s question “asking if he could search Mr. Jacobson was
therefore not justified.” Mem. 9. This is not the law.
In Thomas, an officer investigating a counterfeiting operation asked a suspect if he had any
weapons . When the suspect did not respond, the officer patted him down and felt a handgun.
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Thomas, 863 F.2d at 624. The Court states in dicta that the question was “unjustified,” but a
footnote immediately following clarifies that, at most, Thomas stands for the proposition that a
suspect’s silence in response to an unsupported question concerning weapons cannot be used to
create the reasonable suspicion of fear that is required under Terry to justify a non-consensual frisk.
Thomas, 863 F.2d at 629 n.8.
Those are not the facts here. Officer Mikowski does not rely on Defendant’s silence to
perform a non-consensual Terry frisk; he relies on Defendant’s explicit permission. Officer
Mikowski asks Defendant if it is “cool” if he checks his pockets; Defendant replies, “Yeah. Go
ahead.” Thomas is not as broad as Defendant argues, and certainly does not prevent officers from
asking for consent to search for contraband even if there is no reason to believe a suspect is armed.
3. Defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his pockets.
A search conducted with consent that was freely given is an exception to the warrant
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho
681, 683, 52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct. App. 2002). The State has the burden of demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that consent was voluntary as opposed to being the result of duress
or coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221. Whether consent was granted
voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is a question of fact to be determined by all the
surrounding circumstances. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).
In this case, the circumstances at the moment of consent do not indicate coercion.
Primarily, Officer Mikowski’s request to search Defendant’s pockets was friendly, casual, and
informal, not confrontational or authoritarian. See State v. Bowman, 2015 WL 3540362, *7, Not
Reported in P.3d (Idaho Ct. App. 2015) (“While [the officer] did not explicitly inform the
defendant that he could refuse…, the question was posed in such a way that the defendant was
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clearly invited to refuse consent if that was his desire.”). As Defendant states in his
memorandum, the video shows the conversation:
Officer Mikowski:
Defendant:
Officer Mikowski:
Defendant:
Officer Mikowski:
Defendant:

Do you got anything illegal on you?
No.
Nothing at all, nothing? I know they checked you for weapons or
anything like that, you got nothing in your pockets, anything like
that?
I’ve got a lighter. [reaches into pocket].
Without reaching in. Is it cool if I check really quick, man?
Yeah, go ahead. I’ve got a lighter, chapstick, and my wallet.

As in Bowman, Officer Mikowski’s question was posed in such a way that the Defendant was
clearly invited to refuse consent if that was his desire.
Additionally, the location and conditions of the stop were not coercive. Defendant and his
passenger had traveled to the location of the stop voluntarily. Defendant was not handcuffed at,
or prior to, the exchange with Officer Mikowski. None of the officers on scene had made any
show of force – no guns had been drawn; no physical altercation had occurred. The exchange
took place in the daylight. Defendant is not particularly young or inexperienced with law
enforcement. Defendant was not alone; he had a friend nearby. Both subjects felt comfortable
enough to smoke cigarettes during the stop without asking permission and to chat casually with
the officers – sharing stories, thoughts, and opinions unrelated to the stop freely and unprompted.
In short, there is very little about the situation that could indicate coercion.
Admittedly, the detention was not particularly short, but also had not been exhaustively
long – about 35 minutes at the time of the request to search – during that time, there had not been
repeated or prolonged questioning; most of the discussion was small talk between the police and
Defendant’s passenger. There were four officers on scene, but one was a canine handler and four
officers is not unreasonable given that there were two suspects being detained; moreover, at the
moment of consent, Defendant is talking to only one officer – he is not surrounded by the others
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on scene; they are not “standing over him,” as Defendant’s motion states. The totality of the
circumstances supports a finding of voluntary consent rather than coercion.
4. The search of Defendant’s pockets did not exceed the scope of consent.
The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
objective reasonableness, or in other words what a reasonable person would have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); State v.
Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 849, 186 P.3d 696, 705 (Ct. App. 2008).
As the video transcription above shows, Officer Mikowski explicitly states that the location
he is interested in is Defendant’s pockets. Defendant clearly understands Officer Mikowski because
he responds that he has a lighter in his pocket and starts to reach into his pocket. Officer Mikowski,
for safety, stops Defendant from reaching into his pocket by gesturing and by saying “without
reaching in.”
There is no doubt that both Officer Mikowski and Defendant both understood at that point in
the conversation that they were talking specifically about the contents of Defendant’s pockets. In
that context, Officer Mikowski asks, “Is it cool if I check really quick, man?” And Defendant
responds, “Yeah, go ahead.” And then proceeds to list – again – the contents of his pockets. The
video shows that Officer Mikowski immediately begins searching inside Defendant’s pockets and
Defendant raises no objection or indication of surprise.
The search did not exceed the scope of consent because a reasonable person would have
understood the exchange between Officer Mikowski and Defendant to encompass consent to the
search of Defendant’s pockets.
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5. The stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged.
An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). Such a detention must
be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Roe,
140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51
P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully
tailored to its underlying justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; State v. Parkinson,
135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000). The scope of the intrusion permitted will
vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181,
90 P.3d at 931; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. Brief inquiries not otherwise related to
the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. Roe,
140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. The purpose of an investigative stop is not permanently fixed at
the moment the stop is initiated because suspicion of criminality different from that which initially
prompted the stop may evolve. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224.
Defendant concedes that Officer Mikowski did have sufficient cause to stop him for traffic
infractions and to cite him for those infractions as well as failure to purchase a license. Mem. 8.
However, Defendant argues that Officer Mikowski unlawfully extended the stop in violation of the
Fourth Amendment by deviating from the original purpose of the stop in three ways: (1) by taking
more than reasonable time to investigate and complete the traffic citation; (2) by discussing a drug
investigation with Deputy Kindelberger; and (3) by directing Defendant and his passenger to sit on
the curb during the canine sniff. None of these arguments presents a genuine constitutional defect.
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A. Officer Mikowski did not prolong the stop by taking more than reasonable time
to investigate and/or complete the traffic citation.
Defendant argues, based only on suspicion, that the time it took Officer Mikowski to
prepare the citation demonstrates a lack of diligence and an abandonment of the purpose of the stop.
Officer Mikowski’s video shows this is not the case.
Upon making contact with Defendant and his passenger, Officer Mikowski immediately
explained the reason for the stop. During that initial contact, Defendant told Officer Mikowski that
he did not have a driver’s license. Officer Mikowski returned to his car and began to enter
information into his mobile data terminal (MDT). He spent the next four and a half minutes in his
patrol vehicle. Nothing in his on-body video during this time indicates anything but diligent pursuit
of the initial purpose of the traffic stop.
Officer Mikowski then returned to the Defendant and asked about registration and
insurance. Defendant confirmed that he does not currently have insurance and explained that he is
new to the area. Officer Mikowski asked where Defendant moved from and when. Officer
Mikowski then asked if either of the vehicle’s occupants is on probation or parole. Defendant stated
that he is not, but the passenger admitted he will soon be on probation and was currently out on bail
for misdemeanors, including possession of drug paraphernalia. The conversation then returned to
the vehicle’s recent changes in ownership. Officer Mikowski began to walk back to his patrol
vehicle and, while walking back, called for a canine assist.
For the next 13 minutes (8:20 – 21:20), Officer Mikowski was in his patrol vehicle
preparing the citation. During that time, the video showed that Officer Mikowski was consistently
manipulating his MDT, his cell phone, Defendant’s ID card, and registration certificate. Again,
nothing in his on-body video indicated anything but diligent pursuit of the initial purpose of the
traffic stop.
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During approximately the next minute (21:20 – 22:30), Officer Mikowski printed the
citation(s), gathered the registration and ID cards, and exited his patrol vehicle. He asked Defendant
to sit on the curb so that he could explain the citations. The video shows that it took approximately
one minute for Defendant and his passenger to get seated on the curb. Soon after, the police canine
can be seen passing behind defendant on the way to the truck (24:16). Deputy Kindelberger’s video
shows that within the next thirty seconds of passing behind the Defendant, the canine alerted.
Given the complications that arose during the course of the stop (Defendant had no driver’s
license, the ownership history of the vehicle was convoluted, the vehicle was registered in the
passenger’s name, Defendant had no insurance, Defendant’s passenger was on probation, etc.) the
mere length of the detention is not, in and of itself, sufficiently suspicious to conclude that Officer
Mikowski did not diligently pursue the purpose of the stop.1 At no point does the video show that
Officer Mikowski merely sat idle in his vehicle, or otherwise abandoned the citation. Rather, the
video shows that Officer Mikowski actively pursued the original purpose of the stop during the
entire detention up until the canine alerted.
B. Officer Mikowski did not unreasonably prolong the stop by discussing a drug
investigation with Deputy Kindelberger.
The videos show that upon arriving at the stop, Deputy Kindelberger spoke to Officer
Mikowski for 18 seconds before approaching Defendant’s vehicle. Neither video includes audio
during this exchange. Defendant argues that during those 18 seconds, Officer Mikowski “quit

1

In addition to determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission ordinarily
includes inquiries incident to the stop, which typically involve “checking the driver's license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile's registration and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___,
___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492, 499-501 (2015) (the mission of a traffic stop is “to
address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns”).
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pursuing the task at hand to discuss with Officer Kindelberger why he suspected drug use.” Mem.
17. Defendant’s characterization contains two assumptions; both are mere speculation.
Because the videos do not include audio of the conversation in question, Officer Mikowski
and Deputy Kindelberger are the only sources that can clarify what was said and will provide their
recollections at the suppression hearing. More important than what was discussed, however, is the
question of whether Officer Mikowski abandoned the initial purpose of the stop during the
conversation or whether he continued to pursue it in some fashion. Regardless of what was
discussed, if Officer Mikowski continued to pursue his task of preparing the citation, or if he was
waiting on information necessary to that task while he talked to Deputy Kindelberger, then as
Defendant notes, this portion of the Motion would be controlled by State v. Renteria, 415 P.3d 954
(Ct. App. 2018) (holding that conversation between officers regarding suspicions of drug activity
did not unlawfully extend traffic stop where police were waiting for dispatch to confirm driving
privileges or warrants).
In the alternative, even if Officer Mikowski momentarily paused from his citation, recent
case law holds that “[c]ounting every pause taken while writing a citation as conduct that unlawfully
adds time to the stop is inimical to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement and is
contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent.” State v. McGraw, 418 P.3d 1245, 1250, 163
Idaho 736 (Ct. App. 2018).
In McGraw, the District Court found that the officer that initiated the traffic stop
momentarily paused from his task of preparing a citation to hand off his citation book to a second
officer so that he could conduct a canine sniff, and after that exchange, the second officer was likely
not “continuously writing the citation.” Id. at 1247. The District Court held that the time taken to
exchange the citation book, although de minimis, still constituted an abandonment of the purpose of
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the stop and suppressed the evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that that the few
seconds it took to hand off the citation book, and even the ensuing distractedness of the citing
officer, did not compel the legal conclusion that the stop was constitutionally unreasonable. Id. at
1250. The Court noted that United States Supreme Court cases recognize that inquiries unrelated to
the purpose of the stop do not convert the stop into an unlawful detention so long as those inquiries
do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. Id. The Court specifically declined to hold that
the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to continuously write a citation without ever pausing for
any reason. Id. Instead, the Court reiterated the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement
and held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Id.
This case is similar to McGraw in significant ways. The pause at issue, even if it did not
serve the initial purpose of the stop in any way (which remains to be seen), was only a few seconds
long and – like the exchange of the citation book – it was incidental to the smooth interaction
between two separate investigations. Safe police work requires that the left hand know what the
right hand is doing at an investigation site; the few seconds it takes to convey that information do
not constitute an abandonment of the initial purpose of the stop. Under McGraw, such a slight delay
is not so unreasonable as to violate the Fourth Amendment – indeed, to argue that it does is
“inimical to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.”
C. Officer Mikowski did not prolong the stop by directing Defendant and his
passenger to sit on the curb during the canine sniff.
The video shows that Officer Mikowski exited his patrol vehicle at about 22:30. There is no
audio, but it is clear that he immediately asks Defendant and the passenger to sit on the curb. It
takes approximately one minute and five seconds from Officer Mikowski’s exit for both occupants
to be seated. At that point, Officer Mikowski begins explaining the citation. The video shows
Deputy Kindelburger walk behind Defendant at about 24:15; this corresponds with Deputy
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Kindelberger’s video at 5:07. Deputy Kindelberger’s video shows that his canine alerts about 20 to
30 seconds later, between 5:25 and 5:35.
Based on these time stamps, the time elapsed from the moment Officer Mikowski exited his
vehicle until the canine alert was about 2 minutes and 5 to 15 seconds. The first minute and five
seconds of that time was spent gathering Defendant and his passenger on the curb. The other 60 –
70 seconds is spent explaining the citation.
Sixty seconds is less than a reasonable amount of time to expect Officer Mikowski to fully
explain the citation and Defendant’s legal duties. Indeed, even if the Court were to add back in the
18 seconds previously taken by Officer Mikowski to speak with Deputy Kindelberger upon his
arrival, it would not amount to the time that was reasonably necessary to explain the traffic
infraction. Consequently, the purpose of the stop permissibly transformed into a drug investigation
not only before the traffic citation was actually explained and issued, but even before it reasonably
should have been issued on the facts presented here. See State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 484, 362
P.3d 551, 559 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding a delay of 56 seconds to request a drug dog and speak to
handling deputy upon his arrival did not violate Fourth Amendment because even absent that delay
the purpose of the stop could not reasonably have been completed 56 seconds before police
discovered grounds for drug investigation).
III.

CONCLUSION

Officer Mikowski diligently pursued the initial purpose of the stop until the canine alert,
which provided separate grounds to pursue a drug investigation. At that time, Defendant voluntarily
consented to a search of his pockets. There were no violations of Defendant’s constitutional rights;
therefore Defendant’s Motion should be denied.
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DATED this

14

Sep
day of __________,
2018.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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________________________
By: David Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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a true and correct copy of the foregoing State’s Objection and Memorandum upon the individual(s)
named below in the manner noted:
Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701


By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.



By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.



By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.



By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _________



By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.

x Via iCourt eFile and Serve



Legal Assistant
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Filed: 09/18/2018 07:42:03
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
ORDER FOR PREPARATION
OF TRANSCRIPT

The above matter coming before the Court upon the State’s Motion;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a transcript of proceedings from the Preliminary Hearing
held on the 12th day of June, 2018, be prepared. The Transcription Department and/or Court
Reporter is authorized to prepare and deliver to the Court an original and a copy to the Ada County
Prosecuting Attorney and Ada County Public Defender.
DATED this

day of September, 2018.

Signed: 9/14/2018 04:40 PM

Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Sept 18, 2018
I hereby certify that on ___________________,
I served the foregoing document upon
the following attorneys, persons and agencies at the addresses listed below.
Debra A. Groberg
PO Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Email
mailto:dgroberg@nbmlaw.com

David M. Hunt
Ada County Prosecutor’s Office
200 W. Front St. Rm 3191
Boise, ID 83702

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Email
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Ada County Clerk of the Court
Signed: 9/18/2018 07:42 AM

_____________________________
Deputy Clerk
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Electronically Filed
9/18/2018 2:03 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

STIPULATION OF LODGING

COMES NOW, David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, State
of Idaho, and hereby stipulates to lodge a copy of the On-body Videos of Officer Mikowski and
Deputy Kindelberger as State’s Exhibit 1 for consideration with the State's Objection and
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress which was previously filed.
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DATEDthis

18

day ofSeptember,2018.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

M4.)
By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

'

,_
I

Debra

.rla-g

.

I

nne Groh—

for FREDERICK
JEREMIAH JACOBSEN, Defenda

Attomey

r

‘

NOTICE OF LODGING (JACOBSEN) Page 2
000142

Electronically Filed
9/21/2018 1:38 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970

200 W. Front Street, Room 3 191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287—7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocuuItiocgrmadawclmcl

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TEE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff,

vs.

AMENDED STIPULATION
OF LODGING

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW,
State

of Idaho,

David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

and Debra Groberg,

JACOBSEN, and do

attorney

for

Defendant,

for the

County of Ada,

FREDERICK JEREMIAH

hereby stipulate to lodge and admit portions of on-body videos of Ofﬁcer

Mikowski and Deputy Kindelberger, designated and included

as

State’s

Exhibit

1,

for

consideration with the brieﬁng submitted by the parties related t0 Defendant’s Motion t0

Suppress and State’s Objection t0 that Motion.
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DATED this

19

day of September, 201 8.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County

Prosecuting Attorney

V5J¢4
By: David M. Hunt

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
'

f
«M%0?.%aw
/

...-’

)g

Debra Anne Groherg

‘

‘

FREDERICK
JEREMIAH JACOBSEN, Derridant’
Attorney for
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Electronically Filed
9/26/2018 12:35 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

MOTION TO RESCIND OR
WITHDRAW ORDER FOR
PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPT

COMES NOW, David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, State
of Idaho, and moves this Court for an Order rescinding and/or withdrawing the Order for
Preparation of Transcript signed by the Honorable Judge Reardon on the 14th day of September
2018.
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DATED this the _____
24 day of September, 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

M4.»

By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the _____
26th day of September, 2018 I caused to be
served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Rescind or Withdraw Order for
Preparation of Transcript upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701


By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.



By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.



By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.



By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _________



By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.

X Via iCourt eFile and Serve



Legal Assistant
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Description Reardon

/

M. Olson / Madsen
Location 1A-

Date 9/27/2018

CRT5

Time
1:14:20

PM

1:14:20

PM

0

Note

Speaker

CR01
States

1

18 15616

-

Frederick Jacobsen

-

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

David Hunt

Attorney
1:14:20

PM

Defense
Attorney

1:39:23

PM
PM
PM

1:40:31

PM

1:38:31

1:39:05

defendant went to wrong room, but should be here momentarily
(defendant

Judge
Rcardon
States

Attorney
1:41:03

Debra Groberg

PM

now present)

reviews motion and objection and the Video submitted by stipulation

going t0 submit evidence, comments as to previous stipulated Video
discussion about admitting

it

into evidence

and

it

being part of the

record
1:41:53

PM

Judge

Rcardon
1:48:51

PM

prcvicws thinking after rcvicwing stipulated Videos

States
calls

Attorney

PM
1:52:19 PM
1:53:06 PM
1:50:07

direct

PM

-

sworn

-

examination 0f

Deputy Brian Kindelberger

SW#1

witness identiﬁes defendant
States

Attorney
1:53:16

SW#1

moves

t0 admit

SE#1

Defense
stipulated

Attorney
1:53:20

PM

Judge

Rcardon
1:53:26

PM

States

admits SE#1

continues examination 0f

Attorney
2:02:07

PM

Defense

cross examination of

Attorney
2:08:11

PM

SW#I

SW#1

States

objection

-

relevance

Attorney
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—
—
M
2:08:15

2:08:21

2:09:59

2:10:53

2:12:08

2:14:37

PM
PM
PM
PM
PM

Judge

Reardon
Defense

.

.

.

contlnues cross examlnatlon

Attorney
States

.

.

.

re-dlrect examlnatlon

Attorney

Defense

.

.

re-cross examlnatlon

Attorney

Judge
Reardon

PM

PM
2: 19:25 PM
:01 PM
—2:21

overruled

.

.

1nqu1res of

SW#1
States
calls

Attorney

SW#1
down

steps

SW#2

-

sworn

direct examination

2:15:49

Kyle Mikowski

-

—

ofﬁcer for Meridian

PD

of witness

witness identiﬁes defendant
States

moves

t0

admit SE#1

Attorney
2:21:45

PM

PM
—2322302

Judge
Reardon

fates

admits SE#1

publishes Milkowski video on SE#1

ttorney

PM
2:24:41 PM
PM
—2:44:43

(10m 3056c

2:24:23

in Video)

direct examination

Defense

cross examination of

Attorney

PM
1:35 PM

2:46:37

—3:1

plays audio for
States

re-direct examination

Defense

3:15:34

PM

States

Attorney
3:15:42

3:15:47

PM

Judge
Reardon

PM

Defense

-

Ob.ection
J

_

refresh

memory

of SW#2

re—cross examination 0f

Attorney

continues

SW#2

SW#2

Attorney

PM
—3:15:09

SW#2

of

SW#2

SCO p e

overruled

continues re-cross examination

Attorney
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3:16:41

PM

Judge

Reardon
3:19:35

PM

States

inquires of

SW#2

re-direct examination after courts inquiries

Attorney
3:21:41

PM

Defense

re-cross examination after courts inquiries

Attorney
3:24:05

PM

Judge
Reardon

questions for

SW#2

3:25:17PM Defense
question

Attorney
3:25:23

PM

States

question

Attorney
3:26:37
3:26:43

PM
PM

SW#2

down

steps

States
rests

Attorney
3:26:46

PM

Defense

n0 witnesses

Attorney
3:26:51

PM

3:27:09

PM

Judge
Reardon

submit written argument

-

comments

—

want

PM
3:28:22 PM

t0

0n the fence
see argument on
—

proceed on assumption that

fruits

argument

—

it is

enough

-

post consent

submit briefs w/in 14 days

3:28:11

Defense
requests extension

Attorney
3:28:33

PM

3:28:44

PM

Judge
Reardon
States

Attorney
3:28:55

PM

submit w/in

maybe ﬁnd certain
comments
1st

Judge

Reardon

-

initial

4 minute break

facts

stop not challenged, reasonable stop

-

n0

issue With

reconsider ofﬁcer re-running information 2x

-

-

mostly reasonable troubled by the turning off audio and not turning
back on and relates to credibility — reasonable to being mr roest into
-

conversation

-

may ﬁnd reasonable

talking about towing options

-

resolve that question based on credibility

3:31:05

3:31:43

PM

PM

Defense

my understanding

Attorney

about bail out ofjail
discussion

-

frame

-

conversation was not about towing

it

in

-

conversation

your brief
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M
3:32:06

PM

PM
3:33:43 PM
3:32:41

search

JRlzdagzon

and

if

was w/in
i

ﬁnd

stop

the scope

-

issue

was prolonging

was prolonged, whether

later

the stop

consent cures that

brieﬁng by October 19 (status conference)

end case
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Filed: 10/01/2018 09:10:29
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616

ORDER TO RESCIND OR
WITHDRAW ORDER FOR
PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPT

The above entitled matter having come before this Court based on the State’s Motion to
Rescind or Withdraw Order for Preparation of Transcript;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted.
Signed: 9/27/2018 03:10 PM
DATED _________________________

Judge

ORDER TO RESCIND OR WITHDRAW ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on ___________________,
I served the foregoing document upon
1 October, 2018
the following attorneys, persons and agencies at the addresses listed below.
Debra Anne Groberg
PO Box 2772
Boise ID 83701

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ X] Email
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com

David M. Hunt
Ada County Prosecutor’s Office
200 W. Front St. Rm 3191
Boise, ID 83702

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ X ] Email
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

Ada County Transcripts
Emailed

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Ada County Clerk of the Court
_____________________________
Deputy Clerk
Signed: 10/1/2018 09:11 AM
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Description

|REARDON / MASTERS / MADSEN

19

OCTOBER 2018
Location 1A-

Date 10/19/2018
|

CRT508

Time
10:56:57

Speaker

AM

Note

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CROI

18 15616

STATUS

CONFERENCE
10:57:03

AM

Present:

David Hunt

for the State,

Debra Groberg

for the defense,

defendant on bond

AM
10:57:56 AM
10:58:21 AM
10:57:31

AM
10:59:31 AM
10:59:39 AM
10:58:40

Counsel

Additional brieﬁng 0n the Mo/Suppress will be ﬁled today.

Court

PTC

Hunt

is

next week. Hopefully,

have a decision out by

that time.

Feel that the outcome 0f that decision will very likely be dispositive.

Movc trial

out?

Court

It's

a pretty narrow issue.

Groberg

It's

likely dispositive.

If

Court

I'll

it's

not dispositive (if I deny the motion), then have

Witness/exhibit

lists

ready t0 be ﬁled by the

Monday

following the

PTC.

AM
11:00:34 AM

11:00:31

End 0f case

Produced by FTR GoldTM
www.fortherecord.com
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Electronically Filed
10/19/2018 12:26 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Chynae Hull, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
STATE’S POST-HEARING
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

COMES NOW, David Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for the State of Idaho,
County of Ada, and after presenting evidence to the Court, submits argument and authorities in
opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.
The Court held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion on September 27, 2018. At that hearing,
the Court heard testimony from Officer Mikowski and Deputy Kindelberger, and the parties
stipulated to the admission of excerpts of on-body video from both officers.
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After the presentation of evidence, the Court found that the initial traffic stop was supported
by reasonable suspicion and that Defendant provided knowing and voluntary consent to a search of
his pockets. The Court left open the issue of whether the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged at
any point. The Court requested written closing arguments and specifically asked the parties to
address the issue of whether Defendant’s eventual consent to a search cured any previous delay
during the stop.
I.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. The stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged.
The State’s Objection and Memorandum in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress,
filed on September 14, details the State’s arguments in opposition to Defendant’s claims of unlawful
delay; those arguments remain unchanged by the evidence presented at the hearing – the State will
not burden the Court file by repeating them here, but invites the Court to review that briefing for the
State’s full argument.
In addition, the State addresses the following issues which were specifically raised at the
hearing (time stamps refer to the Mikowski video, Ex. 1).
1. Initial Contact and Four-Minutes in Patrol Vehicle (0:00 – 6:30)
There is no issue regarding the initial contact or the ensuing time Officer Mikowski spent in
the patrol car. During that first contact, Officer Mikowski advised the Defendant of the reason for
the stop – the improperly mounted license plate and his inability to see the registration sticker.
Defendant advised that he did not have a valid driver’s license, the passenger, Mr. Roest,
volunteered (without being asked) that his own driver’s license was suspended.
Officer Mikowski then returned to his vehicle and entered information on his MDT for the
next four and a half minutes. At the hearing, Officer Mikowski testified that during this time he

STATE’S POST-HEARING ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES (JACOBSEN), Page 2
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would have been “running their information”: looking for driving history, prior citations, offense
history, parole or probation status or warrants, and checking Defendant’s driver’s license status.
2. Second Contact and 13 Minutes in Patrol Vehicle (6:30 – 21:20)
Officer Mikowski returned to Defendant’s vehicle and asked whether he was able to find
registration or insurance documentation, Defendant confirmed that he did not have either.
Defendant said he just bought the truck and searched for a bill of sale. Defendant volunteered that
he is new in Idaho, having arrived from Utah about a week prior. Officer Mikowski asked whether
either occupant is on probation or parole and Roest explained he is currently on bail for a
paraphernalia charge. Roest then indicated that he originally purchased the truck, sold it to his boss,
who then sold it to Defendant. Officer Mikowski then returned to his patrol car and, on his way
back, called for a canine assist.
For approximately the next 13 minutes, Officer Mikowski is in his patrol vehicle;
throughout that time, he can be seen manipulating his MDT and the documents Defendant gave
him. At the hearing, Officer Mikowski testified that he was continuing the tasks noted above:
conducting record checks, investigating driver’s license history, arrest history, warrant searches, etc.
His contact with Defendant had raised additional issues that required some follow up: Defendant did
not have a license, registration, or insurance, he had recently moved to Idaho from out of state, the
sale history of the truck was recent and somewhat convoluted, the passenger was out on bail, etc.
This was not a single-issue stop, and all such investigation is permissible. See Rodriguez v. United
States, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492, 499-501 (2015).
When asked why he spent 13 minutes in his car, Officer Mikowski testified he didn’t recall
exactly, but did not indicate that this was an unusually long stop for the issues involved. He cited
possible delays including inability to verify the subjects’ identities without driver’s licenses, lag
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time from the central database, multiple subjects in the car, deciding which infraction to cite,
manually entering required information into the citation without a driver’s license or registration,
and the additional safety concerns presented by one subject on bail. Any of these could have
contributed to the 13-minute processing time.
At the hearing, defense counsel questioned Officer Mikowski regarding what appeared to be
his review of the same screen on his MDT – the license photo – on more than one occasion. Officer
Mikowski testified that he could not recall what exactly he was looking at or why may have
returned to the same screen more than once, but he testified that the screen at issue contains more
than just a photo – it contains up-to-date addresses, criminal record history, prior booking dates, etc.
The MDT shows national, state, and local data regarding people and vehicles. There may be dozens
of data points on each screen that could be relevant to an officer’s investigation and citation of a
traffic offense. There is no “one-look rule” regarding a subject’s MDT information. It is perfectly
reasonable to expect an officer to review the same screen more than once throughout that process.
3. Phone Call to Corporeal Bateman (17:05)
While Officer Mikowski was preparing the citation, he called his supervisor, Corporal
Bateman, and asked what to cite a driver without a valid license. Officer Mikowski explained at the
hearing that he is fairly new to Idaho and that his expertise is not specifically traffic enforcement.
Defense counsel attempted to impeach him by indicating that he had cited this same offense ten
times since March 2017 – it was unclear if that figure covered the period to the stop (which would
have been about 13 months) or to the hearing (which would have been about 16 months), but either
way ten citations over more than a year is less than once a month on average; it is not so common an
occurrence as to make it implausible that Officer Mikowski would want to double check the proper
citation. Additionally, if the call had been some kind of gambit to delay the stop, it was a poor one

STATE’S POST-HEARING ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES (JACOBSEN), Page 4
000157

because the question was answered within a few seconds of the call being placed, and Officer
Mikowski made no effort to prolong the call after he got an answer. Indeed, when Corporal
Bateman brought up the subject of drugs, Officer Mikowski did not dwell on the subject but ended
the conversation as efficiently as possible.
4. 18-Second Conversation with Deputy Kindelberger (19:17 – 19:35)
When Deputy Kindelberger arrived on scene, he walked directly to Officer Mikowski’s
passenger window and an approximately 18 second conversation ensued, during which Officer
Mikowski muted his on-body video.

In prior briefing, the State argued that this 18-second

conversation should be considered a “reasonable pause” under McGraw rather than an
“unreasonable abandonment” under Gutierrez. Those arguments will not be repeated here, but the
State will add that, at the hearing, both officers testified that in the interest of officer safety, it is
necessary to convey certain information to an arriving officer (including information regarding the
nature of the stop, warrants, weapons, and even suspicions regarding whether a subjects might be
dangerous or intoxicated) – information that may be in the exclusive possession of the citing officer.
The issue at the hearing, however, seemed less focused on the propriety of the short
conversation, and more on the propriety of Officer Mikowski’s decision to mute his audio. Defense
counsel indicated that muting the video was contrary to the official policy of the Meridian Police
Department. It was not.
Defense counsel cited to MPD policy 449.4(d) and (e), dealing with “audio recorders,” not
on-body video. 1 That section requires that “audio recorders” remain on throughout any “contact
with a member of the public.” Officer Mikowski was not using an “audio recorder” as that term is

1

My attention was drawn to this distinction by Scott Colaianni at Meridian Police Department
when I asked for copies of the policies after the hearing. He indicated 449 did not apply to OBV.
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used in the policy, and even if he were his conversation with Deputy Kindelberger was not a contact
with “a member of the public,” so he was not required to leave it on.
The correct policy is 450, regarding on-body video. Specifically, section 450.2(e)(2) notes
that the system may be temporarily muted if “it is necessary to discuss tactical plans, other issues or
concerns with another officer or supervisor in private.” That is exactly the situation Officer
Mikowski perceived when he muted his video. Admittedly, he should have un-muted the video
after his conversation with Deputy Kindelberger, but he testified that his failure to do so was
“human error,” and there is nothing to indicate that it was calculated misconduct.

Officer

Mikowski’s decision to mute his conversation with Deputy Kindelberger should not weigh against
his credibility regarding anything that was said during that portion of the stop because, at its
inception, it was in accordance with MPD policy and any violation thereafter was inadvertent.
5. Moving Defendant and Passenger to Curb (22:37 – 23:37)
An officer may, as a matter of course during a lawful traffic stop, order the driver and any
passengers to exit the vehicle pending completion of the stop. State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 105
(Ct.App.2006); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1977); see also Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882 (1997) (extending Mimms rule to passengers). This is a
legitimate precautionary measure to protect the officer’s safety and it is not necessary that the
occupants engage in suspicious or unusual behavior to order them from the vehicle. Id. It follows
that if Officers can remove occupants from a vehicle, they can – after removing them – direct them
where to stand or sit to avoid compromising officer safety.
Officer Mikowski testified at the hearing that his primary objective in moving the subjects to
the curb was to “be with” both occupants because he felt responsible for the safety of all officers on
scene, including a canine handler and a trainee. He testified: “I like to be in control of the people
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involved in a stop”; “it’s a safety issue for me”; “I take ownership of the stop”; “I feel responsible
for the other officers at the stop.” When pressed by the Court on whether there was any reason to
bring Roest into the conversation at the curb, Officer Mikowski admitted Roest did not need to be
part of the “conversation,” but did not concede that there was no reason or purpose for controlling
his movements.

Officer Mikowski controlled both subjects’ positions to prevent them from

wandering into locations that may have compromised the safety of any officer on scene.
Defense counsel may argue that the issue is not whether officers could control the subjects’
movements and position during the stop, but whether doing so added unnecessary delay to the stop.
That argument is illogical. If officers are constitutionally permitted to undertake a given action in
the course of a traffic stop, then they are also necessarily permitted to use the time it requires to
undertake that action.
6. Conversation at Curb (23:37 – 24:31)
Hondo’ s alert is not visible in Officer Mikowski’s video, but testimony at the hearing from
Deputy Kindelberger would place it at approximately 24:31.2 At that moment, the officers have
additional reasonable suspicion to seize both subjects to conduct a drug investigation. State v.
Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843 (1999); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1992).
The issue for the Court to decide is whether Officer Mikowski’s conversation with
Defendant and Mr. Roest for less than one minute from the time they were seated on the curb was
an “unreasonable delay” of the stop or whether it could still be considered pursuing the initial
purpose of the stop with “reasonable diligence.”

2

Deputy Kindelberger testified that Hondo alerted at 5:24 on his video, which was about 17
seconds after he passed behind Defendant (5:07 Kindelberger video). Cross referencing that
moment to Officer Mikowski’s video (24:14) places the alert at 24:31.
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Neither officer could testify regarding what exactly was said during that minute at the curb.
Deputy Kindelberger noted that (if it were him) he may have been following up on questions that
arose during the course of the stop such as the truck’s ownership. He also testified that, depending
on the license status of the occupants, he may have used that time to discuss the disposition of the
vehicle. He also mentioned the possibility that, after completing a citation, an officer may still be
engaged in conversation (related or unrelated to the citation) initiated by one of the occupants; he
noted that if that happens, “we try not to be rude.” He indicated there may have been other issues in
the stop which might have prompted other permissible discussion, but he admitted that he was not
part of the conversation and he was only guessing at possible topics.
Officer Mikowski testified that he was “going to talk to them about how the stop was going
to end,” including explaining the citation and possibly the uncited conduct and equipment violations
and discussing the disposition of the vehicle, given that it would have to be towed. However, he
testified that he couldn’t recall with certainty that he did, in fact, end up discussing those issues with
the subjects at the curb.
Instead he testified that, to the best of his recollection, Mr. Roest was spontaneously telling
him about events the previous night; this is consistent with what the video shows regarding Roest’s
tendency to volunteer information and anecdotes. Defense counsel attempted to refresh Officer
Mikowski’s recollection with (somewhat muffled) audio from Officer Esparza’s on-body video (not
entered into evidence), asking Officer Mikowski if he recalled asking Roest questions about where
they had come from and where they were going. Officer Mikowski conceded Defense counsel’s
characterization of the audio sounded correct (although it did not appear to actually refresh his
independent recollection of what was said). Officer Mikowski testified, “I don’t recall questioning
him [at the curb].”
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Even if Officer Mikowski was asking Roest about where they had come from and where
they were going, such questions are permissible as long as they do not “measurably” extend the
duration of the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15. Furthermore, if such a conversation took place and if it
unreasonably extended the stop, it is still not clear that Officer Mikowski initiated that conversation
or if it would be better characterized as polite participation in a conversation that Roest had initiated
and was carrying on. Officer Mikowski testified that Roest was somewhat prone to offering up
information, stating “he liked to talk.”
In short, although the Court admittedly has limited evidence regarding what was discussed
with the occupants on the curb for the minute before the alert, Officer Mikowski testified that he
intended to engage in a permissible discussion (which could easily have taken more than a minute,
given the uncited conduct and the disposition of the vehicle), that Roest “liked to talk,” and that he
did not independently recall questioning the occupants. This evidence may be somewhat scant, but
it is uncontroverted. And, in any case, it’s not clear that the questioning Defense counsel alluded to
would be prohibited under Rodriguez.
B. Any delay was cured by Defendant’s knowing and voluntary consent to the search
Even if the Court finds that the stop was impermissibly delayed at some point, that delay
should not result in the suppression of the methamphetamine that was later found in Defendant’s
pocket as the result of a consent search.
1.

Discovery of the evidence was not the product of any alleged delay

“Suppression is not justified unless ‘the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of
illegal governmental activity.’” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3391,
82 L.Ed.2d 599, 615 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471,
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100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 63 L.Ed.2d 537, 545 (1980)). Here, the evidence is not the product of illegal
governmental activity because the alleged illegal detention concluded when the canine alerted –
several minutes before Defendant was asked to consent to a search of his pockets, and there is
nothing to suggest that the reason Defendant consented was in any way because of the delay. See,
e.g., State v. McBaine, 144 Idaho 130, 157 P.3d 1101 (Ct. App. 2007) (no suppression where
unlawful entry ended before consent was requested); State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 5 P.3d 993 (Ct.
App. 2000) (consent following delayed traffic stop may be voluntary if illegal detention had ceased
at time of consent; case remanded to determine if illegal detention had ceased).
2.

Discovery of the evidence is attenuated from any alleged delay

Alternatively, if the Court determines, as a threshold matter, that the evidence in this case is
the product of illegal governmental activity, it should still not be suppressed because the discovery
of the evidence is too attenuated from the illegal activity.
The attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be admitted “when the connection between
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been
violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” State v. Cohagan, 162
Idaho 717, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017), reh'g denied (Nov. 17, 2017) (quoting Utah v. Strieff, ––
– U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400, 407–08 (2016)).
In applying the attenuation doctrine, the ultimate question is whether the police acquired the
evidence by exploiting the illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 (1963); State v.
Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 734, 117 P.3d 146, 148 (Ct. App. 2005). The Idaho Supreme Court has
employed a three-factor test to determine attenuation: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct
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and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the
flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846,
103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004).
Under the Wong Sun test, the evidence in this case should be admitted. Officer Mikowski
did not “acquire the evidence by exploiting the [alleged] illegality.” Presumably, Officer Mikowski
could have asked for consent at any time during the course of the stop, and there is no reason to
think Defendant would have reacted any differently. The ability to hypothetically move the consent
to another point in time, even though contrary to the actual facts, demonstrates the conceptual
independence of the delay and the consent (the lack of exploitation). The delay did not lead to the
discovery of the evidence; the consent did. The only causal connection is factual, not proximate; the
consent occurred at the end of the stop, but it could have occurred at any other point and there is no
reason to think the result would have been different, even though there would have been no delay to
“exploit.” The Supreme Court is careful to note that exploitation is the issue in Wong Sun:
We need not hold that all evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree”
simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal actions
of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is
“whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added).
Similarly, under the three-factor test set out in State v. Page, the evidence should not be
suppressed. In addressing the first factor, the period of time to consider is “the elapsed time
between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence.” Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721. Without
knowing what moment the Court may consider impermissible delay, this factor is difficult to
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evaluate, but it would have to be at least ten minutes (Hondo alerted at 24:31 and Officer Mikowski
asks for consent at 35:40). That period favors attenuation.
Second, the intervening circumstance in this case is Defendant’s knowing and voluntary
consent to search, which strongly favors attenuation because it provides a completely separate legal
basis for the search from any advantage gained by delay (the canine alert is the only advantage
gained by delay).
The third factor only favors exclusion “when the police misconduct is most in need of
deterrence—that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.” Id. at 722-23. Even if the Court does find
that the stop was delayed at some point, any such delay was likely inadvertent. If, for example, an
officer asks a question of a passenger while he should be explaining a citation to a driver, even if
that is an unreasonable, unconstitutional delay, it does not make it deliberate misconduct and it
should not be taken as such.
II.

CONCLUSION

Officer Mikowski diligently pursued the initial purpose of the stop until the canine alert,
which provided separate grounds to pursue a drug investigation. Several minutes later, Defendant
voluntarily consented to a search of his pockets. There was no unconstitutional delay, and if there
were, the evidence in this case was not the fruit of that delay, and if it were, it is still too attenuated
to suppress. Defendant’s Motion should be denied.
DATED this 19th day of October 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

M4.»

________________________
By: David Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
)
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSON,
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR01-18-15616
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

COMES NOW, Frederick Jacobson, through his attorney, and files this Memorandum
in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.
I.

FACTS PERTAINING TO THE MOTION1

On April 1, 2018, at approximately 8:22 a.m., Meridian Police Department’s Officer
Mikowski was traveling westbound on Overland Road when a small black Toyota truck driven
by Frederick Jacobson passed him traveling eastbound. Officer Mikowski executed a U-turn
and began following the vehicle. Once following the vehicle, Officer Mikowski observed the
rear license plate of the truck was not mounted on the rear bumper of the vehicle and a portion
of the license plate was blocked by a decal on the window so he could not read the registration
The facts as stated in this memorandum are from the discovery and are the anticipated testimony at an
evidentiary hearing.

1
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tab. The truck turned southbound onto Eagle Road and Officer Mikowski activated his
overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop of Mr. Jacobson’s vehicle. Mr. Jacobson
immediately pulled his vehicle to the shoulder of Eagle Road and stopped. Officer Mikowski
approached Mr. Jacobson’s vehicle and indicated he had been stopped for failing to have his
license plate mounted on the rear of the truck and because the registration tags were not visible
due to the decal in the window. Officer Mikowski then requested insurance, driver’s license,
and registration. He also requested identification from Mr. Jacobson’s sole passenger in the
vehicle, Christopher Roest, who provided his license. Mr. Jacobson provided his identification
card and explained that he did not have a driver’s license and asked if that would require the
vehicle be towed. Officer Mikowski stated that his honesty would go a long way and they
would get it figured out. Video 1 until 2:00.
Officer Mikowski then returned to his vehicle and ran a record check of both parties.
After spending approximately four and a half minutes in his vehicle running their information,
Office Mikowski again returned to the vehicle and asked if they had found the registration or
insurance. Mr. Jacobson responded that he did not because he had just bought the truck and
had just moved out here this week, but he did have the bill of sale for the truck and provided
the bill of sale to Officer Mikowski. The officer questioned Mr. Jacobson about where he was
from and why he moved here, he then asked about whether Mr. Jacobson or his passenger were
on probation, parole, or out on bail. Mr. Jacobson responded no and his passenger explained he
was on bail for a revoked registration and license and possession of paraphernalia. During the
questioning, a second police unit arrived on scene to assist Officer Mikowski. Id. at 2:00 –
8:15.
Officer Mikowski then returned to his vehicle and while walking to his vehicle
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requested a canine unit to also assist. Officer Mikowski proceeds to sit in his vehicle and type
and search on his computer for the next approximately fourteen minutes before printing
citations for Mr. Jacobson. Id. at 8:20 – 22:30. During this span of time, Officer Mikowski also
placed a call to another officer to ask what code violation to use if someone does not have a
driver’s license. The officer responded to cite for failure to purchase or invalid license, Idaho
Code § 49-301, and then asked Officer Mikowski, “got any dope or no?” To which he
responds, “I think it’s a pretty good stop, we’ll see.” Id. at 17:00.
The canine unit (Officer Kindelberger) also arrives while Officer Mikowski was still in
his vehicle. He approached Officer Mikowski’s vehicle and Officer Mikowski turns off his
audio and a conversation ensued while both officers’ audios are off. Id. at 9:10; Video 2 at 0:00
– 0:30. Officer Kindelberger then approached Mr. Jacobson’s vehicle, directed him out of the
vehicle, patted him down for weapons, and directed him to sit in front of Officer Mikowski’s
vehicle. There he questions Mr. Jacobson numerous times about whether there are drugs in the
vehicle. Video 2 at 0:30. Officer Kindelberger leaves Mr. Jacobson and proceeds to pull the
passenger, Mr. Roest, out of the vehicle to search him for weapons and interrogate him about
his drug use. Id. at 2:30. During the questioning of Mr. Roest, Officer Mikowski finished
printing the citations and stepped out of his vehicle. Officer Mikowski approaches Mr.
Jacobson and directs him to sit on a curb by his patrol vehicle. Id. at 3:30; Video 1 at 22:25.
With his audio still off, Officer Mikowski speaks for a moment with Mr. Jacobson as
he is seated on the curb and then returns to the truck to direct Mr. Roast to sit on the curb next
to Mr. Jacobson. He then stands behind the two while Officer Kindelberger retrieves his canine
from his vehicle, then he moves to stand in front of the two while another officer stands behind
them. Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Roest remain seated on the ground, surrounded by three officers
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while Officer Kindelberger runs his canine past them to conduct a sniff of the vehicle. During
this encounter, all officers have their audio turned off. At no point does Officer Mikowski
attempt to provide the printed citations to Mr. Jacobson. Finally, Officer Mikowski turns on his
audio and the ongoing conversation is wholly unrelated to the purpose of the initial stop. Id. at
25:30. The canine eventually alerts on the vehicle and Officer Mikowski assists Officer
Kindelberger in conducting a search of the vehicle.
After the vehicle is searched and nothing is found, Officer Mikowski returns to Mr.
Jacobson, still sitting on the curb, and directs him to stand and speak with him away from Mr.
Roest. Id. at 35:40. The following conversation ensues:
Officer Mikowski:
Mr. Jacobson:
Officer Mikowski:
Mr. Jacobson:
Officer Mikowski:
Mr. Jacobson:

Do you got anything illegal on you?
No.
Nothing at all, nothing? I know they checked you for weapons,
you got nothing in your pockets, anything like that?
I’ve got a lighter.
Without reaching in. Is it cool if I check really quick man?
I’ve got a lighter, chapstick. Yeah, go ahead.

Officer Mikowski thoroughly searches Mr. Jacobson’s person and finds a small baggie of
white substance in the coin pocket of Mr. Jacobson’s pants. Mr. Jacobson is arrested and
placed into Officer Mikowski’s vehicle. Mr. Jacobson is now charged with one count of
possession of a controlled substance, a felony. Mr. Jacobson now challenges the legality of the
seizure and search conducted in this matter and requests this Court suppress all evidence
obtained resultant from this unlawful seizure and search.
II.

WHY RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Greene, 140 Idaho
605, 607, 97 P.3d 472, 474 (Ct. App. 2004). “Evidence discovered in result of an illegal search
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will be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Id. (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable. Id.
A.

Officers Kindelberger and Mikowski did not have a reasonable belief that
Mr. Jacobson was armed and dangerous and thus were not justified in
searching or even asking to search him.

Officers Kindelberger nor Mikowski had a right to search Mr. Jacobson for weapons,
and any request to do so was unjustified. Officer Mikowski further did not have a right, either
pursuant to a Terry patdown or Mr. Jacobson’s consent, to pull out the clear plastic baggie
from Mr. Jacobson’s pocket.
“Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), police may conduct a warrantless search of a
person, without an arrest, if they are conducting the search for the limited purpose of
discovering weapons.” Id. The purpose of the limited patdown search, however, is not to
discover evidence of a crime, “but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear
of violence.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
The United States Supreme Court carefully considered when law enforcement may
perform a patdown on a person in Ybarra v. Illinois. The Court scrutinized the legality of a
police frisk of a patron of a bar where an authorized narcotics search was taking place. The
Court stated that:
The Terry case created an exception to the requirement of probable cause, an
exception whose “narrow scope” this Court “has been careful to maintain.”
Under that doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and
safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or
suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted. Nothing in
Terry can be understood to allow a generalized “cursory search for weapons”
or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The “narrow scope”
of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked . . . .”
444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (citation omitted, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
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In Ybarra, police were executing a warrant at a tavern where Ybarra happened to be a
customer.
Upon seeing Ybarra, [police] neither recognized him as a person with a criminal
history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to
assault them. Moreover . . . [his] hands were empty, [he] gave no indication of
possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent
to commit an assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening .
. . [and] the most [police] could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a 3/4length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be expected on
almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March.
Id. at 93. The Court concluded that the state could not “articulate any specific fact that would
have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and
dangerous.” Id. The search of Ybarra was held to have been unreasonable. Id.
The Ninth Circuit has opined that “[a] wide variety of factors support a reasonable
belief that an individual is armed and dangerous.” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d
1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). In Ramirez, an officer noticed a car parked outside a drugstore with
a man apparently asleep at the wheel. Id. The officer subsequently detained, searched, and
arrested the man, Ramirez, for being under the influence of a controlled substance. Id. Ramirez
later sued the officer’s city and appealed when the district court granted the city’s motion for
summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that:
[T]he officer’s pat-down search of plaintiff violated the Fourth Amendment, as
there was a complete lack of evidence that would support a reasonable suspicion
that he had a weapon. Being “testy” and suspected of illicit drug use did not
support a finding that he had a weapon.
Id. The Court listed the facts surrounding Ramirez’s frisk:
Ramirez was cooperative. He complied with Montez’s request that he exit his
vehicle, and there is no evidence he did so in a furtive manner. There is nothing
in the record to suggest Ramirez made any abrupt movements or that he
attempted to reach for anything upon exiting his vehicle. He also cooperatively
submitted to the search of his person, albeit without his consent. Montez
testified that he tapped Ramirez’s outer garments “to make sure” there were no
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bulges or weapons concealed, but does not allege that he observed a visible
bulge or weapon on Ramirez.
Id. In conclusion, the Court recognized that “[a]lthough the nature of the suspected crime itself
does at times provide the requisite amount of reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down
search of a detained individual . . . this court has never held that mere suspicion of drug use
alone provides the basis for a Terry frisk.” Id.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho found a patdown search to be unreasonable in
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 661, 152 P.3d 16, 22 (2007). In Henage, two brothers were
stopped in a truck with a broken taillight. Id. at 657, 152 P.3d at 18. Law enforcement issued
the driver a citation and told the brothers they were free to go, but then, because the two police
officers were aware that the brothers had prior drug involvement, the officers decided to
continue questioning them. Id. One officer told the brother who was a passenger that he
wanted to talk to him “about some things.” Id.
The officer testified that he had known the brother for several years and had “never had
a problem with him,” stating that during this encounter with the brother, the brother was polite
but nervous. Id. The brother agreed to answer questions and exited the truck. Id. The officer
asked the brother if he had contraband on his person, and the brother responded that he had a
knife. Id. The officer performed a patdown on the brother and retrieved the knife. Id. The
officer then
. . . resumed the search. As the search continued, he “felt a large hard object in
one of [the brother’s] cargo pockets.” When asked what the object was, [the
brother] responded that he did not know. [The officer] reached into the pocket
and removed two objects, which he identified as a glass pipe and a cigar tube.
[The officer] opened the cigar tube and found a white rock later identified as
methamphetamine.
Id.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 7

000173

In opining on the brother’s appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, the Court set
out the rules regarding a patdown search, noting that: “Whether an officer may reasonably
justify such a search is evaluated in light of the ‘facts known to the officers on the scene and
the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of the circumstances.’”
Id. (quoting State v. Wright, 134 Idaho79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301).
The officer testified that, after the brother was known to have a knife, he “felt” that his
safety had been compromised. Id. The Court stated that this did not justify the patdown search
of the brother. Id. Weapons searches, the Court stated, are not justified by an officer’s
subjective feeling; rather, the officer must present specific facts that can be objectively
evaluated to support the conclusion that the subject of the intended search posed a potential
risk. Id. The Court reversed the denial of the brother’s motion to suppress. Id.
In summary, the Court in Ybarra found a patdown to be unreasonable when police:
know nothing about a person; have no reason to stop that person (even though they are on
premises that are subject to a warrant); and the person makes no threatening gestures. The
Ramirez Court reasoned that being testy, under-the-influence, and sleeping behind the wheel of
a car is not behavior that merits a frisk. The Court in Henage found a patdown to be
unreasonable when: the encounter is consensual; the person makes no threatening gestures; the
person is known to be nice; but the person has a knife and is known to have had illicit drug
involvement in the past.
Officer Mikowski did have cause to stop Mr. Jacobson--for a minor traffic infractions-and then cite him for those infractions and failure to purchase a license but, while failure to
purchase a license is a misdemeanor offense under Idaho Code § 49-301, it is a non-arrestable
offense, I.C. § 19-603, and Officer Mikowski did not intend to arrest Mr. Jacobson for the
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offense. Nonetheless, Officer Kindelberger asked Mr. Jacobson to exit his vehicle and patted
him down for weapons, and Officer Mikowski later proceeded to ask Mr. Jacobson if he could
pat him down for weapons.
The Ninth Circuit has held that where an officer does not have a reasonable belief that a
defendant is armed and dangerous, even his question whether the defendant has any weapons is
not justified. United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Officer Kindelberger
did not have an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Jacobson was armed or dangerous, and
his question asking if he could search Mr. Jacobson was therefore not justified.
The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful
patdown search may not be used against the victim of that search. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho
26, 407 P.3d 1285, 1289 (2017). Here, Officers Kindelberger and Mikowski were not justified
in asking to frisk Mr. Jacobson, and thus, evidence obtained as a result of the searches cannot
be used against Mr. Jacobson and should be suppressed.
B.

Officer Mikowski’s seizure of the clear, plastic baggie from Mr. Jacobson’s
pocket exceeded both the limits of an allowable patdown under Terry and
the scope of Mr. Jacobson’s consent to search him for weapons.
1.

Officer Mikowski exceeded the limits of an allowable patdown under
Terry when he removed the baggie of methamphetamine from Mr.
Jacobson’s pocket.

Even had Officer Mikowski been justified in asking to perform a search of Mr.
Jacobson, Officer Mikowski exceeded the allowable limits of such a search. The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the limits of an allowable patdown under Terry are
narrowly drawn. For example in Minnesota v. Dickerson, the defendant was convicted for
possession of a controlled substance after he was frisked by a police officer who found a lump
of cocaine in his pocket. 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993). The officer in that case, while performing a
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protective patdown, did not immediately recognize a lump within the suspect’s pocket as crack
cocaine. Id. Instead, he determined that the lump was crack only after squeezing, sliding, and
otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket -- a pocket which the officer
already knew contained no weapon. Id. The Dickerson Court affirmed the state court’s ruling
that the police officer overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed bounds of a Terry
search, stating that:
Here, the officer’s continued exploration of respondent’s pocket after having
concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to ‘the sole justification of
the search [under Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others
nearby.’ It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry
expressly refused to authorize, and that we have condemned in subsequent
cases.
Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has similarly recognized the limits of Terry. In State v.
Watson, the defendant’s neighbors called police because Watson was walking around his
apartment complex yelling obscenities and talking about killing people. 143 Idaho 840, 842,
153 P.3d 1186, 1188 (Ct. App. 2007). Police responded to a second call from Watson’s
neighbors on the same day. Id. During that second contact, the police officer cuffed Watson
and proceeded to pat him down. Id. “The officer felt a hard object and reached into Watson’s
pocket to remove the object. In doing so, the officer emptied all items from Watson’s front
pocket. The officer found money, a toothpaste container, keys, and a small, plastic bag that
contained methamphetamine.” Id. Watson moved to suppress the methamphetamine. Id.
The Court first affirmed that “. . . discovering an unidentified ‘bulge’ in a pocket during
the course of a lawful pat-down would entitle the officers to assure themselves that it was not a
weapon.” Id. at 44, 153 P.3d at 1190. The Court continued, however, to state that:
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Police officers may not further intrude on a person’s privacy without first
attempting to determine by touch whether the object causing a bulge could be a
weapon. See United States v. Campa, 234 F.3d 733, 739 (1st Cir. 2000)
(reaching into pockets whenever officer felt a protrusion and emptying all items
indiscriminately not permitted when he did not attempt to distinguish between
bulging items that could have been weapons and other types of concealed
objects). Nor may officers further intrude on a person’s privacy when an
objectively reasonable determination can be made by touch that the object
causing the bulge is not a weapon based on its size and density. See Ellis v.
State, 573 So. 2d 724, 725 (Miss. 1990) (officer exceeded limits of Terry frisk
in removing bag causing obvious bulge in pants when he testified bag did not
feel like a solid object).
We therefore hold that the permissible scope of a pat-down search for weapons
is limited to the minimum intrusion necessary to reasonably assure the officer
that the suspect does not have a weapon. If the officer is unable to make an
objectively reasonable determination that an object causing a bulge under a
person’s clothing is not a weapon by feeling its size and density, the officer is
entitled to further invade the person’s privacy only to the extent necessary that
such a determination can be made.
Id. at 845, 153 P.3d at 1191.
There is no indication that Officer Mikowski suspected that the tiny baggie in Mr.
Jacobson’s pocket was a weapon. Officer Mikowski’s continued exploration of Mr. Jacobson’s
pocket was the type of search, as in Dickerson, that exceeds the sole justification set out in
Terry—safety—and that the United States Supreme Court has condemned. As in Watson,
Officer Mikowski “exceeded the scope of a pat-down search for weapons when he emptied
[Mr. Jacobson’s] pocket.” Officer Mikowski intentionally removed an item that could not have
been a weapon when it was unnecessary to do so in violation of Terry. The contraband pulled
out by Officer Mikowski should be suppressed.
2.

Officer Mikowski exceeded the scope of Mr. Jacobson’s consent to search
for weapons.

Whether scope of consent to search has been exceeded is a factual question determined
by totality of circumstances. United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Consent to search is considered a waiver of the right to demand a warrant; thus, it can be
limited in the same way that the specifications of a warrant may be limited i.e. the places to be
searched and the items to be searched for. Id. As the Idaho Court of Appeals has said:
It is well settled that when the basis for a search is consent, the State must
conform its search to the limitations placed upon the right granted by the
consent. The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, or in other words what a
reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer
and the suspect. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 297(1991) . . .
State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626, 288 P.3d 840, 843 (Ct. App. 2012) (some citations
omitted).
In State v. Bonilla, police stopped Bonilla after watching his car, based upon a tip he
was operating a mobile meth lab and witnessing him commit traffic infractions. 161 Idaho 902,
903, 392 P.3d 1243, 1244 (Ct. App. 2017). The officer asked Bonilla to exit the vehicle and he
eventually agreed. Id. Then:
As Bonilla exited the vehicle, Officer Reimers saw a six-inch Maglight on the
driver’s side floorboard, which the officer testified he knew from his training
and experience could be used as a club or weapon. The officer obtained consent
to search Bonilla for weapons and lifted Bonilla’s shirt to look at his waistband.
When doing this, the officer observed a plastic baggie containing
marijuana sticking out of Bonilla’s pocket. The officer then placed Bonilla
under arrest and deployed a drug dog. A search of Bonilla’s vehicle led to the
discovery of methamphetamine, hydrocodone, Temazepam, Quetiapine, a
digital scale, and a shotgun.
Id. Bonilla appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, which he
brought on the grounds that the officer’s search of him exceeded either a Terry patdown
or, alternatively, his consent. Id.
The Court of Appeals, relying on the rules set out in State v. Tyler, found that the
district court did not err in concluding that Bonilla consented to a search, noting that the
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officer’s preliminary hearing testimony supported such a finding:
Q. That’s okay. How did he respond to your inquiry about the additional
weapons?
A. I asked him if I could check his person for weapons, and he told me that he
would allow me to do that.
Q. What did you discover when you patted him down for weapons?
A. Well, he had a T-shirt that was falling below his belt line, and when I lifted
his T-shirt to inspect his waistline, I observed a baggie sticking out of the right
pocket of his pants.
Id. The Court concluded that the lifting of Bonilla’s shirt was within the scope of consent for a
search of weapons and that therefore the search of Bonilla’s person did not exceed his consent.
Id. at 904, 392 P.3d at 1245.
Unlike the officer in Bonilla, however, Officer Mikowski desired to go beyond the
scope of Mr. Jacobson’s original consent to a search for weapons, engaging in conduct that
equated to more than the equivalent of lifting a shirt to check a waistband. This is evidenced by
the fact that Officer Mikowski had to dig in the small pocket of Mr. Jacobson’s pant to pull out
the tiny plastic baggie. Video 1 at 36:15.
C.

Officer Mikowski Unlawfully Prolonged the Seizure of Mr. Jacobson and
Initiated a New Unreasonable Seizure by Launching into a Drug
Investigation Without Reasonable Articulable Suspicion.
1.

An Abandonment of the Purpose of a Seizure Without New Reasonable
Suspicion Is Unlawful.

An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
justifying suspicion that a detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). Idaho
courts have long held that such detentions must be temporary and last no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct.
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App. 2004); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus,
where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931, citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357,
361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000).
An initially reasonable detention becomes unreasonable if an officer extends the
duration of the stop to investigate other criminal conduct for which there is no reasonable
suspicion. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Thus, if addressing an infraction is the
purpose of the stop, the stop may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 407 (2007)). Because an officer must be focused on effectuating the purpose of a stop,
“[w]here a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its
underlying justification.” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924, P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016),
citing Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. Further, the officer is obligated to diligently
pursue his duties with respect to the initial purpose of the stop. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605,
609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016) (referring to Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616
(2015)).
Importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court recently clarified the import of Rodriguez for
Idaho courts:
The United States Supreme Court has plainly established that a traffic stop is a
seizure, but it is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment so long
as there is a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic
laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621
(1981). The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues
the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related. However,
should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that
original reasonable suspicion supporting his new actions. Indeed, when an officer
abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes
initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own
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reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggy-back
on the reasonableness of the original seizure. In other words, unless some new
reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the seizure’s new purpose, a
seized party’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original purpose of
the stop is abandoned (unless that abandonment falls within some established
exception).
State v. Linze, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 354 at *10 (S.Ct. Nov. 10, 2016). In other words, “[t]he
United States Supreme Court’s intention in Rodriguez is thus made clear. The rule isn’t
concerned with when the officer deviates from the original purpose of the traffic stop, it is
concerned with the fact that the officer deviates from the original purpose of the stop at all.”
Id. at *11.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Linze underscores previous holdings of Idaho
courts and sets a bright-line rule indicating that any abandonment of the purpose of a seizure
that is not substantiated by reasonable suspicion is unlawful. For example, in Linze, the Idaho
Supreme Court determined law enforcement violated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment
rights after deviating from the original purpose of the stop “by delaying the traffic stop for two
and a half minutes while performing a back-up function for a drug dog sweep.” Id.
This result aligns with prior Idaho rulings indicating that any abandonment of the
purpose of a seizure without reasonable suspicion is unlawful. For example, in recounting its
prior ruling in State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P.3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005), the Court of
Appeals noted that:
upon informing Aguirre of the purpose of the stop, the officers obtained Aguirre’s
license and registration. However, instead of pursuing the issuance of the citation,
the officer asked if anything illegal was in the vehicle and asked for consent to
search. When denied consent, the officer employed a drug dog around the vehicle.
Though other officers were at the scene, none of the officers continued the initial
purpose of the stop; rather, the officers all pursued the drug investigation. This
Court noted that the “purpose that justified the stop—the issuance of a traffic
citation—was immediately abandoned.” Id. at 564, 112 P.3d at 852. We therefore
held that the use of the drug dog impermissibly extended the duration of the
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detention. Id.
State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 426, P.3d 1280, 1289 (Ct. App. 2015).
Thus, under Idaho law, abandoning the initial purpose of a lawful seizure to pursue a
new investigation constitutes a new seizure. Because such a seizure must comport with the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantees, this new seizure itself must be substantiated by reasonable
suspicion.

If this new seizure’s purpose is not substantiated by independent reasonable

suspicion, the seizure is unlawful.
2.

Officer Mikowski Abandoned the Purpose of the Stop and Initiated a
New Seizure by Beginning a Drug Interrogation and Investigation
Without Reasonable Suspicion.

Even though Officer Mikowski had reasonable suspicion to initially detain Mr.
Jacobson, he did not diligently pursue his duties and abandoned the purpose of that stop and
initiated a new seizure of Mr. Jacobson by beginning an investigation tantamount to a fishing
expedition based on no reasonable suspicion. It is evident that Officer Mikowski intended for
his assist units to engage in a drug investigation, and that he himself abandoned the purpose of
the stop to also engage in a drug investigation.
After speaking with Mr. Jacobson a second time, Officer Mikowski called for a canine
officer to assist him. The call was placed while Officer Mikowski was walking back to his
vehicle, and so would not be considered an extension of the stop under State v. Renteria. 415
P.3d 954, 958 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018). There, the officer stopped a vehicle for failing to signal
for at least five seconds before changing lanes. After collecting the driver’s license and
registration and while walking to his car the officer requested the assistance of a canine officer
through dispatch. The Court held the call was not an unlawful extension of the stop as it was
conducted while the officer was walking to his vehicle, so it did not extend the time of the stop.
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Id. at 956. Here, while Officer Mikowski’s call for a canine unit was not an extension of the
stop, it is illustrative of Officer Mikowski’s intent to begin a drug investigation.
Officer Mikowski first abandoned the purpose of the underlying stop when he did not
diligently pursue his duties. After his first interaction with Mr. Jacobson, he returned to his
vehicle and ran both Mr. Jacobson’s and his passenger’s information for over four minutes.
Yet, after he called the canine unit he sat in his vehicle for another fourteen (14) minutes and
appears to be looking for additional background information on Mr. Jacobson and his
passenger. An officer is obligated to diligently pursue his duties with respect to the initial
purpose of the stop. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016) (emphasis
added) (referring to Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015)). Here, Officer
Mikowski had ample time to perform the checks permitted by law, and instead he abandoned
the purpose underlying the stop and continued to search for background information on Mr.
Jacobson and Mr. Roest to assist in the drug investigation he had no reasonable suspicion to
conduct.
Officer Mikowski again unlawfully extended the stop when he quit pursuing the task at
hand to discuss with Officer Kindelberger why he suspected drug use. The case is
distinguishable from Renteria and McGraw. In Renteria the Court found a stop was not
unlawfully extended where the primary officer explained to the assisting canine officer why he
suspected the defendants of drug use. The Court’s holding was based upon the fact that the
conversation occurred while the officer was awaiting a response from dispatch on a driver’s
license and warrants check, and so the time of the stop was not extended by the conversation.
Id. at 958. Further, in State v. McGraw, the Court held that it was not an extension of the stop
where at least one officer was still diligently pursuing the purpose of the stop. 418 P.3d 1245,
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1249-50. Neither case is applicable here because during Officer Mikowski’s conversation with
Officer Kindelberger, neither was diligently pursuing the purpose of the stop. Rather, the initial
purpose of the stop was put on hold so the officers could engage in a conversation about
suspected drugs – a conversation wholly unrelated to the issuance of citations.
Yet, most illustrative of the blatant extension of the stop is Officer Mikowski’s
complete abandonment of his duties after he prints the citations and gathers Mr. Jacobson and
Mr. Roest, directs they sit on the curb, and stands over them while Officer Kindelberger walks
to his vehicle, retrieves his canine, and conducts a drug search. During that time, Officer
Mikowski does nothing related to the underlying purpose of the stop. He simply waits for
Officer Kindelberger to receive an alert from the canine so the two can search the vehicle for
drugs. Finally, Officer Mikowski again unlawfully extends the duration of the stop when, after
searching the vehicle and finding nothing, he pulls Mr. Jacobson aside and asks to search him
for weapons. This action is again unrelated to the underlying purpose for the stop.
Although Officer Mikowski possessed no reasonable, articulable suspicion establishing
Mr. Jacobson had violated any law other than the purported traffic violations and failure to
purchase a license, again a non-arrestable offense pursuant to I.C. 19-603, Officer Mikowski’s
full attention and investigation was focused not on resolving those traffic violations, but upon a
fishing expedition for drugs or other contraband.
Under Linze, this drug investigation was an abandonment of the original purpose of the
stop and, “for all intents and purposes initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which
requires its own reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Linze at *9-10. These actions
not only unlawfully extended the duration of the stop under Neal, but also comprised an
unreasonable new seizure under the rule set forth in Linze. After all, Officer Mikowski’s
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interaction with Mr. Jacobson was entirely focused on morphing a traffic investigation into a
new investigation for which he had no reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Because Officer Mikowski abandoned the initial purpose for his stop, he was required
to possess reasonable suspicion for the new seizure of Mr. Jacobson in order to comply with
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements. Because Officer Mikowski possessed
no such reasonable suspicion to undergird the new seizure of Mr. Jacobson, this seizure was
unlawful.
D.

Officer Mikowski’s Search of Mr. Jacobson Was Unlawful Because Officer
Mikowski’s Actions Unlawfully Coerced Mr. Jacobson to Consent to the
Search.

In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
searches, the State must demonstrate that consent to search was voluntary rather than the result
of duress or coercion. In State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App.
2006), the Court of Appeals stated:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches. A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se
unreasonable unless the State shows that it fell within one of the narrowly drawn
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct. App. 2002). A
search conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is one such exception.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. It is the
State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was
voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 221; State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State
v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 522, 554, 989 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1999); Dominguez, 137
Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. A voluntary decision is one that is “the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). An individual’s consent is
involuntary, on the other hand, “if his will has been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired.” Id. In determining whether a subject’s will was
overborne in a particular case, the court must assess “the totality of the surrounding
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. Thus, whether consent was granted
voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is a factual determination to be based upon
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the surrounding circumstances, accounting for subtly coercive police questions and the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the party granting the consent to a search.” Id. at
229; Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796, 69 P.3d at 1057; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.2d
at 327.
In State v. Rector, 144 Idaho 643, 167 P.3d 780 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court’s finding that “[the defendant’s] act of pulling the
methamphetamine from her pocket was not an act of free will but the product of coercive
circumstances.” There, the court noted several factors contributing to a coercive atmosphere
and also noted that “by asking the deputies for permission to smoke, [the defendant] had
demonstrated that she did not consider the encounter to be consensual but rather considered
herself to be under the control of the deputies.” Rector, 144 Idaho at 646, 167 P.3d at 783.
Here, Mr. Jacobson was similarly subjected to coercive police behavior. As in Rector,
Jacobson was clearly not free to leave.

In Rector, law enforcement asked “to see [the

defendant’s] pocket’s contents.” Id.,144 Idaho at 644, 167 P.3d at 781. Here, Mr. Jacobson’s
decision to acquiesce to a search of his person was not a voluntary choice, but one in which his
will was overborne by Officers Mikowski and Kindelberger’s actions. Mr. Jacobson had
already once been illegally searched by Officer Kindelberger, then questioned by him about
drug use or possession without any reasonable suspicion for a drug-investigation. Then he was
directed to sit on the curb while three law enforcement officers stood over him and a canine
was directed to his vehicle – all because of traffic related offenses. He then watched as his
vehicle was searched. Only after that was he directed to stand and speak to Officer Mikowski
who asked to again search him for weapons.
The unlawful search of Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Roest in conjunction with the drug
investigation and unlawful extension of the stop were directly and impliedly coercive. Under
such circumstances, it is clear that, as in Rector, the ultimate search and seizure of Mr.
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Jacobson’s person was coerced and not voluntary. Thus, Officer Mikowski’s search was
unlawful.
III.

CONCLUSION

Officer Mikowski abandoned his investigation into Mr. Jacobson’s alleged traffic
violation to begin a separate and unjustified investigation wholly unrelated to the traffic stop.
Because the purpose for Officer Mikowski’s new investigation was not substantiated by
reasonable suspicion, this new seizure violated Mr. Jacobson’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, Officer Mikowski’s seizure and
search of Mr. Jacobson’s person was unlawful because Officer Mikowski did not have consent
to search Mr. Jacobson for anything more than weapons. As a result, the evidence against Mr.
Jacobson obtained subsequent to these unlawful actions should be suppressed.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2018.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg
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Defendant.

COMES NOW,
Memorandum

in

Frederick Jacobson, through his attorney, and ﬁles this Post-Hearing

Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.

1.

A

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

hearing on Defendants Motion to Suppress was held 0n

September 27, 2018. The

Court heard testimony from Ofﬁcer Kindelberger and Ofﬁcer Mikowski. At the end of
testimony, the Court requested closing arguments be submitted

Court noted ofﬁcer credibility was

at issue

and

that

it

in writing.

Speciﬁcally, the

was troubled Ofﬁcer Mikowski had

turned off the audio portion of his Video recorder and failed to turn

it

back 0n. The Court also

requested analysis on the whether Mr. Jacobsen’s consent to a search of his person cured an

unlawful extension of the trafﬁc stop. Counsel

CLOSING ARGUMENTS
-

now

submits the requested brieﬁng.
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2. ARGUMENT
The video recordings show that the traffic stop turned into a drug investigation almost
immediately. As Officer Mikowski proudly stated at the suppression hearing, he has a
reputation for finding narcotics, and the video shows why. Officer Mikowski unlawfully
extended the traffic stop of Mr. Jacobson on numerous occasions in order to conduct a
narcotics investigation and create time for a canine officer to conduct a sniff of the vehicle.
A. The Drug Investigation Begins
After obtaining identification from Mr. Jacobsen and his passenger, Officer Mikowski
spent approximately four and a half minutes running records check on both. The video shows
that there was a records return on both. Office Mikowski then returned to the vehicle and asked
if registration or insurance has been located. Mr. Jacobson honestly responded no explaining
he had recently purchased the truck. He then provided Officer Mikowski the vehicles bill of
sale. The drug investigation then ensues. Officer Mikowski questions Mr. Jacobson about
where he is from, why he moved here, and whether Mr. Jacobson or his passenger are on
probation, parole, or out on bail.
While brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not
necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth Amendment rights, State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 923,
367 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Ct. App. 2016), in a recent decision by the Idaho Court of Appeals, the
Court clarified that “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop are those that are undertaken
for the purpose of ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” State
v. Burgess, Docket No. 45317 (Ct. App., Sept. 14, 2018) (internal citations omitted). There, the
Court held that an investigating officer abandoned the initial purpose of a traffic stop and
unlawfully extended the traffic stop when he stopped issuing a traffic citation in order to check
CLOSING ARGUMENTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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the passenger’s probationary status, noting that to justify an inquiry into probation status the
State must show the inquiry was “necessary for officer safety in continuing to carry out the
purpose of the stop.” Id. Here, Officer Mikowski has consistently testified that Mr. Jacobsen
and his passenger were at all times compliant and respectful. The same is shown by the
admitted videos. There was no officer safety concern to justify the inquiry into either’s
probationary status, let alone whether they are on bail for something each would be presumed
innocent of. Officer Mikowski’s inquiry and search into Mr. Jacobson and his passenger’s
probation and bail status was an unlawful extension of the traffic stop.
State v. Burgess is incredibly similar to the case at hand in many other ways. The
officer there was also informed by the driver that she did not have insurance as she had
recently purchased the vehicle. Id. The officer then conducted a records check that returned for
the driver and passenger. The Court notes that after the records check returned it was
completed. Id. Here it is difficult to see the screen in Officer Mikowski’s vehicle, but it is clear
that he scans both identifications and both return results. Officer Mikowski then spends a
significant amount of time reviewing the results. The records check, as in Burgess, was
completed.
An officer is always obligated to diligently pursue his duties with respect to the initial
purpose of the stop. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016) (referring to
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015)). Yet, after Officer Mikowski speaks
with Mr. Jacobsen again, he returns to his car and runs the same information and analyzes it for
an extensive period of time.1 When asked about it at the hearing his memory is conveniently

1

Officer Mikowski also calls a canine unit while walking back to his car, indicating he suspects narcotics. This is
further evidence that his continued extensive review of the same information was related to a drug investigation,
not issuance of a citation.
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impaired. Yet, when led by the state, he was quick to accept the proposed reasons for what he
may have been doing. Officer Mikowski’s testimony is not credible and he failed to diligently
pursue his duties.
Similarly showing Officer Mikowski was engaged in a drug investigation and buying
time for the canine officer is his call to another officer to ask what code section to use if
someone does not have a driver’s license. The officer gives the code section and then asks,
“got any dope or no?” To which he responds, “I think it’s a pretty good stop, we’ll see.” Aside
from the call being suspect considering Officer Mikowski has issued similar citations
numerous times before, it is just another example of how the investigation had clearly
transformed into a drug investigation.
B. The Drug Investigation Continues
Once the canine unit arrived (Officer Kindelberger), Officer Mikowski turned the audio
portion of his video recorder off to have a conversation with Officer Kindelberger. It is still
unclear why Officer Mikowski muted the audio at all.
i.

Recording Policy

Meridian Police Department Policy Manual 449/450 explains the use of audio and
video is “intended to assist officer in the performance of their duties by providing an unbiased
audio record of a contact.” Policy 449.1. The policy further states:
(d) Members of this department are required to activate their recorders at any
time that the officer reasonably believes that a recording of an on-duty contact
with a member of the public may be of future benefit…
(2) Once activated, the recording equipment should not be turned off
until the event is concluded unless the event is protracted and continued
recording is not valuable.
…
(e) Officers are to make every effort to record the entire contact in a manner that
will provide a clear audio recording or body worn video recording…
(4) [Of] all traffic stops
CLOSING ARGUMENTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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449.1, 449.4. The Body Worn Camera (BWC) policy similarly states:
(a) BWCs shall be used to transparently reflect the mission of the department,
maintain public trust and confidence, and provide accountability to the
citizenry.
(b) BWCs allow for more accurate documentation of police-public contacts,
arrest, and critical incidents. They also serve to enhance the accuracy of officer
reports.
(c) Audio and video recordings also enhance this agency’s ability to review
probable cause for arrest, officer and suspect interaction . . .
(d) The BWC system shall be activated as soon as it is reasonable to do so any
time an officer may become involved in any enforcement contact. The officer
shall begin recording as soon as practical during an enforcement contact and
continue to record until the completion of the event . . .
(e) Once activated, the BWC system shall not be deactivated until the event has
been concluded, unless . . .
(2) It is necessary to discuss tacticalplans, other issues or concerns with
another officer or supervisor in private. During this time the BWC may
be temporarily muted.
(f) In instances that warrant the system being deactivated, the officer should
verbally record the reason for the deactivation. For example, “recording stopped
due to extended perimeter.”
Policy 450.1 – 450.2. It is still unclear why Officer Mikowski felt compelled to turn off his
audio recording if simply updating Officer Kindelberger on the status of the traffic stop. A
routine update does not require turning off audio under the limited exceptions noted above.
Idaho Courts have recognized the Spoliation Doctrine as a form of admission by
conduct attributed to the party connected to the loss or destruction of the evidence.” Courtney
v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930, 933 (Idaho 2003), citing McCormick On
Evidence, 4th Ed. § 265, pp. 189-94 (1992) Officer Mikowski’s decision to turn off his audio,
failure to follow policy by verbally recording the reason for the deactivation, and failure to
timely turn the audio back on is troubling. Because Officer Mikowski’s actions directly
resulted in a loss of evidence the Court should apply the spoliation doctrine and consider his
acts as a form of admission.
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ii.

Moving the Vehicle Occupants and Discussions

After the conversation between Kindelberger and Mikowski concluded, it is undisputed
that Officer Kindelberger conducted a drug investigation while Officer Mikowski finished the
citations. After finishing the citations Officer Mikowski approached Mr. Jacobson and directed
him to sit on a curb by his patrol vehicle. With his audio still off, he speaks for a moment with
Mr. Jacobson as he is seated on the curb and then returns to the truck to direct the passenger to
also sit on the curb. When questioned at the suppression hearing about why he moved Mr.
Jacobsen, Officer Mikowski contradicted himself. Initially he stated he wanted to separate the
passenger and Mr. Jacobsen. After an awkward pause and a request from the prosecution that
he watch the next section of video, where he is shown immediately afterward obtaining the
passenger and directing him to sit on the curb next to Mr. Jacobsen, Officer Mikowski was led
to state he had another purpose for moving both occupants away from the vehicle. Officer
Mikowski then stated he likes to keep control of his traffic stops because they are his traffic
stops. Officer Mikowski’s testimony is not credible and it appears from the video he moved
both Mr. Jacobsen and his passenger away from the vehicle so Officer Kindelberger could
conduct the canine sniff.
Officer Mikowski’s memory again conveniently escapes him as he tries to recall his
conversation with Mr. Jacobsen and his passenger while they were seated on the curb. When
his memory was refreshed by another on scene officer’s recording he reluctantly admitted he is
recorded asking the passenger about how long ago he was arrested, when he got out, whether
Mr. Jacobsen picked him up, and where they were going now – which leads to the passengers
explanation that is partially heard on Officer Mikowski’s video after the audio is turned back
on. Further depicted on Officer Mikowski’s video, after he turns on his audio, is him asking the
CLOSING ARGUMENTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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passenger additional questions unrelated to the stop that keep the passenger talking. All
inquiries are not related to the initial purpose of the stop.
While Mr. Jacobsen and the passenger sit on the curb Officer Kindelberger goes back
to his vehicle and fetches the canine. During this time, Officer Mikowski at one point he even
stands behind the two while Officer Kindelberger retrieves his canine. Mikowski 23:35 –
23:55. He then he moves to stand in front of the two and engages in the aforementioned
conversation, during which you can see Officer Kindelberger walk by with the canine to
conduct the sniff search. At this point in time, Officer Mikowski has audaciously abandoned
the traffic stop. At no point does Officer Mikowski attempt to discuss anything related to the
stop with Mr. Jacobsen or his passenger. He never even hands the citation to Mr. Jacobsen, the
first thing an officer typically does after citing someone.2 The traffic stop was unlawfully
extended.
C. Consent Does Not Cure
“The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both ‘primary evidence obtained as a
direct result of an illegal search or seizure’ and, pertinent here, ‘evidence later discovered and
found to be derivative of an illegality,’ the proverbial ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 661, 662 (2017), quoting Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 804 (1984); accord, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11, 203 P.3d 1203,
1209-10 (2009). Officer Mikowski unlawfully extended the traffic stop to conduct a drug
investigation, which eventually resulted in a positive alert from a canine and a subsequent
search. Only after the search of the vehicle yielded nothing did Officer Mikowski ask to search
Mr. Jacobson. The alleged consent to search is not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful

2

The video recording of the search of Mr. Jacobsen confirms he did not have the citations in his possession.
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extension to be admissible; it directly follows and results from a pattern of unlawful conduct.
See Section A-B.
An initially reasonable detention becomes unreasonable if an officer extends the
duration of the stop to investigate other criminal conduct for which there is no reasonable
suspicion. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Because an officer must be focused on
effectuating the purpose of a stop, “[w]here a person is detained, the scope of detention must
be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924, P.3d
1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016), citing Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. There is no
intervening lawful event that gave Officer Mikowski suspicion that Mr. Jacobsen was in
possession of narcotics.3 Officer Mikowski exploited the circumstances to conduct a drug
investigation without reasonable suspicion.
The request for consent to search Mr. Jacobson’s person was the result of the unlawful
extension of the traffic stop and subsequent canine alert on the truck. Even Officer Mikowski
testified at both the preliminary hearing and suppression hearing that after he cited Mr.
Jacobsen he was going to release him. Thus, even if Mr. Jacobsen did consent to the search of
his person,4 any evidence obtained therefrom must be suppressed as derivative of the earlier
illegality.
3. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should grant the Motion to Suppress
Evidence.
3

It is impossible to actually know what would have happened if the traffic stop was not unlawfully extended, but
the Court is not expected to engage in that analysis. What we do know is that the extension led to the canine alert
which led to the request to search Mr. Jacobsen. State v. Burgess is a great example of how consent does not cure
the violation. There the Court did not engage in an analysis of whether the consent was sufficiently attenuated
because the unlawful extension, as here, is what led to the reasonable suspicion and request for consent to search.
4
Mr. Jacobsen does not concede that the search of his person was lawful. He reasserts all arguments from the
initial Motion to Suppress, particularly that the scope of the search of his person exceeded his consent.
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DATED this 18th day of October, 2018.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

that

on

this 19th

day of October, 2018,

l

electronically ﬁled the

foregoing with the Clerk 0f the Court using the iCouIt e-ﬁle system, which caused the
following parties or counsel t0 be served

Ada County

by

electronic means:

Prosecutor

acpocourtdocngadawebnet
Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg
/s/
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REARDON / MASTERS MADSEN 26 OCTOBER 2018

Description

/

Location 1A-

Date 10/26/201 8
|

CRT508

Time
10:33:15

Note

Speaker

AM

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CRO]

18 1561 6

PRETRIAL

CONFERENCE

AM
10:33:21 AM
10:34:03 AM
10:34:13 AM
10:34:15 AM
10:35:20 AM
10:35:37 AM
10:36:24 AM
10:33:16

AM
10:37:17 AM
10:37:17 AM
10:51:22 AM
10:51:23 AM
10:51:38 AM

Present:

David Hunt

me ﬁve min

Grober

Defendant called

Court

Set for pretrial today.

Counsel

No

Court

Hope

to

Hunt

If

against the State,

Court

Have

Court

it‘s

Debra Grober

for the State,

ago,

Any change

is

0n

his

for the defense

way.

in status?

have decision out by Tuesday.

trial

we would

not be able t0 proceed.

documents ﬁled by Wednesday.

If defendant's not here within

15min,

I'll

probably issue a warrant.

Will take brief recess until he hopefully shows up.

10:37:13

AM
10:53:07 AM
10:53:21 AM
10:52:48

Court reconvenes; both attorneys present

Grober

No

Court

He still does not appear, he's had more than enough time. I'll revoke
bond and issue warrant with $40,000 bond. If he appears in next
15min, you can bring him back at 3:00 this afternoon.

Hunt

Move

Court

Granted conditional upon

further

word from him.

t0 vacate trial.
lhis failure t0

appear by end 0f today.

End 0f case

Produced by FTR GoldTM
www.fortherecord.com
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho

Case No. CR01 -18-1 561 6

vs.

Notice of Forfeiture of Surety

JACOBSEN. FREDERICK

Bond/Power No: ACS-7542350
Bond Amount: 2.000.00
Date Posted: April 03. 2018

Bond

American Contractors Indemnity Company

Chen
S Figueroa

Attn Alex

801

Ste 700
90017-2523

Street,

CA

Los Angeles

Aladdin Bail Bonds DBA:

Two

Jinn. Inc

Johnson, Aaron

DR

1000 Aviara
Carisbad

CA

You are
Obligor.

Suite 300
9201 1-421 8

notiﬁed that the bail for the

was

above-named defendant.

for

which you are the

declared forfeited by Order of the Court on 10/26/18 pursuant

to

Idaho

Code

19-291 5.

If.

within

180 days of the date of the

the Court the forfeiture

will

forfeiture Order.

you bring the defendant before

be set aside.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I

certify that

bond agent

on October 29. 2018.

to the

addtess

listed

I

mailed a copy of

this Notice to the

above named

above.

By:

zameu.
Deputy Clerk Sow Imowooosm

®

NOTICE OF FORFEITURE OF SURETY BOND
D/M-CR (N015) (Appv.os,26.1s)(Moa 09

1

1e 15)
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Filed:

10/29/2018 0912115

Fourth Jwidal

District.

Ada County
me ooun

Christopher Rich. Clerk ov
By: Deputy Cleft

IN

-

Masters. Beth

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho

Case No. CR01-18—15616

VS.

Notice of Forfeiture of Surety Bond
Bonleower No: AC25-7544484
Bond Amount: 20,000.00
Date Posted: July 20. 2018

JACOBSEN. FREDERICK

American Contractors Indemnity Company
Attn Alex

Chen

801 S Figueroa Street. Ste 700
Los Angeles CA 90017-2523
Aladdin Bail Bonds DBA: Two Jinn, Inc
Bernhard. Ryan M
1000 Aviara DR Suite 300

Carisbad

CA

You are
Obligor.

92011-4218

notiﬁed that the bail for the

was declared

forfeited

above-named defendant.

for

which you are the

by Order of the Court on 10/26/18 pursuant to Idaho Code

19-291 5.

If,

within

180 days

of the date of the forfeiture Order.

the Court the foﬂeilure

will

you bring the defendant before

be set aside.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I

certify that

bond agent

on October

to the

address

29. 2018.

listed

I

mailed a copy of

this

XI'L
Deputy Clerk

®

named

above.

By:

NOTICE OF FORFEITURE 0F SURETY BOND
om-CR

Notice to the above

mm
swan ‘ovmouaos u

m

1

(N015) (Appv.os.26 15)(Moa 09 16 15)
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Filed: 11/01/2018 14:07:38
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

[J

IN

K4)

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO.

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN

THE STATE OF IDAHO.
Plaintiff.

Case No. CR01 18 15616

vs.

FREDERICK JACOBSEN.,

ORDER QUASHING NOTICE OF BOND

Defendant.

FORFEITURE

A

Notice of Forfeiture of Surety

29 October. 2018
IT IS
is

Bond

for

Bond No. AC5-7542350 having been issued on

in error;

HEREBY ORDERED That the

Notice of Bond Foﬁeiture

is

quashed and said bond

hereby exonerated.

Signed: 11/1/2018 10:56 AM

Dated;

MICHAEL REARDON
District

Judge

Order Quashing Notice of Bond Forfeiture
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify that

on

1 November, 2018

I

served a copy of

this

document

on:

American Contractors Indemnity Co
Attn Alex

Chen

801 S Figueroa St Ste 700
Los Angeles CA 90017-2523
Aladdin Bail Bonds

Dba Two

Jinn Inc

Aaron Johnson
1000 Aviara Dr Ste 300
Carlsbad CA 9201 1-4218

CHRISTOPHER

D.

RICH

Clerk of the Court

Deputy Clerk Signed: 11/1/2018 02:07 PM

Order Quashing Notice of Bond Forfeiture
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IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA.
-

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiﬁ,

NOTICE OF COURT DATE
vs.

qvw

Am

W

JACOBSEN. FREDRICK JEREMIAH
Defendant
6 21 1984

BOND

003(mm/dd/yyyy)
8755

9M

'

RECE'PT

NOV

ﬂ

2013

1

CHRISTOPHER D.

RICH, Clerk
By RACHAEL WEATHERBY

551v (last 4)

DEPUTY

You are hereby notiﬁed that you must appear before the Judge,
on 11/2/2018

at

08:30 A.M.

ADA County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID

83702

you fail to appear as speciﬁed herein, your bond
forfeited and a Warrant of Arrest will be issued against you.

You are further notiﬁed that

Charge 31

if

Bond Amount

Case

Bond ﬂ

Bond Type

Acso-7546549

Cash

Bond Type

l!

D

FFTA

$40,000.00

CRo1-18-15615

Charge #2

Bond Amount

Case k

Bond R

Charge #3

Bond Amount

Case ﬂ

Bond 3

Bond Type

Charge k4

Bond Amount

Case 3

80nd k

Bond Type

Charge #5

Bond Amount

Case H

Bond ﬂ

Charge #6

Bond Amount

Case 8

Bond w

D
Cash D
Cash D
Cash D
Cash D

Cash

will

be

Surety
Surety
Surety
Surety

E
D
D
D
D
D

‘

Bond Type

Surety

Bond Type

Su rety

Bonding Agency/Person:

ALADDIN BB
Address:

80 N COLE RD
City:

State:

Zip Code:

BOISE

ID

83704

Bondsperson:

DAVID LAYNE
This
I

is

to certify that

understand that

I

appear

am
in

|

have received a copy of this NOTICE

being released on the conditions of posting

cou n

7-

he time, date and place described

TO APPEAR.
and my promise to

bail

in this

notice.

[0’ 5/
Date

Printed:

10/31/2018 03:07

PM

By:TW5563(|nitia|s

& ADA#)

ACSO

Revised 11/16

NC5646
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Description

|REARDON / MASTERS / MADSEN 2 NOVEMBER 2018
Location 1A-CRT508

Date 11/2/201 8
|

Time

|

Speaker

AM
08:59:34 AM

Note

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CR01

08:59:21

Present:

David Hunt

for the State,

18 15616

STATUS

Debra Groberg

for the defense,

defendant on bond

AM
09:00:04 AM
08:59:47

AM
09:00:41 AM
09:01:08 AM
09:00:29

Court
Court

This

is

an appearance following defendant‘s arrest 0n

Yesterday

I

FTA warrant.

entered an order denying Mo/Suppress. Trial was

vacated earlier based 0n

Groberg

Perhaps a SC.

Court

11/16/18

FTA

-

set a

new

trial

now?

@ 9:30am.

End of case
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Filed: 11/05/2018 11:01:09
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4
5

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

6
7

CASE NO. CR01-18-15616

vs.

8
9
10

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,

DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Defendants.

11
12
13
14
15

INTRODUCTION
On body video shows that on April 1, 2018 Meridian Police Department’s Officer
Mikowski initiated a traffic stop after observing that the rear license plate of Defendant’s truck
was not mounted on the rear bumper and a portion of the license plate in the window was
blocked by a decal. Officer Mikowski requested Defendant’s insurance, driver’s license,

16

registration, and also identification from the passenger in the vehicle, Christopher Roest.

17

Defendant provided his identification card and explained that he did not have a driver’s license.

18

Mr. Roest provided a suspended license.

19
20

Officer Mikowski returned to his vehicle and ran a record check of both parties. After
approximately four and a half minutes in his vehicle Officer Mikowski returned to Defendant’s
vehicle and asked if Defendant had found the registration or insurance for the truck. Defendant

21

responded that he did not have insurance because he had just bought the truck and had just

22

moved to the area that week, but Defendant did have the bill of sale for the truck and it appears

23

that Mr. Roest located the registration from the previous owner in the glove box. Mr. Roest

24
25
26

explained that he had originally owned the truck and then sold it to his boss, who then sold the
truck to Defendant. Officer Mikowski questioned Defendant about where he was from, why he
DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 1
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1
2

had moved, and whether Defendant or his passenger was on probation, parole, or out on bail.
Defendant responded no and Mr. Roest explained that he was on bail for a revoked registration
and license and possession of paraphernalia. During the questioning, a second police unit

3

arrived on scene to assist Officer Mikowski. Officer Mikowski then returned to his vehicle and

4

typed on his computer for the next approximately fourteen minutes before printing citations for

5
6

Defendant. During this span of time, Officer Mikowski also placed a call to another officer to
ask what code violation to use if someone does not have a driver’s license.
While Officer Mikowski was still in his vehicle, Officer Kindelberger arrived on the

7

scene with his canine. Officer Kindelberger approached Officer Mikowski’s vehicle and Officer

8

Mikowski turned off his audio and had a short conversation with Officer Kindelberger. Officer

9

Kindelberger then approached Defendant’s vehicle, directed him out of the vehicle, patted him

10
11

down for weapons, and directed him to sit in front of Officer Mikowski’s vehicle. Officer
Kindelberger’s body cam video shows that he questioned Defendant about whether there were
drugs in the vehicle. Officer Kindelberger then had Mr. Roest exit the vehicle to search him for

12

weapons and ask him about his drug use. During the questioning of Mr. Roest, Officer

13

Mikowski finished printing the citations and stepped out of his vehicle. Officer Mikowski then

14

approached Defendant and directed him to sit on a curb by the patrol vehicle.

15
16

With the audio still off, the video shows Officer Mikowski speaking for a moment with
Defendant on the curb, after which Officer Mikowski directs Mr. Roast to sit on the curb next to
Defendant. During this time, Officer Kindelberger retrieves his canine from his vehicle.

17

Defendant and Mr. Roest remain seated on the ground while Officer Kindelberger runs his

18

canine past them to conduct a sniff of the vehicle. During this encounter, Officer Mikowski has

19

his audio turned off. When Officer Mikowski then turns on his audio, Officer Mikowski is heard

20
21

having a casual conversation with Mr. Roest that is not related to the citation. Officer
Kindelberger’s canine then alerts on the vehicle and Officer Mikowski assists Officer
Kindelberger in conducting a search of the vehicle. After the vehicle is searched and nothing is

22

found, Officer Mikowski returns to Defendant, still sitting on the curb, and directs him to stand

23

and speak with him away from Mr. Roest. Defendant then consents to a search of his person and

24
25
26

Officer Mikowski finds a small baggie of white substance in the coin pocket of Defendant’s
pants.
DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2

000206

1
2

On August 10, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress requesting that the Court
suppress all evidence obtained from the seizure and search. On September 27, 2018, the Court
held a hearing on the motion. During the hearing the Court found that the initial traffic stop was

3

supported by reasonable suspicion and that Defendant knowing and voluntarily consented to a

4

search of his pockets; however, the Court requested additional briefing from the parties on the

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

issue of whether the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged or whether Defendant’s consent to a
search cured any previous delay during the stop. Having received the requested briefing, and
having reviewed the arguments of the parties and the record, the Court denies the motion to
suppress.
STANDARD
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State
v. Conant, 143 Idaho 797, 799, 153 P.3d 477, 479 (2007). Even if the factual evidence is
“equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court’s finding of fact is based on reasonable

12

inferences that may be drawn from the record, it will not be disturbed . . . .” State v. Jaborra,

13

143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006).

14
15
16

ANALYSIS
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and
implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). In the context of

17

traffic stops, authority for the seizure ends when the tasks related to the infraction are, or

18

reasonably should have been, completed. Rodriguez v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct.

19

1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Such tasks include ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic

20
21

stop such as checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.
Rodriguez, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615. “These checks serve the same objective as

22

enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and

23

responsibly.” Id. An officer may also require the occupants to exit the vehicle during a traffic

24
25
26

stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). The scope
of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of
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1
2
3
4
5
6

each case. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004). Asking a
defendant to exit a vehicle in preparation for handing over and explaining a citation is a
procedure within the police officer’s discretion and is not otherwise unlawful. State v. Silva, 134
Idaho 848, 853, 11 P.3d 44, 49 (Ct. App. 2000).
It is well-established that a drug-dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop is
constitutionally permissible if it is executed in a reasonable manner and does not itself infringe
upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10, 125
S.Ct. 834. Conversely, a drug-dog sniff conducted after an otherwise-completed traffic stop is

7

unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion for the sniff. Rodriguez, ––– U.S. –––

8

–, 135 S.Ct. at 1614. In the context of unconstitutionally prolonging a traffic stop, “the critical

9

question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket ... but

10
11

whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ ” State v. Linze, 161
Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).
In his post-hearing briefing, Defendant argues that Officer Mikowski unconstitutionally

12

prolonged the traffic stop by not diligently pursuing his duties with respect to the initial purpose

13

of the stop. Specifically, Defendant argues that Officer Mikowski’s inquiry into Defendant’s

14

and Mr. Roest’s probation and bail status was an unlawful extension of the traffic stop. To

15
16

support his argument, Defendant cites to State v. Burgess, No. 45317, 2018 WL 4374440, at *1
(Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2018). The Court of Appeals in Burgess held that absent a showing by
the State that the circumstances of the stop provided an officer safety justification for an inquiry

17

into the probationary statuses of the passenger, such an inquiry would constitute an

18

unconstitutional extension of the stop. Id. at *4.

19
20
21
22
23
24

Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive for two reasons: one, Burgess has not yet been
released for publication in the permanent law reports and is still subject to revision or
withdrawal; and two, the fact pattern in Burgess is distinct from the present case. In Burgess, the
Court of Appeals found that:
The video recording of the traffic stop shows that within a minute, the computer
announced a separate “return” for each person, relating to warrant and driving
status. Burgess’s record check was completed. However, instead of beginning the
citation process, the officers waited another “minute or two” in order for dispatch
to verify the passenger’s probationary status.

25

State v. Burgess, No. 45317, 2018 WL 4374440, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2018). Here,

26
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1
2

the video evidence shows Officer Mikowski continuously manipulating his MDT for
information both after receiving the initial identification card from Defendant and suspended
driver’s license from Mr. Roest, and again upon returning his vehicle with the old registration

3

that was provided by Mr. Roest. Based upon the submitted video, the Court is unable to

4

determine exactly how much time, if any, was spent researching Mr. Roest’s probation or bail

5
6
7

status, or whether any of that time was spent in place of time spent researching Defendant’s
information as opposed to time that may have been spent on Mr. Roest while waiting for
information about Defendant. To that extent, the Court cannot find that Officer Mikowski
unconstitutionally extended the traffic stop under the holding in Burgess.

8

Similarly, the Court cannot find that Officer Mikowski’s actions during the conclusion

9

of the traffic stop and contemporaneous canine drug sniff constitutes unconstitutional extension

10
11

of the stop. Officer Mikowski’s body cam video shows that he obtained printed citation forms at
approximately 14:44:45, at which point, Officer Mikowski exited his vehicle and instructed
Defendant to sit on the curb. At approximately 14:45:30 Officer Mikowski then approached Mr.

12

Roest and instructed him to also sit on the curb. Officer Kindelberger’s body cam video shows

13

that at approximately 14:45:55, as Officer Mikowski was instructing Mr. Roest to sit on the curb

14

with Defendant to begin explaining the citation, Mr. Roest was explaining the series of vehicle

15
16

sales that led to Defendant’s eventual ownership of the truck. That conversation appears to end
at approximately 14:46:02.
At 14:46:27, Officer Kindelberger and his canine can be seen in Officer Mikowski’s

17

body cam video walking behind Defendant and Mr. Roest toward Defendant’s truck. Officer

18

Mikowski’s audio is still turned off at this point and it appears that Officer Mikowski is in

19

conversation with Mr. Roest, but it is not clear what the exact nature of that conversation was.

20
21

Officer Kindelberger’s body cam video shows that his canine alerted at approximately 14:46:45.
Officer Kindelberger confirmed that with testimony during the hearing. At approximately
14:47:37, Officer Mikowski turns his audio back on and it appears that Mr. Roest is telling a

22

story about one of his past encounters with law enforcement. It is not clear how that

23

conversation started.

24
25
26

Based on the video evidence, it appears that there was only forty-three (43) seconds
between the time at which Officer Mikowski could have begun to explain the citation after
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1
2

having both Defendant and Mr. Roest seated on the curb (14:46:02), and the point at which
Officer Kindelberger’s canine alerted on Defendant’s vehicle (14:46:45). Given the complex
nature of the stop: with Defendant’s lack of a driver’s license; the convoluted ownership history

3

of the vehicle; that the vehicle was registered in the passenger’s name; that Defendant had no

4

insurance; that Mr. Roest had a suspended driver’s license; the fact that neither Defendant nor

5
6

Mr. Roest would have been allowed to drive the truck away after the citation was given; and
that Officer Mikowski would have needed to explain both the citation process and the options
for Defendant and Mr. Roest regarding transportation following the conclusion of the traffic

7

stop, the Court cannot find that the time required to reasonably address the purpose of the traffic

8

stop would have expired prior the Officer Kindelberger’s canine alerting on Defendant’s truck.

9
10
11

Once Officer Kindelberger’s canine alerted on Defendant’s vehicle prior to the
conclusion of the traffic stop, “[u]nder the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,
police officers may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” State v. Hays,

12

159 Idaho 476, 484, 362 P.3d 551, 559 (Ct. App. 2015). While it appears that Officer Mikowski

13

does engage with Mr. Roest in a conversation unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop with

14

Defendant, based on the video evidence the Court cannot find that Officer Mikowski

15
16
17
18
19

intentionally extended the stop past the time reasonably necessary to complete the traffic stop.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion to suppress is DENIED.
Signed: 11/5/2018 10:52 AM

DATED this _____ day of __________, 2018.
____________________________
Michael J. Reardon, District Judge

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned authority does hereby certify that on the ______
day of _________
5th
November
2018, I served one copy of the:

4
DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
5
6

to each of the parties below as follows:

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP
Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
David Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

15

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

16
17
18
19

Signed: 11/5/2018 11:01 AM
Date: ___________________

By _________________________
Deputy Clerk

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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Electronically Filed
11/6/2018 3:10 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

GABRIEL MCCARTHY, ISB #7516
802

W Bannock, Suite 201

Boise, Idaho 83702

Telephone: 208-343-8888
Facsimile:

208-342—4200

Email: gabe@gabrielmccarthy.com

Attorney for

IN

Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin Bail Bonds

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE 0F IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No.: CR01—18-15616
Bond No.: AC25-7544484
Plaintiff,

vs.

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant,

ALADDIN BAIL BONDS as

Bond Amount:

$20,000.00

MOTION To SET ASIDE
FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE
BOND, CERTIFICATE 0F
SURRENDER, AND
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR
HEARING

agent for

AMERICAN CONTRACTORS
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety/Real Party in Interest.

Two
and

Jinn, Inc.

Signed: 11/8/2018 02:44 PM

dba Aladdin Bail Bonds (“Aladdin”), the authorized agent

real party in interest

for the surety

American Contractors Indemnity Company, through

Gabﬁel McCarthy, hereby moves

this

Court to

set aside the

its

attorney,

October 26, 2018 forfeiture and

exonerate this bond in the above referenced case. This Motion

is

made pursuant

t0 I.C. §§ 19-

2913, 19-2922(5) and I.C.R. 46. The attached original Certiﬁcate of Surrender 0f Defendant
incorporated herein

by

reference.

The above-identiﬁed Defendant was surrendered

t0 the

is

Ada

MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND, CERTIFICATE OF SURRENDER,
AND CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR HEARING
PAGE 1 OF 3

ORlGINAL

000212

County

Ofﬁce by the

Sheriff’s

surety

on October

LC.

31, 2018.

19-2913(3) provides as

§

follows:

The

surety insurance

company

or cash deposit shall, within

or

its

ﬁve

bail agent or person posting a property

defendant, ﬁle with the court in which the action or appeal
certiﬁcate of surrender and shall deliver a
state.

The

copy of the same

of Surrender has been timely delivered and

this

Further, this

Motion

2018, which

bond. See Court

pending the

is

based upon the

is prior to the 180th

ROA. The

is

November

7,

2018. The Certiﬁcate

Motion has been timely ﬁled. Wherefore, the

Court must order the bond exonerated as required by LC.

2,

is

to the attorney for the

court shall thereupon order the bail exonerated.

The ﬁfth business day aﬁer surrender of Defendant

November

bond

(5) business days of the surrender of the

§

19-29136).

fact that

Defendant appeared in Court on

day aﬁer the

forfeiture

of the above mentioned

court shall order the bail exonerated pursuant to LC. § 19-2922(5)

when

a defendant appears before the court within 180 days 0f the court’s order of forfeiture.

180th

day aﬁer

The

forfeiture

of the bond

is

April 24, 2019.

State, as a party to this bail agreement,

Motion. See State

v.

The

has the right to be heard with respect to

Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 952 P.2d 1249

Should the Court, for any reason, determine

that this

(Ct.

this

App. 1998).

Motion should be denied,

it

is

respectfully requested that the Court set this matter for a heating at a mutually convenient date

and time.
Respectfully submitted this (”a day of November, 201 8.

GABRTEL

CCARTHY

Attorney

Two

Jinn, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
la day 0f November, 201 8, I electronicaliy ﬁled the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt e-ﬁle system, which caused the following
parties or counsel to be served by electronic means:

Ada County Prosecutor
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

Debra Anne Groberg
Attorney for Defendant

d ober

nbmlaw.com

MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND, CERTIFICATE- OF SURRENDER,
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Case Information

i

a

1

l

l

CRO1~18~15616
I

JACOBSEIN

State of Idaho

Plaintiff, vs.

Case Number

Court

CR01

Ada County
Coun

File

5616

-18-1

FREDERICK JEREMIAH

Defendant.

Date

04/02/2018

Judiciai Officer
District

Reardon
Michael

(District),

J.

Case Type

Case Status

Criminal

Active

—

Pending

Bond
Bond Type

Bond Number

Bond Amount

Current Bond Status

Su rety

AC5—7542350

$2,000.00

Exonerated

Surety

AC25-

$20,000.00

Notice of Bond

Bond

7544484

Surety

ACSO-

Bond

7546549

Bond

Forfeitu re

$40,000.00

Posted

Events and Hearings

04/02/2018 Video Arraignment v

Judiciaf

Ofﬁcer

Hawiey/Lojek, Judge

Hearing Time
1:30

PM

https://mycourts.idaho.gov/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0

00021511/2/20 1 8

PageZOfll"

Details

04/02/2018

Initiating

Document

w

Pre~File

Case

04/02/2018 Criminal Complaint

04/02/2018 Advisement of Rights

~

Felony Arraignment (Provided

t0

Def.)

04/02/2018 Application

04/02/2018

PC

04/02/2018

Arr,

for Public:

Defender

Minute Sheet

Minutes & Hearing Notice

04/02/2018 Order Appointing Public Defender

04/02/2018 Bond Set v

Comment
2000

04/02/2018

Pl‘e’friai

Release Order V

Comment
Supervised

04/03/2018 Proof 0f Service V

Comment
Notice of hearing 4/23/18

04/03/2018

Preirial

Release Order v

Comment
Proof of service—PTRO

04/05/2018 Bond Receipt and Court Date v

Comment
4/23/18

04/05/2018 Bond Posted

~

Surety V

Comment
ACS—7542350 $2000

04/23/2018 Preliminary Hearing v

i

Judicial Officer

Oths, Michael

J.

httpsﬂmycourt s.idah0. gOV/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0

00021611/2/2018

Details

Page

".mvu... «~~\u,

3 o'f

"
1'1

Baskin, Nancy, Barton, Peter G.

Hearing Time

AM

8:30

Result

Hearing Held

04/23/201 8 Court Minutes

04/23/2018 Notice 0f Hearing

04/26/2018 Stipulation v

Comment
for Substitution of

Counsel

04/26/201 8 Request for Discovery

05/02/2018 Stipulation v

Comment
to

Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing

05/04/2018 Order V

Comment
Granting Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing

05/1

“2018

Judicial

Fiie

MemolReview v

Ofﬁcer

Gardunia, Theresa

L.

Hearing Time
8:00

AM

Cancel Reason

Vacated

05/1 ”1/2018 Probable

Judicial

Cause Hearing v

Ofﬁcer

Gardunia, Theresa

L.

Hearing Time
8:30

AM

Result

Hearing Held

05/1 1/2018 Motion

& Afﬁdavit V

'r

https:/}mycoﬁrts.idaho.gov/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?ﬁ=0

‘
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Details

05/1 1/2018 Warrant/Det Order Issued

—

Bench

l
1

|

05/1 5/2018 Stipulation

v

x

!

I

Comment
i

Stipulation to Continue

05/1 6/2018 Request

Ifor

05/16/2018 Response

Discovery

to

Request

for

Discovery v

Comment
State’s Discovery

05/21/2018 Order

Response

to Court

V

Comment
to Continue

05/22/2018 Preliminary Hearing v

Judicia! Officer

Oths, Michael

J.

Magistrate(s)

Hoagland, Samuel, Norton, Lynn G.
Hearing Time
8:30

AM

Cancel Reason
_

Vacated

06/12/2018 Preliminary Hearing

V

Judicial Officer

Oths, Michael

J.

Magistrate(s)

Hoagland, Samuel, Norton. Lynn G.
Hearing Time
1:30

PM

Result

Hearing Held

06/1 2/201 8 Court Minutes

06/1 2/201 8 Court Minutes

06/12/2018 Notice of Hearing

https ://mycourts idaho. gov/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0
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‘

1

'

Page 5

Details

06/1 2/201 8 Order for

o'f

1'].

Commitment

06/1 2/2018 Exhibit List/Log

I

06/12/2018 Motion V

I

Comment
to

Revoke and Increase

-

Denied

I

06/1 2/2015 Warrant or Detenfion Oraer

Qﬁashed

E

I

06/13/2-0-18 WarrantlDet Ourder

Returned

—

No

I

Service

06/13/2018 Motion v

Comment

_

Motion for Preparation of Preliminary Hearing Transcript

;
i

06/15/2018 Order

for Preliminary

Hearing Transcript

06/15/2018 Information Filed v

Comment

'

l

Info

and Booking Photo

z

i

06/18/2018 Estimate '

Comment
;

of Cost for Transcript

06/21l2018 Notice of Payment of Transcript

I

=

06/22/2018 Arraignment v

Judicial

Ofﬁcer

Reardon

Michael

(District),

J.

Hearing Time
I

3:30
'

AM

Result

Hearing Held
g

‘

Parties Present:

h

Defendant:

JACOBSEN. FREDERICK JEREMIAH

State: State of Idaho

06/22/2018 Court Minutes
g

é

i

'2

06/22/2018 Order

V

5

https:/)mycoﬁrts.idaho.gov/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0
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Details
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Governing Further Criminal Proceedings and Notice of Trial
Setting

0612212018 Motion for Disqualification 0f Judge

V

Comment
Alternate

08/25/2018 Order V

Comment
i

Disqualifying Alternate

Judge (Copsey)

06/27/2018 Transcript Filed v

Comment
Preliminary Hearing 6/1 2/1 8

06/29/2018 Motion t0 Disqualify

07/03/2018 Order v

Comment
to Disqualify

(Carey as alternate)

07/1 0/2018 Notice 0f Hearing

v

Comment
(07/20/13

@ 8:30am)

07/1 0/2018 Motion

i

V

Comment
to

Revoke and Increase Bond

07/1 8/201 8 Notice

V

Comment
of Lodging

07/19/2018 Notice v

Comment
of Lodging

07/20/2018 Hearing Scheduled v

Judicial Officer

Reardon

(District),

Michae}

J.

https://mycoﬁrt.s-.idéhclgov/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?13=0
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Details
I

1

Result

g

Hearing Held

Comment
a

Bond

7

Parties PresentA

Defendant:

1

JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH

State: State of Idaho

07/20/2018 Court Minutes

07/20/2018 Order Changing

Baii

07f23/2018 Order v

‘

Comment
g

Revoke and Increase Bond

to

07/24/2018 Response

to

Request

for

Discovery v

Comment

‘

‘

Discovery Response

‘

i

‘

to

Court

1

07/25/2018 Notice of Sewice v

Comment
Defendant’s Notice of Service of Response
for

to State's

Request

i

Discovery

07/28/2018 Bond Receipt and Court Date

07/26/2078 Bond Posted

—

L

Surety v

Comment
A025-7544484

08/10/201 8 Motion to Suppress

08/10/2018

Memorandum

In

Support 0f Motion v

Comment
to

Suppress Evidence

09/06/2018 Notice of Hearing v

i

§

i

Comment
(09/27/18

@ 1:30pm)

09/10/2018 Response

t0

Request

for

Discovery v
3

‘

1

‘

‘

https://mycourts.idaho.gov/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0
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‘

v

09/1 1/2018 Motion v

J

w

‘

w

\

Comment

‘

\

Motion for Preparation of Transcript

09/14/2018 Objection v

Comment
State's Objection

and Memorandum

in

Response

to

Defendant's

Motion to Suppress

091180018 Order v

Comment
for

Preparation of Transcript

09/1 8/2018 Stipulation

v

Comment
Stipulation of Lodging

09/21/2018 Stipulation v

Comment
Amended

Stipulation of Lodging

09/26/2018 Motion V

Comment
Motion to Rescind or VWthdraw Order For Preparation of

Transcﬂpt

09/27/2018 Motion

to

Suppress v

Judicial Officer

Reardon

(District),

Michael

J.

Hearing Time
1:30

PM

Result

Hearing Herd
Parties PresentA

Defendant:

JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH

State: State of Idaho

09/27/2018 Court Minutes
\

09/27/2018 Exhibit List/Log v

https: //myc0urts. idaho

gov/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p— 0

\
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Details
(Suppression Hearing)

10/01/201 8 Order

V

Comment
t0

Rescind or VWthdraw Order

10/1 9/2018 Status

for

Preparation of Transcript

Conference V

Judicial Officer

Reardon

(District),

Michael

J.

Hearing Time
10:30

AM

Result

Hearing Held
Parties PresentA

Defendant:

JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH

State: State 0f Idaho

10/19/2018 Court Minutes

10/1 9/2018

Response v

Comment
State‘s Post-Hearing

10/19/2018

Authorities

Memorandum v

Comment
Memorandum

10/22/2018

Argument and

'm

Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence

Memorandum v

Comment
Closing Arguments

Memorandum

In

Suppor1 of Motion to

Suppress Evidence

10/26/2018

Pre~trial

Conference v

Judicial Officer

Reardon

(District),

Michael

J.

Hearing Time
10:30

AM

Result
‘

I

Failed to

Appear

for

Hearing or

Trial

3
1‘

i
y

Parties PresentA

https://mycoﬁrts.idéhb.goWchgééiﬁggélﬁdfﬁé/WbrkspaceMode?p=0

000223

11/2/2018
\

L

Page 100f11'i

Details

10/26/2018 COUIT Minutes

10/29/2018 Notice Of Forfeiture 0f Surety Bond

10/29/2018 Notice of Fon‘eiture 0f Surety Bond

10/29/2018 Warrant/Det Order Issued

w

Bench

11/01/2018 Order v

Comment
Quashing Notice of Bond Forfeiture

11/01/2018 Warrant Returned

~

Served

11/01/2018 Bond Receipt and Court Date v

Comment
11/2/18

11/01/2018 Bond Posted

-

Surety v

Comment
A050—7546549 $40,000

11/02/2018 Status Conference v

Judiciai Ofﬁcer

Reardon

(District),

Michael

J.

Hearing Time
8:30

AM

Result

Hearing Held
Parties PresentA
Defendant:

JACOBSEN, FREDERICK JEREMIAH

State: State of Idaho

11/02/2018 Court Minutes

11/05/2018 Jury

Trial

V

Judicial Ofﬁcer

Reardon

(District),

Michael

J.

Hearing Time
9:00

AM

Ponon! Qaacnn

httpsz/kmyoourt s.idaho.gov/odysseyportaI/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0
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Comment
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1

11/16/2018 Status Conference v

i

Judicial Ofﬁcer

Reardon

(District),

Michael

J.

Hearing Time
9:30

AM

https://mycourts.idaho.gOV/odysseyportal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0
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Electronically Filed
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk
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DBA ALADDIN BAIL BONDS
ANYTIME BAIL BONDS
80 N. COLE
BOISE, IDAHO 83704

1N

THE DISTRICT COURT 0F THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY 0F ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No.: CR01— 18—15616

Bond No.: AC25-7544484
Bond Amount: 20000

Plaintiff,
vs.

CERTIFICATE OF SURRENDER

Jacobsen, Frederick Jeremiah

Defendant.

Pre—Forfeiture 0f Bail:

U

For the purpose of surrender of the defendant pursuant t0

19—29130), the undersigned
certiﬁes that he/she surrendered the defendant to the county sheriff where the action is
pending, 0n the
day 0f
20_, at the hour of
I.C.

,

Post—Forfeiture of Bail:

N

For the purpose of surrender of defendant aﬁer forfeiture 0f bail, the undersigned certiﬁes
he/she surrendered the defendant to the

ZOMt the hour 0f

WM %\

g

3/

4Z

Q

ﬂ

County Sheriff 0n the

day 0f

f

Z

/WA z/ﬂ/oza

AUﬁ-IORIZED @PRESENTATIVE/
PERSON POSTING BAIL

3

that

10-3/~-/ 5V"

DATE

AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE/
PERSON POSTING BAIL PRINTED NAME

VERIFICATION 0F OFFICER

U

As evidence of

surrenger by the Bail Agent/Authorized Representative

ofﬁcer 0f the
this'bl

D

day 0f

00% (m0 W

As evidence 0f the

the undersigned

County Sheriff s Department has incarcerated the defendant
.120 8, at the hour of )55 b

self‘surrender

by the Defendant pursuant to LC.

19-2913(4), the

undersigned oﬁicer 0f the

County Sheriff s Department has incarcerated

defendant in lieu of the bail originally set

by the coun.

Mdﬁ

j

Deputy Sheﬁff
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Filed: 11/14/2018 11:42:20
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

GABRIEL MCCARTHY, ISB #7516
802 W Bannock, Suite 201
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: 208-343-8888
Facsimile: 208-342-4200
Email: gabe@gabrielmccarthy.com
Attorney for Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin Bail Bonds
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant,

Case No.: CR01-18-15616
Bond No.: AC25-7544484
Bond Amount: $20,000.00
ORDER

ALADDIN BAIL BONDS as agent for
AMERICAN CONTRACTORS
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety/Real Party in Interest.
X

The Court, having considered the Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond,
Certificate of Surrender, and Conditional Request for Hearing in this matter hereby
GRANTS said Motion. The forfeiture in the above-referenced matter is set aside and the
bond is exonerated.
The Court, having considered the Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond,
Certificate of Surrender, and Conditional Request for Hearing in this matter hereby
DENIES said Motion. Bond Number AC25-7544484 is forfeited for the reasons stated
on the record.
DATED:

Signed: 11/13/2018 08:42 AM

.
_____________________________
Judge

ORDER – AC25-7544484
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CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be served by electronic means to the following: on 14 November, 2018:
Ada County Prosecutor
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
Debra Anne Groberg
Attorney for Defendant
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
Heather Price, Aladdin Court Services
hprice@tritonmsllc.com
DATED:

Signed: 11/14/2018 11:42 AM

Deputy

ORDER – AC25-7544484

.
_____________________________
Clerk of the Court
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Electronically Filed
11/16/2018 9:13 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
SECOND ADDENDUM TO
DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT

COMES NOW, David M. Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County, State
of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to
Discovery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the ____
15 day of November, 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

M44

By: David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

SECOND ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (JACOBSEN) Page 1
000229

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

16

day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Addendum to Discovery Response to Court was served to the following in the
manner noted below:
Debra Anne Groberg, PO Box 2772 Boise ID 83701
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By hand.
x By iCourt eFile & Serve.


ANM KBrwaS

Legal Assistant

SECOND ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (JACOBSEN) Page 2
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Description

IREARDON / MASTERS / MADSEN

16

NOVEMBER 2018
Location 1A-

Date 11/16/2018
|

CRT508

Time

Note

Speaker

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CRO]

09:38:24

AM

09:38:39

09:38:53

Grobcrg

Court

Just spoke with

10:13:11

A_M

M

10:14:46

A_M

Court

Grobcrg

David Hunt

This

is

second time

He'll plead guilty.

Hunt

l

ﬂ
ﬂ

10:16:13

case recalled

for thc State,

in a

Debra Grobcrg

row you've been

Defense

have a settlement sheet

I'd like

Court

Groberg

that in

for thc dcfcnsc,

is

late t0 court.

free to appeal the ruling

that

on the Motion

does not include that condition.

some form of written agreement.

It's

reservation 0f the right t0 appeal a pretrial ruling,
011

the plea, and

We've marked

I

think

that section

it

best if that

is

effectively a

Which would not be

articulated in writing.

0n the Guilty Plea Advisory

- is

that

acceptable?

Hunt

Cites Criminal Rule 11(a)(2)

-

appears to require

Arguably the Plea Advisory Form might do
Court

comfortable
11/30/18

10:16:01

way up

to Suppress.

10:15:16

AM

advises he's in the

defendant bond.

waived
10:14:25

for the defense

Will pass the case.

Prcscnt:

10:13:44

M

Debra Groberg

my client 0n the phone, he

courthouse, on his

10:11:13

ﬂ

for the State,

FREDERICK JACOBSEN

10:10:57

10:11:38

David Hunt

Present:

10:10:17

A_M

STATUS

CONFERENCE

09:38:38

M
M
M
M
M

18 15616

Groberg

Court

I'll

if

it's

that,

it

in writing.

but

I'd feel

more

articulated in a separate form. Set this over t0

@ 9:30am.

be unavailable, but someone from

Warns defendant

my ofﬁce will

if he's late again, he'll

be here.

probably be remanded into

custody.

000231

‘

MM

W

End ofcase
I
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REARDON / MASTERS MADSEN 3O NOVEMBER 2018

Description

Date

/

|

1

Location 1A-

1/30/2018

CRT508

Time

Note

Speaker

AM
10:44:55 AM
10:44:43

AM
10:46:26 AM
10:46:43 AM
10:46:52 AM
10:46:56 AM
10:47:08 AM
10:47:18 AM
10:47:29 AM
10:48:57 AM
10:53:55 AM
10:45:02

18 15616

David Hunt
defendant on bond

Debra Groberg

Present:

for the defense,

This will be a Rule 11 plea. Submits formal written guilty plea form.

Hunt

That form doesn't include

Court

Only condition

Groberg

Yes

Hunt

Submits settlement sheet as a supplement.

Groberg

Agreed.

Hunt

Settlement sheet should reﬂect the 2

Court

Inquires 0f Ms. Groberg.

is

all

the standard terms.

reservation 0f right t0 appeal?

+

5 with rider.

Defendant sworn, examined by the Court.

Accept plea as being knowing and voluntary, ﬁnd there's a factual
basis. Order PSI. SH 01/25/19
1pm. Will rely on the PSI prepared

@

for

AM

for the State,

Groberg

Court

10:55:34

ENTRY OF PLEA

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CROl

J.

Barton.

End of case

Produced by FTR GoldT'V'
www.fortherecord.com
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IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA IN AND FOR THE STATE 0F IDAHO
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY AND FORM (JUDGE MICHAEL REARDON)

Filed: 12/04/2018
11/30/18 11:14:07
at 5pm
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

T0 BE FILLED OUT BY THE DEFENDANT
,/
Defendant‘s Namc':

.

ﬂ ed fﬁcgé

/’7

.

E(QDSC. \r Signatur(

,

~>

’

I

Date:

jj~

21"

20/1?

Case Number:

Minimum

of Charge(s):

MM

COAT {O‘Wd

(A

0

befhxwéé

& Maximum Possible Penalty:

’ '7

12027

2A5?

m Tlhas

STATEMENT 0F RIGHTS & EXPLANATION 0F WAIVERS BY PLEA 0F GUILTY
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE)
l.

You have

the right to remain silent.

crimc(s) you

You do

not havc to say anything about thc

are accused of committing. If you choose to have a

trial,

the Stale cannot

you to testify. If you do decide to testify. however, the State will be permitted
you questions on cross examination and anything you say can be used as
evidence against you in court.
require
to ask

I

understand tha

during

2.

pleading guilty

I

am

waiving

my

right to

remain silcm before and

trial.

waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to the
crimc(s) in this case. liven aﬂcr pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse
to answer any question or to provide any information that might tend to show you

'I‘hc

committed some other crimc(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide any
infomalion that might tend Io increase the punishment for the crime(s) to which you
are pleading guilty.

I

understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case. l still have the right to
answering
L
silcnl with respect to any other crime(s) and with res

remain

questions or providing infomation that

Reardon Guilty Plea Form

may

increase

my

scntcnc

.
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3"

You havc
cannot
county.

the right Io bc represented by an attorney. If

w.

you want an attorney and
who will be Paid by the

you can ask thc judge for an attorney

.

\

You

4.

presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty
of thejudgc. or 2) you arc found guilty at a jury trial.

are

in front

ﬂd
You havc

ZJ'

that

by pleading guilty

thc right to a speedy

am

I

waiving

and public jury

my

tn'al.

if:

right to bc

A jury

l)

you plead

guilty

presumed innocent.

trial is

a court hearing lo

determine whether you arc guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) brought against you.
In a jury trial. you have the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in

your
guilt

l

own defense. Thc state must convince each and every one of the jurors of your
beyond a reasonable doubt.

undygt by pleading

trial.

I

am

my

waiving

right to a

speedy and public jury

.

You have

6.

guilty

the right to confront the witnesses called against you. This occurs during a

where the statc must prove its case by calling witnesses l0 testify under oath
of you. the jury, and your attomcy. Your attorney could then cross-cxamine
(question) each witness. You could also call your own witnesses of your choosing 10
testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If you do not have the funds to bring those
witnesses to court. thc statc will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to court.

jury

trial

in front

understand that by pleading guilty,
resent witnesses on
against mc
I

am waiving my right to confront the witnesses
my ovm behalf and lo present evidence in my

I

defense.
7.

'l'hc

State

he burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

understand that by pleading guilty. I am
prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I

w

'

'

g

my

right to require the Stale to

’

QUESTIONS REGARmNG PLEA
(Please

answer every question.

If

you do not understand a question consult your

attorney before answering.)

PLEASE CHECK ONE
l.

YESM NOD

Do you

read and write the English language?
have you been provided with an interpreter to
hclp you ﬁll out this form?

If not.

your true and legal name?

2.

What

3.

What was

is

the highest grade

Reardon Guilty Plea Form

Egg g mg K,

you completed?

1'2

NOD

YESz:

r)
g

(g

mmg K, S Awae 0U
g

L
r”
.
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If

you did not complete high school. havc you received

either a

GED or HSE?
YES

c

N00

U/ﬂ
4.

Are you currently under the care of a mental health professional?
If

you answered “yes," what

is

the mental health professional’s

Humom
5.

Havc you ever been diagnosed with a mental
If

wwdmm
6.

,

0F IGMD

it

If

“yes,“

answered

you

what

tAbuSe

are

taking

your

at

YES:

In thc last 24 hours. havc you taken any medications or drugs.
counter drugs, or drunk any alcoholic beverages?

Do you

believe this affects your ability lo understand these questions, and

there any other reason that

this

YESD

case?

you would be unable

to

make

what

is

of a plea agreement?

your guilty plea the

lf

you answered “yes,“ what are the terms of

result

that plea

written plea agreeme‘rﬁihould be attached hereto
(6

f

t

Tum

N00

.

“I A

YESD

N01

YESﬁ

NOD

or
9‘

lvx

US

TLH, \FULH

E [U

f.

agreement?

3%“Addendum

LL) \HA

(If available,

a

‘A’”)

(RQNE W'N WT

'

g

a

the reason?

ls

-

make

a reasoned and informed

decision in this case?
1f "yes.”

N [p

NOV

what have you taken?

reasoned and informed decisions in

9.

N00

If “yes."

Is

time?

this

INCLUDING over the
YES:

8.

NOX

you answered “yes," have you taken your prescription medication during the past

24 hours?
7.

J:

”Hump“?
YESU

medications

HQ

made?

Are you currently prescribed any medication?
If

-—

YESV NO:

health disorder?

angmnu

?\S’k—

NOD

name?

g: w‘o‘ood

you answered “yes.” what was the diagnosis and when was

YESW’

U
[k

2 \a

€ v“

{Sr

Q

Com

Reardon Guilty Plea Form
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'

10.

There arc two types of plca agreements. Please initial the ONE paragraph below
which describes the type of plea you are entering. DO NOT INITIAL BOTH

PARAGRAPHS:
a.

understand that thc Court

M

bound by the plca agreement or
any sentencing recommendations. and may impose any sentence
authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above.
Bccausc lhe court is not bound by the agreement. if the district coun
I

is

chooses not to follow the
withdraw my guilty

ement,

I

will not

have the right to

.

plca.L/§;.
9

b.

l

understand that

my

plca agreement

is

a binding plea agreement. This

means that if thc district court does not impose the speciﬁc sentence as
recommended by both panics. I will be allowed to withdraw my plea
of guilty pursuant
proceed to a jury
ll.

As

to

Rule ll(d)(4) of the Idaho Criminal Rules and

trial.

a term of your plca agreement, are you pleading guilty to

more than one crime?

YESU
If

you answered “yes." do you understand

ordered to be served either concurrently

that

(at the

your sentence for each crime could be
same time) or consecutively (one aﬂer

YESU

the other)?
l2.

Do you

fccl

you have had sufﬁcient timc

N01

to discuss

NOD

N, A

your case with your attorney?

YES? N0:
l3.

Have you

told your attorney everything

l4. Is there anything

you know about the crime?

you havc requested your attorney

to

do

15.

your attorney has

YESU

done?
lf

that

YES? NOC
n_o!

NO?

you answered “yes,“ please explain.

Your attomcy can

may

gel various items from the prosecutor relating to your case.

'l‘his

include police reports. witness statements. tape recordings, photographs, reports

of scientiﬁc testing. etc. This is called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence
provided to your attorney during discovery?
YES” NOC
l6.

Are there any witnesses who could show you are innocent?
If

you answered “yes." have you

told

your attorney

who

YES:

NOﬂ

those witnesses are?

YESU

NOD

N a
l

Reardon Guilty Plea Form
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l7. Is this a conditional guilty plca in

which you arc reserving your

Qrc-m‘al issues?

right to appeal

any

N00

YESﬁ

1f you answered ”yes." what issue arc you reserving the right to appeal?

Th4
18.

Do you

Wham

understand that

if

50

SupchS

you enter an unconditional

not be able to challenge any rulings that

came betbre

guilty plea in this case

you

will

the guilty plea including:

any searches or seizures that occurred in your case,
any issues concerning the method or manner ofyour arrest, and
3) any issues about any statements you may have made to law enforcement?
l)

2)

YESR
l9.

Have you waived your
part

20.

right to appeal

your judgment of conviction and sentence as

YESU

of your plea agreement?

Have any other promises been made

lo

2|.

YESD

you answered “yes." what

Do you
factual

22.

If

23.

N09

understand that by pleading guilty you waive or give up any defenses, both
legal, that you believe you may have in this case?
NOD

YESﬂ

and

for relief that

you believe should

still

YESU

case?

be ﬁled

N05

you answered “yes." what motions or requests?

Do you

understand that

when you

and every allegation contained

24. Are

If

to

are those promises?

Arc there any motions or other requests
in this

NOV

you which have inﬂuenced your decision

plead guilty?

1f

NOC

plcad guilty, you are admitting the truth of each

in the charge(s) to

which you plead guilty?

you currently on probation or parole?

you answered “yes". do you understand

that a plea

of guilty

YESp'

N0:

YESD

NOp

in this case

could be

thc basis of a violation of that probation or parole and additional punishment?

YESﬁ
Do you

NOD

also understand that this sentence can be served consecutively to

other sentence you are currently serving?
Reardon Guilty Plea Form

YES

any

NO:
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25.

As a

result

of your plea

restitution to

pay

in this case.

have you been advised that you may be required

any victim in this case pursuant to LC. §l9-5304?

YESC
whom?

If “yes”. to

26.

As

a result of your plea in this case, have you been advised that you may be required
party as a condition of your plea agreement?
pay restitution to any

(m

to

YESD

27.As a

result

of your plea

you be required

in this case, will

a

DNA

As

sample

to the state

and pay for any testing of

that

samplc? (LC. § 19-5506)

YESC

§ 19-5307)
a

rcsuh of your plea in this casc.

is

there

a

“yes‘L for

31.As

mandatory

how

Noy

driver‘s

YES:

suspension?
If

N00

a tesult of your plea in this case. do you understand that thc court can impose a
for a crime of violence of up to $5.000, payable to lhe victim of the crime? (LC.

m

30.As

NON

a result of your plca in this case, do you understand you will be required to submit

YES,
29.

W

pay the costs of

to

YESU

prosecution and investigation? (LC. § 37-2732(k))

As

NOﬁ

whom?

If “yes”, to

28.

NOX

license

NW

long mus! your license be suspended?

a result of your plea in this case.

is

there a mandatory domestic violence.

substance abuse. or psychoscxual evaluation“? (LC. §§ l8-9l8(7)(a),-8005(9),-83l7)

YEW

32.

Have you discussed with your

NOD

attorney the fact the Court will order a pre-sentence

investigation. psychoscxual evaluation. anger evaluation and/or domestic violence

evaluation
against

m

you

in

that anything

you say during any of those examinations may bc used

sentencing?

YESg

N00

33. Ilas your attorney explained the fact that you have a constitutional right lo remain
silent during any of those examinations but that you may give up that right and
voluntarily panicipate in those examinations?

34.

YEsy

NOD

Do you

understand that by pleading guilty to a felony. you run the risk that if you
have new felony charges in the future, you could be charged as a Persistent Violator?

(LC. § 19-2514)

Reardon Guilty Plea Form

YESQ

N0:
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Do you

you arc convicted as a Persistent Violator, the court in that
ncw case could sentence you lo an enhanced sentence which could include ﬁt:
imprisonment?
YES” NO:
3S.

As

understand that

if

a result of your plea in this case, will you be required lo register as a scx offender?

NOV

YESr

(LC. § 18-8304)

you answered "yes“

do you understand that if you are found guilty
you to register as a sex offender in the
future, you could bc charged in the new crime under LC. § 19-25200 requiring a
mandatory sentence of ﬁﬁeen (IS) years lo run consecutive to any other sentence
YESU NOD
imposed by the court?
If

to this question.

or plead guilty to another charge that requires

36.

Do you
in

understand that

if

you plead

guilty to a felony,

you

will lose

your right to vole

Idaho during the period of your sentence? (ID. COXST. art. 6, § 3)

NOC

YES
37.

Do you

understand that

if

you plead

guilty lo a felony.

you

will lose

public ofﬁce in Idaho during the period of your sentence?

(ID.

your right to hold

CONST.

art. 6,

§ 3)

NOC

YES?

38. [)0 you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony. you will lose your right to
perform jury service in Idaho during the period of your sentence? (ID. CONST. art. 6,

39.

40.

Do you

you plead guilty to a felony you
purchase. possess. 0r carry ﬁrearms? (LC. § 18-310)
understand that

Do you understand
in this

if

no one. including your

that

«mama, can

will lose

guilty freely

42.

Arc you pleading

guilty because

NO:

force you to plead guilty

and voluntarily?

Are you pleading

your right to

YESy

case?

4|.

you committed the acts alleged

YES?

NOC

YESﬁ

N00

in the

information or

NOD

YES“

indictment?

43. If

NOD

YES“

§ 3)

you were provided with an

interpreter to help

you

ﬁll out this form,

YESU

any trouble understanding your interpreter?

have you had

NOC NAV

44.llas any person (including a law enforcement ofﬁcer or police ofﬁce or your
attorney) threatened you or done anything to make you cnlcr this plea against your

YESC

will?

If

45.

your

answer

Other than

is

“yes,”

in the nlea

what

threats

have

been

made

and

agreement, has any person promised you

NOﬁ
by

that

whom?

you

will

receive any special sentence. reward. favorable treatment. or leniency with regard to the

plea you are about to enter?

Reardon Guilty Plea Form

YESC

N0“

Page 7 of 8
Revised IOIISIZOB

000240

If

46.

your answer

Do you

what

promises

understand that the only person

actually rcccivc
Ilas lhc

“yes,”

is

is

have

been

made and by whom?

who can promise what

the Judge?

Judge made any promises

lo

you?

47.

Arc you satisﬁed with your attorney?

48.

Have you answered

all

sentence you m‘ll

YESﬂ

NOD

YESD

NW

YEW NOE

questions on this Questionnaire truthfully and of your

YEW

frcc will?

you had any trouble answering any of the questions in
could no! work out bx discussing the issue with your attomex?

49. Ilave

this

own

NOI:

form which you

YESD

NOV

YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN 0F THE UNITED STATES,

do you understand
trigger
deponation or
this
making
admissions,
factual
by pleading guilty. or
removal proceedings. meaning that you face being removed from the United States
and returned to your country of origin, and the loss of your ability lo obtain legal

50. IF

ﬂ

that

status in lhc United States. or denial

of an application for United Slates citizenship?

Have you and xour attorney discussed

5|.

Do you swear under
true

YESU

N00 NA”

YESD

NO: NA;

these issues?

penalty of perjury that your answers to these questions are

NO

and correct?

have answered the questions on pages 1-8 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form truthfully.
understand all of the questions and answers herein. have discussed each question and answer
with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one
I

I

has threatened

Dated

mc

to

do

so.

this

hereby acknowledge that
with my client.
l

V Lu; y

I

have discussed.

in detail, the

foregoing questions and answers

f

.

(Z/Léééw

’DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

Reardon Guilty Plea Form

J/
Page 8 of 8
Revised 10/18/2013
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SETTLEMENT SHEET
l.

2.

Defendant

Frederick Jeremiah Jacobsen

Prior Record
.'

.\'

CROI-l8-15616

Case ﬂ

Fclonv

Misdemeanor

l

-:‘ [Saiks

Pcs-os (UT)
DUl-O‘) (UT)

"'

Pcs-o3

o7 (U'r). 17; Open Com-oo (UT)
Reckless-AIc/Drug Related-06 (UT)
Stolen Pr0p-07 (UT); lntoxication-W (UT)
(U'r),

Disorderly Cond-O7 (UT); DUl-07 (UT)
Fail to remain at acc~injury-07 (UT)

Trespass-07 (UT); False Statement-OS (UT)
Evidence-Destroying-08 (U'I')
Contrib Delinq Minor-09 (UT)
FTA-09 (UT); Unauth use of veh-l6 (UT)
Ignition interlock violation-l 5

FTA

3.

arrests:

Filed (fhargc/s: CI.

4. Offer:

PCS (FELONY, Methamphetamine)

I:

Amended

(Dawn; n

*

__X»_

S

(UT)

Plead

WHJ

7_X_ J/C

Ct.

to:

PCS (FELONY)

)

Dismiss:

years probation)

(

(

I:

by

_2

+

___ ACJ
commence at

__ﬂ_ Probation with

ACJ
Jail

to

=

5

7

)

§n_d State may argue for special probation tcrms (including in-custody jail classes).
time of sentencing in district court

options available. Restrictions on options,

if'

any:

__X_ Retained Jurisdiction

~_a

_X_:

Other casc(s)/charge(s) affected:
Special Terms:

NO INFO

ll

Frederick Jeremiah Jacobsen/CROI-lS-l5616

11F

PRIORS QUALIFY)

Court Copy

000242
1mm:

tom Rum:

,

X

Thc

State

may recommend any

ﬁne. driver's license suspension. no contact order, public defender reimbursement,

or other statutorily permitted sentencing terms

X

The

may

Statc

il

determines to be appropriate.

use as aggravating, factors as part of

its

sentencing argument

all facts

of all charged or dismissed

cases or counts and/or any crimcs/cascs not ﬁled.

_X_v _

Defendant

may recommend

_‘X_ Rcstitution/Pro

e

'

a lesser sentence.

Release Stipulations as part of this oITcr:

Defendant agrees lo pay restitution for all charged, uncharged, and dismissed conduct in this case or in any casc
dismissed by the terms ofthis offer in an amount to bc dctcrmincd or in the amount ofSTo Bc Determineg
Defendant additionally agrees to pay for all losscs referenced in DR #s: Provided in Discovcrv.
Defendant agrees lo pay drug restitution for costs of investigation and/or prosecution pursuant to LC. § 37-

_X_

.

_X_
_X_

2732(k)

in

an amount ofa $145 hourly

_Dcfcndam

agrees thal

enforcement Io the

_X_ Defendant

Coun

lo

all

bc applied to

Unless the plea

all

stipulates to the conﬁscation

pursuant lo LC. § 19-3807 and waives

X

rate.

sums of cash

is

all

currently held

for cvidcntiary purposes

ﬁnes, costs, and restitution

will

be released by law

in this case.

and police disposal of contraband or ﬁrearms possessed during

this

crime

notice and hearing requirements.

rcjcctcd or revoked, lhc Defendant gives

up any and

all

motions, defenses, or objections to the

Court's entry ofjudgmcnl and conviction that results from the Defendant‘s acceptance of this plea agreement.

5.

Bv accepting

State’s offer

is

this

agreement, the Defendant acknowledges and agrees to the following conditions outlined below. The

conditioned upon and shall bc revoked for failure to comely with the following:

X—

Defendam's prior criminal record being limited lo Ihc crimes set forth above in Section #2; and,
Defendant's
timely cooperation with thc prcscntence investigation process, including timely cooperation with any
__)_(_
evaluator the court orders aﬁer plca and prior to sentencing; and.
Defendant obtains all required evaluations ordered by lhc Court after plca and prior lo sentencing, including a
_
x

X_

waiver of‘any claimed privilege for lhc PSI and evaluation process; and,
Defendant's timely appearance for all funher court proceedings and court-ordered evaluations and/or investigations
K

X_

in

preparation for sentencing in this case; and,

X

Defendant not acquiring a ncw criminal charge or charges belwccn the date of this oﬁ‘er and sentencing, even

if

the

charge or charges are not yet conviction(s); and,
_UX A Defendant complies with conditions of pretrial release and bond and appears sober for sentencing; and.
Defendant further agrees that any victims associated with this case may make Victim Impact Statements
X
sentencing. including victims ofdismissed charges or charges no! ﬁled as

at

pan of this agreemcm.

Defendant does not meet ANY one or more of these conditions outlined above in Section #5, the State is not bound lo
thc sentencing recommendation as outlined above and the Slate is nol bound to an! of the terms as set forth on this
Offer Sheet as outlined above, which also means that the State ma! reinstate an! dismissed counts and seek the maximum
Qenalty allowed bx Idaho law and anv sentences imposed could be imposed consecutivclv as lo all of the counts.
lf the

make

6.

This offer

i.

ii.

iii.

is

AUTOMATICALLY REVOKED

ifanx onc or more

ol'

the following occurs:

Defendant rejects the offer by asserting his right to have the Stale conduct a preliminary hearing; and/or,
Defendant ﬁles a dispositivc motion in this case or any case included in the terms of the offer; and/or
Defendant pleads not guilty. stands silent, or has this case or any case included in the terms of Ihe oﬂ‘cr set
for trial in District Court.

Handling Prosecutor:
.—

()ﬁ‘er relayed to

::

Defendant rejects offer

J.

Dated 04/ 18/2018

Matthew Haynes

Defendant

Frederick Jeremiah Jacobsen/CROl-l8-15616

Court Copy

000243
rum.

Rum:

m

L)

:c..~

Debra Groberg (lSBf! 9797)

NEVIN. BENJAMIN.

MCKAY &

BAR’I‘LE'FI' LLI’

Filed: 12/04/2018
11:14:53
11/30/18 at 5pm
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

303 Wcsl Bannock
P.(). Box 2772
8370!

Boise. Idaho

telephone (208) 343- 000
l

facsimile (208) 345-8274

dgrobcrngTnbmlawxom
Attorneys

l‘or

Defendant

IN Tl

lli

DIS'I‘RIC’I‘ (.‘OUR'I'

THE
S'I‘A'l‘li ()l’

FOR

S'I‘ATI‘I OI" ll)/\| IO.

IN

'l'l

lli

AND

IDA] l0.

I’OUR
I‘OR

I'll

DIS‘I'RICI'

Jl ‘l)l('|.'\|.

l‘l ll-i

C‘()lI\ I'Y

()l-

()I-

ADA

J

)

J

Plaintiff.

(‘ASLi

)

N0.

(.‘ROl-l8~ 561 6
l

)

\‘S.

)

FOR Rl‘LI“.
CONDITIONAL (£l'll.’l'\"
AGRICICMI‘ZN'I‘

)

l-‘RliDL-‘RICK

JACOBSl-ZN.

ll

l’I.I-‘,.-\

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

Pursuant to Rule

l

l(a)(2)

oflhc Idaho

(.‘riminul Rules. lhc parties

agreement which contemplates the cnlry ol'a conditional guilty plea
possession ofa controlled substance. Idaho (“ode § 37-2732(c)(

|

lo

Supprcss

allowed to withdraw his

The

|-’.\'idcncc. If

guilt)“ plcu.

l‘hc

Rulc

I

is

recommend

this

L Pursuant lo discussions. thc

l(t‘)(

chmhcr 5.

”(13). lhal thc State “ill

total

Court rcluilyiurisdiclion and scnlcncc

0 AGRI-Il-IMl-ZN’I‘ l-‘OR Rl,'l.l{ ll

felony.

2W8.

\x ill

hc

contingent m1 lhc ('nurl's approval.

sentence of two years ﬁxed and ﬁve years indeterminate. for a
will further

l:

Mr. Jacobson prcxuils un appeal. hc

agrccmcnl

parties further agree. pursuant lo

Count

to

panics agree that Mr. Jacobscn ma) appeal the ("uurl‘s ()rdcr. cnlcrcd

denying his Motion

have reached 2m

recommend

ofscx cn years.

\1r.

Jacobson

'I'hc

u

Stulc

In u ridcr

CONDI‘I'IOKAI (H'llfl‘Y PLEA

000244

program through lhc Idaho Department
Stale will not

'l‘hc

recommend

Slate‘s

a

ol'l’er is

()I‘C‘orrcction. l‘hc

Dcfcnsc

may

argue for

will only rcqucsl restitution for lhc costs ol‘ lab testing.

ﬁne and

conditioned upon Mr. Jacobscn's cooperation wilh lhc prcscntcncc

investigation process and any court orders aﬁcr plea und prior lo sentencing.

further conditioned

less. 'l‘hc

on Mr. Jacobsen acquiring no new criminal charges

'l‘hc ul'l'cr is

after plea

and prior

1n

sentencing. and complying with conditions ol‘prclrial release and bond. Mr. Jacobscn must

also appear sober

l‘ur

DATED this

sentencing.

ﬂ

2m s.

day or November.

M?VN. BENJAMIN. M(‘KAY & BARTLETT
I

'1

/

V/

I

I

I'
.

DebraGro

ADA

,
rg.

Z/

ZMWF

Amorm‘)

r,
’

for

chfcnd-

2

0

m

COLrN'I‘Y PROSIx‘mdQ‘Ig‘sImrl-‘IC'F.

«2/411 ur/Z‘t
/+m~/

l.l.l’

[\x

David Hunt Ikbu'lg'rﬁmscculing Minnie)

AGREEMENT FOR RULE H CONDITIONAL GUILTY

l’Ll-iA
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Filed: 12/04/2018
11/30/18 at11:22:21
5pm
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth
IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ADA

ORDER FOR PRESENTENCE REPORT AND EVALUATIONS
STATE 0F IDAHO

Case No:

Ckm

)‘o’

lgb’L

‘

Plaintiff,

vs

PUD

crimes“):

T

?LAH‘HK

,3

Wk‘aéﬁ

(Last)

(Ml)

(First)

Investigation Report

_ROA: P§IO1~ Orderfor Presentenge

“'50 - ‘Y

On

a Pre-sentence Investigation Report

by the Honorable Michael Reardon to be completed for

ls.

D

All

‘

\IA

at

D

Mental Health Examination only waived

on:

P

Behavioral Health Assessments waived by the Court (P8101

D

D
D
D

BID‘NAM: 19W

Coun appearance

was ordered

ROA code)

Substance Use Disorder Assessment only waived

Waiver under IC 19-2524(2)(e) allowing assessment and treatrkezt services by the same person or facility
County
Request for copy of PSI from
Updated PSI
A.
File

Revuew

c.

KD‘ lg

b1555-

7

Other no::§ 19-2524 evaluationshx‘mlnations oédorodV f6: use with the PSI:

D Sex Offender D Domestic Violence D Other:
__,,

Evaluator:

é

,

.

,

PLEA AGREEMENT:

,1

State recommendation

w WHJI@ D Probation C] PD Relmb. D Fine D ACJ D Restitution momer
01 T §
DEFENSE COUNSEL.
bL¥crLJ7 (7‘: t r63

3R

‘

A

V Y.

-

Km)

PROSECUTORTHE DEFENDANT

IS IN

CUSTODY:

DO YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER?
Area of emphasis

Date:

to

“'50 1{

PSI

\Js

mu)

U YES
D YES

ﬂ
ﬂ

NO
NO

Ifso.
If

yes.

where?

what

is

the language?

writer:

Signature:

Jud

eardon

000246

Filed: December 27, 2018 at 2:46 PM.
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Beth Masters Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Ada
State of Idaho

Case No. CR01-18-15616

Plaintiff,

Notice of Continued Sentencing Hearing

vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN
Defendant.
NOTICE IS GIVEN That sentencing in the above-entitled case has been continued to:
Date
February 01, 2019

Time
01:00 PM

Judge
Michael J. Reardon
(District)

at the: Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise ID 83702
All parties and counsel are required to be present.
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the Court
Dated: December 27, 2018

By:

Beth Masters
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date I served a copy of the attached to:
David Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
Debra Groberg
Attorney for the Defendant
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
Frederick Jeremiah Jacobsen
4504 W Quail Ridge Drive
Boise ID 83703

Dated: December 27, 2018

%

NOTICE OF CONTINUED SENTENCING HEARING

By: Beth Masters
Deputy Clerk

1

M-CR (NO34)

000247

Description

|WILLIAMSON FOR REARDON / MASTERS / MADSEN

1

FEBRUARY

2019
Location 1A-CRT508

Date |2/1/2019

Time

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CRO]

PM
01:02:20 PM
01:02:16

01 :04z26

Note

Speaker

01:02:10PM

01:03:31

|

PM
PM

Present:

Groberg

Court

Dave Hunt

He was just

for the State,

18 15616

SENTENCING

Debra Groberg

for the defense

sentenced t0 a rider in another couIT so

we need t0

continue this to do a transport order.

Find out Where he

is

for sure

and d0 a transport order. 02/08/19

@

1pm
End 0f case

Produced by FTR GoldTM
www.fortherecord.com
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Filed: 02/01/2019 17:01:44
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO.

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN

Case

State of Idaho

No. CR01-18—15616

{

Plaintiff.
l

V5

‘i

Order to Transport from
Department of Correction

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN.
#131229
Defendant.

_DQ§

06/21/1984__

The Defendant
that

is in

the custody of the Idaho Board of Corrections. and

Defendant be brought before

this

said time

@

Date
02/08/2019

Sheriff shall bring the

and on said

is

necessary

Court on:

Hearing Tygg
Sentencing

The Ada County

it

Ti

e

O1 :00

Defendam from

(he peni‘entiary

PM

m me court a‘

date;

Immediately following the court appearance the Sheriff

will

return the Defendant to the

custody of the Idaho State Penitentiary;

The Idaho State

Penitentiary shall release the Defendant for the purpose of the court

hearing.

The Clerk
forthwith

IT IS

and

of this Court shall serve a
certify to

copy hereof upon the Idaho State Penitentiary

the same.

SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL REARDON
District

Judge

ORDER TO TRANSPORT FROM DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

1

D—CR (OR21) 56 14

000249

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I

cenify that

on February

01, 2019.

I

served a copy of the attached

Debra Groberg

IDOC - Central Records

Attorney for Defendant

begurdyggdocjdahogov

to:

dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
David Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

ac °°°und

adaweb'm‘

ACJ — Transport
$04785@adaweb.net
dcollins@adaweb.net

PHIL

McGRANE

Clerk of the Court

By:

Deputy Clefk Signed: 2/1/2019 05:01 PM

ORDER TO TRANSPORT FROM DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
D-CR (0R21) 5 6

14

000250

Description

REARDON / MASTERS MADSEN 8 FEBRUARY 2019
/

Location 1A-

Date 2/8/2019

CRT508

Time

Note

Speaker

01:03:58

PM

FREDERICK JACOBSEN CR01

01:04:14

PM

Present:

Dave Hunt

for the State,

18 15616

SENTENCING

Debra Groberg

for the defense,

defendant in custody

PM
01:06:23 PM
01:06:36 PM
01:07:36 PM
01:08:31 PM
01:08:41 PM
01:04:46

Court

Reviews case

Counsel

Have reviewed

Groberg

Re

Court

Make

Defendant

I've

Counsel

N0

PSI.

errors in PSI.

note 0f those 0n an errata sheet.

reviewed the PSI.
objections t0 anything included in PSI; no additional

investigation/eval needed.

01:08:53

PM

PM
01:09:04 PM
01:11:30 PM
01:11:42 PM
01:17:07 PM
01:17:44 PM
01:17:53 PM
01:09:00

Hunt

$100

Groberg

N0

Hunt

Recommend JJOC

Groberg

Underlying in

Groberg

Recommend

restitution.

objection

Counsel

N0

legal cause

Find defendant
ﬁrst 365d.
restitution.

PM

2

+

5 with a rider.

Barton's case

+

2

+

5.

own behalf.

why judgment
is

is

3 with a concurrent rider.

Defendant Addresses the Court on his

Court

01:20:14

J.

2

can‘t

guilty of PCS.

Recommend CBISA
Appeal

be entered.

JOC

5

=2+

3, retain jursidiction for

program. Court costs. $100

rights.

End of case

Produced by FTR GoldTM
www.fortherecord.com

000251

Filed: 02/11/2019 09:01:14
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Brizendine, Tresa

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
David M. Hunt
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 8970
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax:
(208)-287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-18-15616
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AND
JUDGMENT

8th of February, 2019
WHEREAS, on the __________________________________,
a Judgment of Conviction
was entered against the defendant, FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN, and therefore pursuant
to Idaho Code §37-2732(k) the defendant, FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN, shall make
restitution to the law enforcement agency(ies) in the amount of $100.00, as follows:
RESTITUTION – LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
DRUG ENFORCEMENT DONATION ACCOUNT
TOTAL:

$100.00
$100.00

ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AND JUDGMENT (CR01-18-15616), Page 1

000252

Post judgment interest on said restitution amount will accrue from the date of this Order
and Judgment at the rate specified in Idaho Code §28-22-104.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED

Signed: 2/8/2019 03:53 PM

Judge

ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AND JUDGMENT (CR01-18-15616), Page 2

000253

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 2/11/2019 09:01 AM
I hereby certify that on ___________________,
I served the foregoing document upon

the following attorneys, persons and agencies at the addresses listed below.
Debra Anne Groberg
PO Box 2772
Boise ID 83701
David M. Hunt
200 W. Front St. Rm 3191
Boise, ID 83702

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Email
dgroberg@nbmlaw.com
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Email
acpocourtdocs@adacounty.id.gov

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Ada County Clerk of the Court

_____________________________
Deputy Clerk

ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AND JUDGMENT (CR01-18-15616), Page 3
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Filed: 02/14/2019 08:56:54
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sims-Douglas, Linda
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CR01-18-15616

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND
ORDER OF RETAINED JURISDICTION

Defendant.

On the 8th day of February, 2019, before the Honorable Michael Reardon, District Judge,
personally appeared David Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, State of
Idaho, and the Defendant with his attorney, Debra Groberg, this being the time fixed for
pronouncing judgment in this matter.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant has been convicted upon a plea of guilty to the
offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, FELONY, I.C. §37-2732(c) of
the Information; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
having been shown or appearing to the Court;
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that
the offense for which the Defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed on or about April
1, 2018.
1

000255

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the Defendant is sentenced pursuant to Idaho Code
§19-2513 to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by
said Board in a suitable place for a period of time as follows:
For a minimum fixed and determinate period of confinement of two (2) years; such fixed
minimum period shall thereafter be followed by an indeterminate period of custody of up to three
(3) years, for a total term not to exceed five (5) years.
The Court retains jurisdiction up to 365 days under Idaho Code §19-2601(4). The
Court specifically recommends the Cognitive Behavioral Interventions for Substance
Abuse (“CBISA”) program while incarcerated. After case completion, Defendant may be
returned to the Ada County Jail for Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be committed to the custody of the
Sheriff of Ada County, Idaho, for delivery forthwith to the custody of the Idaho State Board of
Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other facility within the state designated by the State
Board of Correction.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §18-309, the Defendant shall be given credit for the time already
served upon the charge specified herein of five (5) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of
one hundred dollars ($100.00); and shall remit court costs of seventeen and 50/100 dollars
($17.50); Criminal Justice Fee of ten dollars ($10.00); P.O.S.T. Fee of fifteen dollars ($15.00);
Victim Notification Fee (VINE), pursuant to I.C. §31-3204, in the amount of fifteen dollars
($15.00); Court Technology Fee of ten dollars ($10.00); Peace Officer Temporary Disability Fee of
three dollars ($3.00); Victim's Compensation Fund in the amount of seventy-five dollars ($75.00);
Drug Hotline Fee, pursuant to I.C. §37-2735A, in the amount of ten dollars ($10.00); Domestic
2

000256

Violence Fee of thirty dollars ($30.00); and Emergency Surcharge Fee of one hundred dollars
($100.00).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall submit a DNA sample and
thumbprint impression to the State of Idaho database, as required under Idaho law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this Judgment and
Commitment to the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the Defendant.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have the right to appeal this order to the
Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two (42) days of the
entry of the written order in this matter.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal,
you have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for the appointment
of counsel at public expense. If you have questions concerning your right to appeal, you should
consult your present lawyer.
Done in open Court this 8th day of February, 2019.

Signed: 2/12/2019 11:37 AM

__________________________________________
MICHAEL REARDON
District Judge

3

000257

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I

true

HEREBY CERTIFY

that

0n

this

14th

and correct copy 0f the within instrument

day 0f February, 2019,

I

emailed (served) a

t0:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
VIA

— EMAIL

DEBRA GROBERG
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
VIA

— EMAIL

d rober

nbmlaw.com

ADA COUNTY JAIL
VIA

— EMAIL

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
VIA

7 EMAIL

CCD SENTENCING TEAM
VIA

— EMAIL

PROBATION & PAROLE-PSI DEPARTMENT
VIA
EMAIL

7

PHIL

MCGRANE

Clerk of the District Court

Signed: 2/14/2019 08:57 AM

Deputy Court Clerk

000258

Electronically Filed

3/20/2019 8:56 AM
Fourth Judicial District,

Ada County
McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk
Phil

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP

303 West Bannock
P.O.

Box 2772

Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

nbmlaw.com

d rober

Attorneys for the Defendant-Appellant

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

CASE NO. CRO 1 - 1 8— 1 5 6 1 6

)

vs.

)
)

FREDERICK JACOBSEN,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS
ATTORNEYS, THE ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT
TO:

REPORTERS:
1.

State

Appellant Frederick Jeremiah Jacobsen appeals against the above-named Respondent

of Idaho t0 the Idaho Supreme Court from Judgment of Conviction and Commitment

entered 0n February 14, 2019,

by the Honorable Michael Reardon,

District

Judge of the Fourth

Judicial District (attached).

2.

Mr. Jacobsen has a right t0 appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment

described in paragraph

1,

above,

is

appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule

11(c)(1).

NOTICE OF APPEAL

- 1

000259

3. A preliminary statement of the issue Appellant intends to assert in the appeal is: Did
the district court err in denying the Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(3) Motion to Suppress? The issue
is preserved for appeal through the entry of a I.C.R. 11(a)(2) conditional plea. Any list of
issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.
4. A presentence report was prepared in this case, which was sealed pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 32.
5. The Appellant requests the standard preparation of the following transcripts:
•
•

Preliminary Hearing: June 12, 2018
o Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Motion Hearing: September 27, 2018
o Court Reporter: Kim Madsen

6. Mr. Jacobsen requests the standard record under I.A.R. 28. In addition, he requests
the following documents:
a. All memorandums, stipulations of lodging, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, and
decisions.
b. All exhibits admitted or offered at any motion hearing or the preliminary
hearing.
7. I certify:
a. That service has been made upon the court reporter and all parties required
to be served pursuant to I.A.R. 20 and the Attorney General of Idaho
pursuant to ' 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.
b. That Mr. Jacobsen is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the reporter’s transcript because he is indigent pursuant to
Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A.
c. That Mr. Jacobsen is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because he is indigent pursuant to Idaho Code §§
31-3220, 31-3220A.
d. That Mr. Jacobsen is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee pursuant to
I.A.R. Rule 23(a)(8) as there is no fee for an appeal in a criminal case.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

000260

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 2019.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
/s/ Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

000261

CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE
hereby certify that on this 20th day of March, 2019, I electronically ﬁled the foregoing
with the Clerk 0f the Court using the iCourt e-ﬁle system, which caused the following parties
I

or counsel to be served

by

electronic means:

Ada County Prosecutor
acpocouﬂdochDadacountv.id.gov
Idaho Attorney General
ecf@ag.idaho. gov

Kim Madsen, Court Reporter
kmadsen@adacountv.id.gov
transcripts@adacountv.id.g0v

Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg
/s/

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-

4
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Filed: 02/14/2019 08:56:54
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sims-Douglas, Linda
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CR01-18-15616

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND
ORDER OF RETAINED JURISDICTION

Defendant.

On the 8th day of February, 2019, before the Honorable Michael Reardon, District Judge,
personally appeared David Hunt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, State of
Idaho, and the Defendant with his attorney, Debra Groberg, this being the time fixed for
pronouncing judgment in this matter.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant has been convicted upon a plea of guilty to the
offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, FELONY, I.C. §37-2732(c) of
the Information; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
having been shown or appearing to the Court;
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that
the offense for which the Defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed on or about April
1, 2018.
1

000263

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the Defendant is sentenced pursuant to Idaho Code
§19-2513 to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by
said Board in a suitable place for a period of time as follows:
For a minimum fixed and determinate period of confinement of two (2) years; such fixed
minimum period shall thereafter be followed by an indeterminate period of custody of up to three
(3) years, for a total term not to exceed five (5) years.
The Court retains jurisdiction up to 365 days under Idaho Code §19-2601(4). The
Court specifically recommends the Cognitive Behavioral Interventions for Substance
Abuse (“CBISA”) program while incarcerated. After case completion, Defendant may be
returned to the Ada County Jail for Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be committed to the custody of the
Sheriff of Ada County, Idaho, for delivery forthwith to the custody of the Idaho State Board of
Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other facility within the state designated by the State
Board of Correction.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §18-309, the Defendant shall be given credit for the time already
served upon the charge specified herein of five (5) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of
one hundred dollars ($100.00); and shall remit court costs of seventeen and 50/100 dollars
($17.50); Criminal Justice Fee of ten dollars ($10.00); P.O.S.T. Fee of fifteen dollars ($15.00);
Victim Notification Fee (VINE), pursuant to I.C. §31-3204, in the amount of fifteen dollars
($15.00); Court Technology Fee of ten dollars ($10.00); Peace Officer Temporary Disability Fee of
three dollars ($3.00); Victim's Compensation Fund in the amount of seventy-five dollars ($75.00);
Drug Hotline Fee, pursuant to I.C. §37-2735A, in the amount of ten dollars ($10.00); Domestic
2
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Violence Fee of thirty dollars ($30.00); and Emergency Surcharge Fee of one hundred dollars
($100.00).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall submit a DNA sample and
thumbprint impression to the State of Idaho database, as required under Idaho law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this Judgment and
Commitment to the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the Defendant.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have the right to appeal this order to the
Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two (42) days of the
entry of the written order in this matter.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal,
you have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for the appointment
of counsel at public expense. If you have questions concerning your right to appeal, you should
consult your present lawyer.
Done in open Court this 8th day of February, 2019.

Signed: 2/12/2019 11:37 AM

ML

__________________________________________
MICHAEL REARDON
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I

true

HEREBY CERTIFY

that

0n

this

14th day

and correct copy 0f the within
Within instrument

0f February, 2019,

I

emailed (served) a

t0:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
VIA

— EMAIL

DEBRA GROBERG
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
VIA

— EMAIL

d rober

nbmlaw.com
nbmlaw.c0m

ADA COUNTY JAIL
VIA

— EMAIL

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
VIA

7 EMAIL
—

CCD SENTENCING TEAM
VIA

— EMAIL

PROBATION & PAROLE-PSI DEPARTMENT
VIA
EMAIL

7
—

PHIL

McGRANE
MCGRANE

_

of the District Court
Clerk 0f

Signed: 2/14/2019 08:57 AM

Deputy Court Clerk

000266

Electronically Filed

3/20/2019 8:56 AM
Fourth Judicial District,

Ada County
McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Leslie Sanchez, Deputy Clerk
Phil

Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP

303 West Bannock
P.O.

Box 2772

Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

d rober

nbmlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant-Appellant

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

IN

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

CASE NO. CRO 1 - 1 8- 1 5 6 1 6

)
)

VS.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

)

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

)

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Frederick Jeremiah Jacobsen, through his attorney of record, Debra Groberg, hereby

moves

this

Court for

its

order, pursuant to Idaho

Code

§ 19-867, appointing the State Appellate

Public Defender’s Ofﬁce to represent the Appellant in

motion

is

all

further appellate proceedings. This

brought on the grounds that the State Appellate Public Defender

statute t0 represent the appellant in all felony appellate

ofjustice for

them t0 d0 so

in this case

proceedings and

because Mr. Jacobsen

is

it is

is

authorized

by

within the interest

indigent.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 2019.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,
/s/

McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

— 1

000267

CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE
hereby certify that on this 20th day of March, 2019, I electronically ﬁled the foregoing
with the Clerk 0f the Court using the iCourt e-ﬁle system, which caused the following parties
I

or counsel to be served

by

electronic means:

Ada County Prosecutor
acpocouﬁdocs@adaweb.net

Debra Groberg
Debra Groberg
/s/

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

—

2
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Debra Groberg (ISB#9797)

NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Filed: 03/25/2019 10:58:40
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

303 West Bannock
P.O.

Box 2772

Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone: (208) 343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274

d rober

nbmlaw.com

Attorneys for the Defendant-Appellant

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

CASE NO. CRO 1 - 1 8— 1 5 6 1 6

)

vs.

)

FREDERICK JACOBSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF

)

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC

)

DEFENDER

)
)

Pursuant t0 Defendant-Appellant’s Motion for Appointment 0f State Appellate Public
Defender, the Court having reviewed the pleadings 0n ﬁle and the motion, and good cause
appearing;

IT IS
Bartlett

LLP,

HEREBY ORDERED
are

that

Debra Groberg and Nevin, Benjamin,

McKay

&

withdrawn as counsel 0f record for the Defendant-Appellant and the State

Appellate Public Defender

is

hereby appointed t0 represent the Defendant-Appellant, Frederick

Jeremiah Jacobsen, in the above entitled matter for appellate purposes.

DATED:

Signed: 3/21/2019 11:33 AM

Honorable Michael Reardon

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER —

1

000269

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th

electronic

means

day 0f March, 2019,

I

served the foregoing by

to the following parties or counsel:

Ada County Prosecutor
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

SAPD
documents@sapd.state.id.us

Debra Groberg
nbmlaw.com
d ober
dpresher@nbmlaw.com

Deputy

Clerk 0f Court

Signed: 3/25/2019 10:58 AM

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER — 2
000270

TO:

Filed: 04/11/2019 07:22:03
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
83720
Boise, Idaho

(

(

SC No.

46886-2019

(

(

(

STATE

(

VS.

(

(

(

Jacobsen

CORRECTED NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
given that on April lO, 2019 I
transcript of 108 pages in length in the
appeal with the District Court Clerk of the
the 4th Judicial

12

Notice is hereby
lodged an appeal
above—referenced
County of Ada in
District

l3

This transcript contains hearings held on

lO
ll

l4

...... September 27,

2018, Motion to Suppress

l5
l6
l7

l8

l9

20
21

/s/

KIM I. MADSEN
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 287—7583

22

23
24

25

000271

Electronically Filed
4/1

9/2019 5:47

Fourth Judicial
Phil

PM
District,

McGrane, Clerk

By: Jennifer Keyes,

Ada County

of the Court

Deputy Clerk

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public
I.S.B.

Defender

#6555

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit

#6247
322 E. Front

I.S.B.

Street, Suite

570

Boise, Idaho 83702

Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E—mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

CASE NO. CR01-18-15616

)
)

V.

S.C.

)
)

FREDERICK JEREMIAH JACOBSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO.

46886—2019

)

AMENDED

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE
TO:
PARTY’S ATTORNEYS, JAN M. BENNETT’S, ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR,
BOISE, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named

WW.

appellant, Frederick Jeremiah Jacobsen, appeals against the

above-named respondent Idaho Supreme Court

ﬁom

the

Judgment of Conviction and

Gemmi’ement Order 0f Retained Jurisdiction entered February
Michael
2.

J.

Reardon, presiding

14,

2019, the Honorable

That the party has a right to appeal t0 the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments

0r orders described in paragraph

1

above are

i_s

appealable orders under and pursuant to

Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 11(c)(1-2).

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

-

Page

1

000272

3.

A preliminary statement

0f the issues on appeal, Which the appellant then intends

t0 assert in the appeal, but not limited t0. the following

appeal shall not prevent the appellant

(a)

t0 Suppress?

(b)

ﬁom asserting other issues

W

Did the

district court err in

Did the

district

provided anV such

list

on appeal,

of issues 0n

is/are:

denying the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(3) Motion

court abuse

its

discretion

bV imposing an excessive

sentence?

4.

sealed

5.

There
is

is

a portion 0f the record that

sealed. That portion

is

of the record

that

is

the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI).

The appellant requests the preparation 0f

Reporter’s Transcript.

reporter’s standard transcript as

deﬁned

The appellant

in I.A.R. 25(d).

the entire

also requests the

preparation of the additional portions 0f the reporter’s transcript:

(a)

(b)

Motion

Kim Madsen,
(c)

t0 Suppress

Hearing held on September 27, 2018 (Court Reporter:

no estimation 0f pages

listed

on the Register of Actions);

Change 0f Plea Hearing held on November

Madsen, n0 estimation of pages
(d)

is

is

listed

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

-

is listed

Page 2

2018 (Court Reporter:

Kim

0n the Register 0f Actions); and

Sentencing Hearing held 0n February

Madsen, no estimation ofpages

30,

8,

2019 (Court Reporter:

Kim

on the Register 0f Actions).

000273

6.

The appellant requests

Clerk’s Record.

I.A.R. 28(b)(2).

The appellant requests

the standard Clerk’s record pursuant t0

the following

documents

clerk’s record, in addition t0 those automatically included

to

be included in the

under I.A.R. 28(b)(2).

Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel ﬁled April 26, 2018;

Stipulation t0 Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing ﬁled

Afﬁdavit ofE. Flores ﬁled

Warrant/Det Order ﬁled

May

Mav

Stipulation t0 Continue ﬁled

11,

11,

MaV

May 2,

2018;

2018;

2018;
15.

2018;

Exhibit List/Log ﬁled June 12, 2018;

Transcript Filed

Memorandum

(i)

-

in

State’s Obiection

Preliminary Hearing 06/12/18 ﬁled June 27, 2018;

Support 0f Motion t0 Suppress Evidence ﬁled August 10,

and

Memorandum in Response

to Defendant’s

Motion

t0

Suppress ﬁled September 14, 2018;

(j)

Stipulation

(k)

Amended

of Lodging ﬁled September

18,

2018;

Stipulation 0f Lodging ﬁled September 21, 2018;

Exhibit List/Log (Suppression Hearing) ﬁled September 27, 2018;

Memorandum in

(n)

Support of Motion t0 Suppress Evidence

Closing Arguments

Memorandum

in

filed

October

19,

Support 0f Motion to Suppress

Evidence ﬁled October 22, 2018;

(0)

Warrant/Det Issued ﬁled October 29, 2018;

(p)

Guilty Plea Advisorv

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Form ﬁled November

-

Page 3

30, 2018;

000274

(q)

Rule 11 Plea Agreement ﬁled November 30, 2018;

(r)

A11

Memorandums,

stipulations

0f lodging, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement,

and decisions;

(s)

A11 Exhibits Admitted

01'

Offered

at

any Motion Hearing 0r the Preliminary

Hearing.

(t)

Any

statements,

exhibits, including but not limited t0 the PSI, letters 0r Victim

addendums

the

t0

PSI

or

other

items

offered

at

impact

sentencing

hearing. Except that any pictures or depictions of child pornography necessary t0

the appeal need not be sent, but

may be sought later by motion to the Idaho Supreme

w.
7.

I

certify:

(a)

That a copy ofthis

Reporter,

(b)

Amended Notice oprpeal has been served 0n the Court

Kim Madsen;

That the appellant

is

exempt from paying the estimated

preparation 0f the record because the appellant

is

fee

for the

indigent. (LC. §§ 31-3220, 31-

3220A, I.A.R. 27m);
(c)

That there

is

no appellate ﬁling fee since

this is

an appeal

in a criminal case

(LC. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 23(a)(8));
(d)

Gede That arrangements have been made With Cassia County Who
responsible for paving for the reporter’s transcript, as the client

is

will

be

indigent, (LC. §§

31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24ghn; and

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

-

Page 4
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That service has been made upon

(e)

t0

all

parties required t0 be served pursuant

I.A.R 20.

DATED this

19th

day of April, 2019.

/s/

Erik R. Lehtinen

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

correct

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy of the foregoing

that

on

this 19th

day 0f

April, 2019,

I

caused a true and

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, t0 be served as follows:

KIM MADSEN
COURT REPORTER
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702

STATEHOUSE MAIL

KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/

Mary Ann Lara

MARY ANN LARA
Administrative Assistant

ERL/mal

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

-

Page 5

000276

TO:

Filed: 05/08/2019 12:28:01
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
83720
Boise, Idaho

(

(

SC No.

46886-2019

(

(

(

STATE

(

VS.

(

(

(

Jacobsen

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

12

Notice is hereby
lodged an appeal
above—referenced
County of Ada in
District

l3

This transcript contains hearings held on

lO
ll

given that on May 7, 2019 I
transcript of 29 pages in length in the
appeal with the District Court Clerk of the
the 4th Judicial

l4

...... November 30,

2018,

Entry of Plea.

l5

...... February 8,

2019,

Sentencing

l6
l7

l8

l9

20
21
22

/s/

KIM I. MADSEN
Ada County Courthouse
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 287—7583

23
24

25
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